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The Aesthetics of Politics and the Politics  
of Aesthetics In and After Cavell 
EDITORIAL COMMENT 
Politics seems bound up with questions of the ordinary and everyday as opposed to 
the extraordinary. This may be a Cavellian way of articulating the problem of political 
praxis, i.e., the point at which theory becomes action, but notice, at least in Cavell-
speak, which way the trajectory flows. The Wittgensteinian charge to bring language 
back from holiday could be construed as a search for political or real-world praxis but 
not at the point where theory becomes action, but where theory is, in a sense, forgone 
or put on hiatus for the sake of action. 
Yet how to prescribe such a hiatus or forgoing, say, theoretically? The banal 
charge to “simply do,” or to say, “this is simply what I do,” seems not much better. 
These essays wrestle with such issues. We have gathered them here, for the sake of 
coherence, under the thematic moniker of “politics,” as our call for papers explicitly 
solicited explorations of Cavell and the Aesthetization of Politics. The contributions, 
nonetheless, are broad and eclectic and address politics and praxis from a number of 
angles. 
The first three explore the pedagogical take-aways of Stanley’s writings on 
education. Jeff Frank stresses the importance not of teaching students to remain in-
quisitive about subjects considered “foregone” (i.e., why is there inequality in the 
world?) but of teaching teachers to teach students to remain inquisitive—to have tea-
chers face, in a sense, the crisis of skepticism bred not only by the existence of injusti-
ce in the world, but the hollowness of language. To Frank, “an educator welcomes the 
moment [of crisis] as an opportunity to grow: to make the school—and our society—
more humane, more educative, more just.” 
Derek Gottlieb further explores scenes of instruction, or, rather, post-scenes of 
instruction, i.e., the moment after spades are turned and bedrock is hit. If incom-
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prehensibility follows, Gottlieb reminds us, something has happened, been revealed, 
even if the moment fails. That action must follow because we have reached the limits 
of language or the ineptness of intellection denies this knowledge. Political action be-
gins with or from a sense of crisis, and this Cavellian revelation is not a bulwark or 
inhibitor to political action but a useful precursor—indicative, in other words, of Ran-
ciere’s “active intervention” and patager.  
Jon Najarian equally forcefully extends the idea that Cavell’s philosophy is not 
solely interested in ideas of aesthetics, eschewing politics; rather, Cavell seeks to do 
what Benjamin did from the other way around. Rather than politicizing aesthetics by 
articulating one’s politics first, Cavell seeks instead to understand the nature of 
aesthetic experiences and judgments as a basis for understanding how politics hap-
pens.   
Rastislav Dinić, who is making headway as a scholar isolating Cavellian the-
mes in the films of Dušan Makavejev, adds a socialist tint to Cavellian praxis; that 
such a tint exists in Cavell’s writings may indeed be apparent, if not readily or easily 
articulated. The same could be said of Heidegger, and the intersection of Cavell, Hei-
degger, and Cavell’s famous pupil protégé Terence Malick is touched upon in a brief 
excursus by Babak Geranfar. 
We are also delighted to run an excerpt of Larry Jackson’s illuminating secon-
dary treatment of Cavell’s oeuvre. The first of seven chapters follows here, along with 
a review essay of the entire work.  
We wind down with some poetry by Larry Rhu, a dear friend of the journal 
whose eye and ear for language, Cavellian and otherwise, lucidly puts forward themes 
of American exceptionalism gone awry or spent, hence of philosophical promise was-
ted; dreams of a grandfather and a Heideggerian “thrownness”—into the autobody of 
a car or mind, or onto the American West—remain. Lastly, Richard Eldridge shares 
some of his meditations on the Cavellian valences of so-called “character criticism” in 
Shakespeare studies. To deny that Shakespeare’s characters can be read as actual 
human beings (via “impressionistic encounters”) necessitates forgoing a plenitude of 
significance latent in human speech. If we cannot exactly say that Shakespeare’s tra-
gic characters are human beings, the dramatist’s chief power is to capture the breadth 
and scope of a form of life, not exactly biological, but in a way, organic. 
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A last(ing) note on Stanley Bates passing on December 10. In the saying of Vic-
tor Nuovo, his colleague at Middlebury College,  
Stanley was a philosopher not only by profession, but in the whole of his being: 
his mind was open and tirelessly curious, never dogmatic, always careful in 
forming his opinions, always ready to revise them, and he was relentless in the 
search for truth. 
About his work we can write the same as he wrote on Cavell’s: his “works on [...] vari-
ous-seeming topics possess a deep unity—one might say the unity of a life.”  We find a 1
deep agreement of principle between these philosophers in a well-known passage 
from Thoreau’s Walden, an inspiration to both Stanleys: “There are nowadays profes-
sors of philosophy, but not philosophers. Yet it is admirable to profess because it was 
once admirable to live.”  To live one’s philosophy is something Bates embraced. Such 2
sentiment still inspires readers and contributors in the conversations of this journal, 
a project Bates was enthusiastic about. He did not hesitate, for example, to accept our 
invitation to sit on our inaugural Advisory Board; Conversations continues to be gui-
ded by his spirit and generosity. 
With all best wishes, 
SÉRGIO AND AMIR	
$ . Stanley Bates, “Stanley Cavell and Ethics,” in Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Eldridge (Cambridge: 1
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17. 
$ . Henry David Thoreau, Walden, ed. J. Lyndon Shanley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2
1971), 14.
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Stanley Cavell and the Questioning  
of the Foregone: Openness to Conversion  
as a Political Act 
JEFF FRANK 
This paper makes the case that Stanley Cavell’s thinking on conversion, developed in 
“Normal and Natural” in The Claim of Reason, offers resources that can be used to 
develop a politics that acknowledges the importance of learning from the voice of 
skepticism instead of seeking to silence the skeptic through the pursuit of policies and 
practices that promise a type of certainty that will forever silence skepticism. I deve-
lop this case from my position as a teacher educator who knows very well the desire 
to silence skepticism in the form of finding a way of teaching future teachers so that 
I/we can be certain that they will be effective and engaging educators after graduati-
on. Giving up the belief that we can achieve certainty when it comes to teacher prepa-
ration does not consign us to hopelessness, but it does suggest that teacher educators 
may have more to learn from listening to the voice of skepticism than is suggested by 
current discourses in teacher education. Though I write from the position of a teacher 
educator and my examples are drawn from the work of teacher education, the main 
goal of this paper is to develop a reading of “Normal and Natural” that may help us 
appreciate new dimensions of the political implications of Cavell’s work.  
§ 
Public school teaching in the United States is highly-regulated. Programs of teacher 
education must be accredited, students seeking certification must meet many requi-
rements, including—but certainly not limited to—multiple and varied standardized 
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exams, and once teachers begin teaching, their performance will be assessed by ad-
ministrators, often using the results of student scores on standardized tests to deter-
mine effectiveness of teaching. Yet, for all this regulation, for all this oversight, how 
many of us have been in classrooms or heard about a teacher and wondered: How is 
this person teaching? How did this person meet every professional standard we have 
set, and yet cannot educate children effectively and humanely?  
These questions can give rise to a skepticism about the efficacy of regulating 
the human act of educating. And, this skepticism—as Stanley Cavell teaches—can go 
in at least two directions. The first—call it the most easily recognized as a political di-
rection—denies skepticism with the promise of more certainty. That is, we can seek 
better regulations to ensure better teachers entering classrooms, or we can give up 
the very idea of regulating teaching altogether. These responses strike me as domi-
nant poles of political discussion in educational policy. One group seeks better regu-
lation, while the other questions the very idea of regulations. What neither group se-
ems to appreciate is that the voice of skepticism will not be quieted with more—or no
—regulation. We will be cast imaginatively back into the classroom, left wondering: 
How do we get good teachers in front of children? 
More regulations, less regulations, we have schools and students attend them. 
It seems important to acknowledge that there will be teachers teaching and students 
subjected to that teaching, and so we will never have silence: being concerned with 
the improvement of education is our fate. In education, we are fated to questions of 
improvement so long as we are concerned about the education of children and its im-
plications.   
The seeming unavoidability of asking about improvement in education leads me 
to feel that we should try to develop a politics that doesn’t deny—through the quest for 
certainty—the inescapability of questioning our educational practices—as if more, or 
different, or no regulations can ever be enough—but works in acknowledgement of it. 
Though Cavell’s thinking is not political in the sense that it will help us pick sides in the 
regulation/deregulation debate (or debates like it), it reminds us that even when we re-
alize our better policies (no, more, better regulations), there will be a remainder. The 
voice of skepticism remains, asking: How do we really know that we are better off with 
this new policy? How do we know that students will turn out better now that we’ve 
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made these changes? Instead of silencing these questions, we must acknowledge their 
force and the limitations of even our best attempts at working to improve the human 
act of educating. More, we can come to see the importance of asserting this remainder 
as a political act. Instead of seeking policies and practices that will silence the voice of 
skepticism, we can give it play: learning what it might mean to educate in acknowled-
gement of the limitations of even our best thinking and our best policies.   
As a teacher educator, this acknowledgement is unsettling. Students need good 
teachers, teaching well is hard, and instead of succumbing to the voice of skepticism, 
I need to use the very limited time I have with students to teach them what we—as a 
community of educators and educational researchers—know about good teaching. 
Schools of education and teacher educators like myself need to prepare teachers who 
can enact, in very concrete ways and in diverse contexts of learning, the concepts and 
ideals that lead to effective teaching.  We don’t have time for skepticism; what we 1
need are better and more effective practices that can be taught to teachers. But—as I 
will develop below—this effort to silence skepticism, though motivated by a desire to 
produce effective teachers, will often keep us from realizing this aim, because there 
will always be moments in our lives as teachers where what is needed are not new or 
improved practices, but a change of heart. 
To begin getting at what I mean by a change of heart, consider an example, one 
too common in schools. It is deeply difficult—if not impossible—to teach a child when 
she does not trust us, or because she has learned to distrust authority figures. Chan-
ging teaching practices will not provide a response that will make a difference to that 
child. Instead of looking to practices—skills, strategies, techniques—for solutions, we 
are thrown back upon ourselves, left wondering if anything at all will work. More, we 
may come to wonder how it is that these practices ever work for any child, seeing how 
they can fail to reach this student who stands in need right now. We turn away from 
the quest for solutions, seeing how even the best strategy can so quickly leave us wan-
ting, and we thus re-open ourselves to the voice of skepticism. 
$ . The concept of enactment is an important one in teacher education literature. For excellent starting 1
places into this conversation, see: Mary M. Kennedy, “The Role of Preservice Teacher Education,” in 
Teaching as the Learning Profession: Handbook of Teaching and Policy, ed. Linda Darling-Ham-
mond and Gary Sykes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999) and Pam Grossman, Morva McDonald, 
Karen Hammerness, Matthew Ronfeldt, “Dismantling Dichotomies in Teacher Education,” in Hand-
book of Research on Teacher Education, ed. Marilyn Cochran-Smith, Sharon Feiman-Nemser, D. 
John McIntyre, Kelly E. Demers (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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There are too few resources in educational literatures to help us learn from the 
voice of skepticism, and for this reason, I see the section “Normal and Natural” from 
Cavell’s The Claim of Reason as a greatly underappreciated resource for teaching.  2
Though this section will not help us find our way in teacher education discussions as 
they are presently framed, I find “Normal and Natural” to be a text that offers a dee-
ply important and much needed vision for the work of teaching and teacher educati-
on. And, as all work in teacher education is inherently political, given—at the very le-
ast—its ties to regulation and how often it is made the object of political discussion,  I 3
see Cavell offering us a politics—though one not normally seen as such given its lack 
of a direct tie to present policies or practices—for teacher education that we need, es-
pecially when we open ourselves to the voice of skepticism. 
A central theme of “Normal and Natural” is Cavell’s thinking about how the 
process of becoming educated leads us to accept many things as normal or natural; 
foregone conclusions not open to question. Cavell begins with Wittgenstein’s example 
of teaching a child to continue a series. We judge teaching a success when the child 
successfully completes the series as we would, when, for the child, “the continuity is a 
matter of course, a foregone conclusion.”  Much is accomplished when the young 4
continue as we do, when their reactions are the same as ours—this is pain, this is 
what it means to count, this is being in love—but, the accomplishment also comes at a 
cost. Although it is important that another person recognizes my wince as a sign that 
I am in pain, the fact that my pain can be almost instantly recognized as such can 
cause me to worry—to echo Wittgenstein—that this instant public recognition can 
somehow take away from my pain being mine. If something so seemingly personal as 
my pain is not wholly mine, at least mine in the ways I took it to be, then what else 
follows? Why do I/we call this a painting? Why do I/we call this school? Why do I/we 
value the things we do in the ways we do?  
The problem with asking these questions is that, if our education has been 
successful, it is not as if I can simply decide to change the way I inhabit my world. As 
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: Oxford 2
University Press, 1999), 111-25.
$ . For a brief and insightful overview, see Marilyn Cochran-Smith, “The Politics of Teacher Education 3
and the Curse of Complexity,” Journal of Teacher Education 56.3 (2005): 181-185.
$ . Ibid., 122.4
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Cavell writes, “I cannot decide what I take as a matter of course.”  I begin to feel that 5
my education goes all the way down. Before I was fully conscious of being formed, I 
am formed. And, once I realize that, much is foregone; so much so that I can begin to 
wonder where my judgments begin and where convention stops. I can worry that I do 
not judge, I simply do—and see, and feel, and respond—as we do. I can’t get behind 
those judgments to question them, I am caught by conformity and do not know how 
to reanimate my life or my ways of expressing my life as mine.  Here is how Cavell 6
puts it:  
I may feel that my foregone conclusions were never conclusions I have arrived 
at, but were merely imbibed by me, merely conventional. I may blunt that rea-
lization through hypocrisy or cynicism or bullying. But I may take the occasion 
to throw myself back upon my culture, and ask why we do what we do, judge 
as we judge, how we have arrived at these crossroads.   7
This is a key moment, and a political one. If I decide to throw myself back upon my 
culture, then I can begin to wonder why “we do what we do, judge as we judge” and 
think about the education that has brought me to “these crossroads.”  
As we ask questions about our ways of doing things, and whether I assent to 
them, we are cast back to scenes of instruction, the education that has led us to these 
crossroads and that mark our culture. We are forced to consider how much of what 
we call education is marked by “hypocrisy or cynicism or bullying,” especially when 
our elders, or the elder we are now, are confronted with questions—the questions of 
youth and adolescence—that threaten to bring our ways into question. As we skate 
along the grooves of the foregone and expect the child to follow, we may be brought 
up short by a question. As Cavell writes, “if the child, little or big, asks me: Why do we 
eat animals? or Why are some people poor and others rich? or Why do I have to go to 
school? or Do you love black people as much as white people?...I may find my 
$ . Ibid., 122-123.5
$ . Here is where I see Cavell as such a deeply insightful reader of the voices of Wittgenstein’s Investi6 -
gation that express exasperation and fear that my pain is somehow not my own. This isn’t just a prob-
lem of epistemology, it goes to the very root of my being-in-the-world. 
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford 7
University Press, 1979), 125.
CONVERSATIONS 5 !9
answers thin, I may feel run out of reasons without being willing to say “This is what I 
do” (what I say, what I sense, what I know), and honor that.”  8
We can replay the questions we asked as children, and we can replay the ques-
tions children ask us. I can replay these questions as a way of connecting me to what 
our educations have formed, I can use these questions as an “occasion to go over the 
ground I hitherto thought foregone.”  Is it a foregone conclusion that our society 9
must be marked by inequality? What would it mean to call my “natural” reactions to 
the existence of inequality—or racism, or sexism—into question? Instead of seeing 
our ways as wholly natural, we can begin to listen more to the questions of childhood, 
responding with openness, not cynicism, bullying or fear. This listening to the questi-
ons of childhood strikes me as one of the most important political implications of Ca-
vell’s work for teaching and working with future teachers. As much as we can prepare 
future teachers to anticipate the limitations of our way of life as it currently stands—
for example, teaching about white privilege, teaching about cis privilege—new questi-
ons will inevitably arise, and we need to prepare future teachers for this reality. Ins-
tead of taking unforeseen questions as a threat or an affront, teachers can respond to 
these questions as opportunities; an “occasion to throw [themselves] back upon 
[their] culture.” The voice of skepticism offers a political education where teachers 
see the good of throwing themselves against their own enculturation as teachers, and 
the culture of schooling that they find themselves in. 
Cavell is deeply instructive here. He writes: “Why do we take it that because we 
then must put away childish things, we must put away the prospect of growth and the 
memory of childhood? The anxiety in teaching, in serious communication, is that I my-
self require education. And for grownups this is not natural growth, but change. Con-
version is a turning of our natural reactions; so it is symbolized as rebirth.”  An educa10 -
tor must stand open to the need for conversion and rebirth, and this conversion is not 
necessarily brought about by anything that she learns in her teacher education, but it is 
occasioned by “the prospect of growth and the memory of childhood.” Both are worth 
fuller attention. First, the prospect of growth is something that should be much more 
central to learning to teach than it currently is. Anyone entering the complex work of 
$ . Ibid., 125.8
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 125.9
$ . Ibid., 125.10
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teaching will seek some certainty, especially when it comes to the very real challenges of 
effectively managing a classroom for learning. That is, she will want to have certain 
things “figured out” before teaching. But, this desire for a way of being in the classroom 
that allows for order and effectiveness (to take two things most new teachers worry 
about) should not harden into the fixity of the one and only routine, or the lesson that 
works and never invites revision. Rather, the prospect of a life of teaching should be 
one premised on the promise of continuous growth.  One’s subject is always changing, 11
one’s students are always changing, the context of school and society are always chan-
ging, and the educator is the one who learns through change, not in avoidance of it. 
Though one may have never imagined—say, as a public educator in North Carolina—
that the bathrooms in a school would be charged with the significance they have at our 
moment in history, an educator welcomes the moment as an opportunity to grow: to 
make the school—and our society—more humane, more educative, more just.  
It is hard to know just how a future teacher can be prepared for this openness to 
growth, but I find Cavell’s thinking on the artist as deeply suggestive. Cavell writes, “Ar-
tists are people who know how to do such things, i.e., how to make objects in response 
to which we are enabled, but also fated, to explore and educate and enjoy and chastise 
our capacities as they stand.”  Again, it is important to prepare students to think about 12
and respond to the issues and politics of the moment, but the issues and politics that 
consume the culture at the start of a teacher’s career will likely be very different as she 
grows into her work. For this reason, it is important that future teachers see the need to 
be responsive to questions beyond the options that are on offer by society as it presently 
stands. Instead of looking to what we teachers know to be solutions to the problems we 
face in the classroom, we may need to look elsewhere. The ways in which we’ve been 
educated—as teachers—to see certain behaviors or outcomes as foregone, may be a 
commentary on the limitations of our teaching practices, and not necessarily an accura-
te depiction of what is possible or desirable. For this reason, Cavell asks that we let our 
responsiveness be educated broadly, especially by things like the arts. Teachers need to 
$ . Here I use growth in much the same way that John Dewey does. On growth, Cavell and Dewey may 11
be closer than Cavell may be ready to concede, though it would take a separate paper to develop this 
point. Outside of Cavell’s own discussion of Dewey—especially in Conditions Handsome and Unhand-
some (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1991)—I find Philip Jackson’s discussion in John Dewey 
and the Philosopher’s Task (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002) particularly useful in relation to 
educational themes of this paper.
$ . Ibid., 123.12
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experience art “in response to which we are enabled, but also fated, to explore and edu-
cate and enjoy and chastise our capacities as they stand.”  
As someone who knows the very real pressure to teach a student in ways that 
will effectively prepare her for her first year of teaching, it sounds fanciful—at best—
to suggest that students should engage with art if she wants to prepare for a life of te-
aching. At the same time, I cannot deny that I would not be the teacher I am if I 
didn’t have the experience of attempting to let art—broadly understood—educate my 
responsiveness to the world.  Art can create a space of play where what appears fixed 13
in society is made to move. Though the world may feel just as fixed when I am done 
reading or experiencing the art, somehow the sense of motion—the energies unle-
ashed by the art—empower us to keep asking questions and not be put off by the cy-
nicism or the bullying of elders who would preserve our ways, even if these ways are 
not educative, just, or life-giving.  
I appreciate that Cavell shows us that “we are enabled, but also fated” to ask 
questions when moved by art. Art opens possibilities, but we are also fated to see tho-
se possibilities whenever a child asks us: “Why do I have to ask permission to use the 
bathroom? Why are only some children good at math (in your classroom)?” We are 
fated to think the questions with the students, we cannot “put the pupil out of sight—
as though his intellectual reactions are disgusting to me,”  we are cast into moments 14
of decision where we can continue running our classroom along the groove of what is 
done, or seek change, growth, conversion. Our best practices come to an end—our te-
acherly spade is turned—and we must find our way forward, trying to create a way of 
being together in the classroom that avoids what is deadening in favor of possibilities 
for growth. Making the attempt to break with the foregone is difficult, and Cavell is 
right—I feel—to liken it to a rebirth. Our classroom, who we are in the classroom, who 
our students can become in the classroom are different if we make the move to go 
against, or resist, the foregone.  
Just as we shouldn’t put away the “prospect of growth” if we want to be effecti-
$ . I see much of Cora Diamond’s work on the moral life to be about literature’s ability to educate our 13
responsiveness to the world. For two examples, see “Henry James, Moral Philosophers, Moralism,” 
The Henry James Review 18.3 (1997): 243-257 and “Losing Your Concepts,” Ethics 98.2 (1988): 
255-277. For a discussion of this work as it relates to education, see Megan Laverty, “Learning Our 
Concepts,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 43.1 (2009): 27-40. 
$ . Cavell, Claim of Reason, 125.14
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ve educators, Cavell calls us to remain in touch with “the memory of childhood.”  I 15
teach students who plan to become secondary teachers, so I would include the me-
mory of adolescence with the memory of childhood. The educator, of all people, needs 
to remember, needs to be in touch with, the feelings of resistance, the longing for 
connection, the willingness to question, the acceptance and fear of difference, the 
deep hurt of a felt injustice—and much else—that mark childhood and adolescence.  16
By maintaining touch with these, the educator will be less apt to feel threatened by a 
child’s questioning, and more willing to learn from and with the questioning. This, 
again, will allow us to resist the foregone, thereby remaining receptive to the possibi-
lities of what Cavell calls conversion or rebirth.  Cora Diamond describes the need 17
for conversion or rebirth—in relation to her reading of A Christmas Carol, by Charles 
Dickens—this way:  
We all know that we were once children, but that may be mere abstract kno-
wledge, incapable of entering our adult lives. Or it may be imaginatively avai-
lable to us; the acceptance of our own past childhood may be imaginatively 
present and active in us as adults. Without the imaginative presence in us of 
the child we were, we are as adults incapable, Dickens thought, of enjoyment 
and hope, and that cripples us morally.  18
The sense of being crippled morally makes a great deal of sense to me in relation to 
teaching. When a teacher puts herself outside the realm of childhood and adolescen-
ce, as if the deep concerns and feelings she felt as a child were mere abstract kno-
wledge, she ceases to be responsive to the life of, to what is alive to, her own students. 
In this situation, when the teacher is at a remove from what is living in her classroom, 
what is necessary is not new practices, but a change of heart. 
We might—following Cavell’s fondness for troping images from the Bible in a 
$ . For a beautifully moving discussion of being in touch with childhood, see: Cora Diamond, “The Im15 -
portance of Being Human,” in Human Being, ed. David Cockburn (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991).
$ . For a beautiful discussion of remembering in teaching, see David Hansen, “A Poetics of Teaching,” 16
Educational Theory 54.2 (2004), esp. 142.
$ . Though it would be impossible to pursue this line of thinking here, there are interesting connec17 -
tions between rebirth as used in The Claim of Reason and Cavell’s thinking on remarriage, see: Pur-
suits of Happiness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
$ . Diamond, “Being Human,” 42.18
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way reminiscent of someone like Emerson —think of conversion for an educator in 19
terms of pouring new wine into old skins. That is, the best in-service training, or book 
on pedagogy or workshop will have next to no impact on the teacher whose memory 
of childhood is not “imaginatively available.” By contrast, the teacher who remembers 
childhood, might not need these practices or training, because she can play the class-
room by ear, figuring out—finding, founding—modes of responsiveness as she goes 
along. I see something like this happening when I read the moving and artistic work 
of Vivian Paley, a writer and early childhood educator who models what it means to 
resist the foregone conclusion and learn to listen to, to get closer to, the worlds of 
children.  Hers is representative of the aversive effort: turning away from mere con20 -
formity—turning away from the conventionality of what we do—and to what the 
world is trying to teach. More, Paley acts on what she learns. When she learns—for 
example—the expansiveness of exclusion and its long-lasting effects that happen in 
classrooms under the banner of the common phrase, “You can’t play with us,” she 
enacts a new rule in her classroom: “You can’t say you can’t play.”  Where most pa21 -
rents, educators—and even the students themselves—see it as natural that some chil-
dren are not allowed to play, while other children are, Paley—through responsiveness 
to the life of her classroom—sees this so-taken natural act as the exclusionary practice 
it is. Though this classroom rule and practice may seem like a minor thing, I take it to 
be representative of openness to conversion, and hence a political act. Teacher wri-
ters like Paley demonstrate that listening well to children and responding to what one 
learns can be a political act, though it may not ever be recognized as such given the 
terms we’ve been taught to talk about politics as it relates to teaching and education. 
Teacher writers like Paley demonstrate how Cavell’s politics of resisting the 
foregone help make us more present to our students. In addition to being open and 
receptive to their questions and their questioning of what we’ve taken as foregone, we 
become open and receptive to who they are and how they’ve internalized their place 
in the foregone order. This openness, this receptiveness is deeply important, and has
$ . On troping, see Richard Poirier, The Renewal of Literature (New York: Random House, 1987). 19
Cavell’s use of religious language can be seen in “childish things” as quoted above and will be explored 
briefly below with relation to turning the other cheek.
$ . A good starting place may be her White Teacher (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 20
2000) or The Boy Who Would be a Helicopter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
$ . Vivian Paley, You Can’t Say You Can’t Play (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).21
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—though this way of stating it seems to risk something like overstatement—the power 
to transform lives and the foundations of educational practices. We can see this 
transformative power most clearly when Cavell discusses the child who we see as dis-
gusting until one adult does not recognize the child as we do. Cavell writes: 
Sometimes a stranger does not find the child disgusting when the child’s pa-
rents do. Sometimes the stranger is a doctor and teaches the child something 
new in his acceptance of him. This is not accomplished by his growing accus-
tomed to the disgusting creature. It is a refusing of foregone reaction; offering 
the other cheek.  22
At least two points are worth noting. First, it is important that the stranger does not 
grow accustomed to the child and thus come to learn that the child is not disgusting. 
Rather, the stranger refuses the foregone reaction; the child is not disgusting, it is the 
criteria that force us into this conclusion that are disgusting and stand in need of re-
formation. Here is a key point for teachers and teacher educators to remain mindful 
of. When working with students we can—and often should—refuse the foregone reac-
tion. No student is bad at math—or English, or science—just as no child is irredeema-
ble—or disruptive, or any other label that becomes convenient for educators but fate-
ful for the child—and teachers must risk the possibilities of learning when she ackno-
wledges that the child is not her label and so discover—through the conversion of 
human responsiveness through contact with the living child—how to be with and 
educate the child. 
The second point to highlight is Cavell’s use of offering the other cheek. It is 
important to appreciate the full weight of what Cavell is calling for. In a fascinating 
reading of the parable of the good Samaritan, Ivan Illich makes the case that one of 
the lessons of the good Samaritan story is that we are called to love whoever is in 
front of us calling for our love.  This offers a radical break with ethics based on obli23 -
gations to our group—fellow adherents of our religion or citizens of our nation—or an 
$ . Cavell, Claim of Reason, 124.22
$ . See: Ivan Illich, The Rivers North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich (Toronto: House of 23
Anansi Press, 2005). For an interesting gloss of Illich’s reading, see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 737ff.
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ethics based on obligations to our principles—the Law tells us we do X in situation Y
—and opens us to a new way of being that calls us to learn what it means to respond 
with love whenever our love is called on. Now, I am not making the case that Cavell is 
a Christian writer in the way that Illich is, but I think Cavell would find something 
important in how Illich sees the good Samaritan parable as offering this type of radi-
cal break with how we do things and endorse its transformative power. Instead of 
relying on how we do things or relying on our principles, we are called to offer the 
other cheek, to see what it might mean to not go on as we do, to discover the possibi-
lities that emerge and open when we forego the foregone conclusion and try to res-
pond to the life in front of us. 
I feel like I’ve taken us far afield from the discussion of teacher education regu-
lations with which we started, but this is exactly why I find Cavell’s thinking impor-
tant for teaching and teacher education. Even as I prepare my students to do well on 
their edTPA exam  so they can become certified teachers and as I work to make sure 24
they can implement best practices in their classrooms and lesson planning,  I also 25
attempt to teach in acknowledgement that it is important—especially as an educa-
tor—to turn the other cheek so that we turn toward the preciousness of each student, 
each moment.  Even if something like turning the other cheek cannot be directly 26
taught in the space of a teacher education program, it is important that we not let talk 
of best practices be the end of the story, as if one won’t find oneself called to conver-
sion and need to answer that call if one is to remain a good teacher by one’s own 
lights. For this reason, in teacher education we need to empower self-trust and not 
give the impression that we are all-knowing and that knowingness is the goal, or re-
sult, of a life of teaching. We need to respond to the questions of our own students in 
ways that let them know that we don’t know everything—no one can—about the hu-
man act of educating, and so we must often fall back on nothing more—though 
$ . A $300 exam—one of many—that my students must take and pass before they can become public 24
school teachers in New York. For a brief overview, see Raymond L. Pecheone and Andrea Whittaker, 
“Well-Prepared Teachers Inspire Student Learning,” Phi Delta Kappan 97.7 (2016): 8-13. For a look at 
its predictive validity, see: Dan Goldhaber, James Cowan, and Roddy Theobald, “Evaluating Prospecti-
ve Teachers: Testing the Predictive Validity of the edTPA,” Journal of Teacher Education 68.4 (2017): 
377-393.
$ . For example, differentiated instruction, understanding by design and restorative justice instead of 25
punitive classroom discipline.
$ . The use of preciousness may be, well, too precious, but I use it because I think Raimond Gaita is 26
correct to hold that this is the term that best captures our full human responsiveness to the other. See: 
Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity (New York: Routledge, 2002), 5.
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nothing less—than our fullest responsiveness to the present moment. Instead of fal-
ling back on our way as the way—through bullying, cynicism, or righteous certainty—
we can live the questions we can’t yet answer, trusting that not following the foregone 
conclusion is our better hope, even if it is a hope that doesn’t offer any promise of 
success.  
In a way, it is up to the teacher educator to be representative of this way of li-
ving.  Our politics will have to be one of remaining open to conversion through resis27 -
ting and questioning the foregone conclusion. We must remain present to the questi-
ons of the child and the adolescent—Does this work really prepare me for anything 
other than more school? Why do adults seem so uninterested in the world? Am I 
worthy of love?—and let the questions educate our responsiveness to the world. 
Though this work may not feel as politically efficacious as protesting educational po-
licies or advocating for practices we feel are more effective than the ones we have, it 
doesn’t mean it should be denigrated out of existence, or seen as a- or nonpolitical. 
Choosing to remain open to conversion is indeed political, and freeing a child to see 
herself as the eyes of love see her—not as disgusting, or stupid, or ugly—though not 
politics in any major key, is nonetheless transformative and needful. This is what I 
take to be Cavell’s call to educators especially, and one I think deserves far more at-
tention than we give it.  
It is easy to get pulled into the world of adulthood, where it feels like we should 
only talk of serious things and put away all that is childish or reminds us of childho-
od, but it is just this reminder that we may need if we are to make schools more hu-
mane, more just, more educative. The teacher teaches children, not foregone conclu-
sions in a world where possibilities are fixed and locked in place. Cavell’s thinking 
shows us that there is far more play in the world, and we should join children in ex-
ploring possibilities that offer the hope of growth and conversion: “This seems to me 
a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is also the description of something 
we might call education.”  We teachers and teacher educators should wonder: Can 28
education become philosophy and still recognize itself? I think we can only respond 
$ . For Cavell on the representative, see Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, esp. 31. For a dis27 -
cussion of this aspect of Cavell’s thought, see Jeff Frank, “The Claims of Documentary,” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 45.10 (2013): 1018-1027.
$ . Cavell, Claim of Reason, 125.28
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to this question by thinking with children as they question the limits of our foregone 
conclusions, and always stand ready to leave even our best practices behind when we 
find them wanting. This process of learning how to be free from the foregone through 
human responsiveness needs to be one of the main goals of becoming a teacher, and 
though preparing for this work may not fit what we currently take to be teacher edu-
cation, this is no reason to silence Cavell’s claim on our attention as we—as a culture 
and as educators—educate future teachers. 
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Something Must Be Shown: Consent,  
Conversation, and the End of Reasons 
DEREK GOTTLIEB 
This essay attempts to respond to what I see as a persistent misunderstanding of Ca-
vellian conversation and its relation to politics as such. More specifically, I find that 
critics of Cavell and his acolytes, such as Davide Panagia, tend to read a Cavellian po-
litics as dependent on a conventional sort of judgment, such that Cavell’s idea of 
“conversation” is overly similar to Habermas’s notion of exercising “public reason” or 
a more general social contractarianism. Panagia specifically contrasts a Cavellian po-
litics with Rancière’s more actively participatory variety. Without wanting to dwell 
overmuch on Rancière specifically, I wish to argue that this contrast is overblown to 
the extent that it underestimates the stakes and confrontational nature of Cavellian 
conversation, and that it ignores Cavell’s own account of what happens when justifi-
cations come to an end and one’s spade is turned: something must be shown. I wish 
to link the kind of showing that I think Cavell has in mind to the long tradition of 
African American activism in the United States, culminating, thus far, in the Move-
ment for Black Lives.  
Panagia, Zerilli, and Cavell 
In his new book, Rancière’s Sentiments, Davide Panagia uses Linda Zerilli as a Cavel-
lian foil against which to position Rancière’s active politics of partager.  My purpose 
in this opening section will be to show that Panagia misreads Zerilli’s sense of “judg-
ment,” and that—properly understood—the notion of judgment that Zerilli and Cavell 
develop is much closer to Rancière than Panagia allows. 
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As Panagia defines Rancière’s core concept, partager is part-taking specifically 
by those who have no-part, who have no (recognized) role in politics:  
They act by taking part in an activity that does not belong to them and that 
they have not been tasked to do. And they don’t spend their time making or 
justifying arguments to one another, or to others, because their doings are im-
proper and any reason they may give for their actions is de facto illegitimate.  1
His specification of what partager is not doing–justifying arguments by giving rea-
sons–is meant to signal the contrast with the view he attributes to Zerilli.  
Citing Zerilli’s Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom and A Democratic Theory 
of Judgment, Panagia declares that Zerilli is fatally committed to “consensus theories 
of democratic representation” rooted in members’ “having to sign on to a common set 
of conditions,” which unwarrantedly narrows the sphere of the politically possible. 
He notes that “such accounts […] demand capacities like judgment and attention of 
their agents and presume that a capacity for judgment (and thus a particular account 
of intelligence) is necessary for politics.”   On Panagia’s view, then, Zerilli stands in a 2
long line of social-contractarian political thinkers, for whom political activity mainly 
consists in exchanging reasons with others who have also “signed on” to certain con-
ditions, all with the aim of persuading those others to adopt this or that view of a par-
ticular topic. This sort of politics is so far from Rancière’s sense of partager that Pa-
nagia finds Zerilli’s alignment of Cavell and Arendt with Rancière galling.  But the 
view Panagia attributes to Zerilli is not, in fact, Zerilli’s.  
To see this, it is worth quoting Panagia’s reading of Zerilli on judgment and 
criteria in full. 
Placing Rancière alongside Cavell and Arendt, [Zerilli] affirms, “Aesthetic and 
political judgments, in which there is no concept to be applied, raise the ques-
tion of criteria in an acute way, for saying what counts involves something 
other than the activity of subsumption. Unique to such judgments is that the 
$ . Davide Panagia, Rancière’s Sentiments (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), x.1
$ . Ibid., 6.2
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subject does not recall the grounds upon which things can be rightly judged, 
but is called upon to elicit, in relation to specific interlocutors, the criteria ap-
propriate to the particular at hand.”  3
In this quoted passage, Zerilli is establishing what she understands as a similarity 
between a Cavellian-Arendtian position and Racnière’s view, a similarity centered 
upon the way in which publicly raising “criteria” is a means of asserting “what 
counts” in a particular situation. This criterial recounting, she says, is specifically ori-
ented toward “something other than the activity of subsumption.” Panagia seems to 
misunderstand this point, as is evident from his exegesis of the passage: 
Like Arendt (via Cavell), Zerilli wants to extend Kant’s claim… that aesthetic 
experience solicits a sense of freedom and that that sense of freedom arises 
from the experience of ungroundedness that emerges from one’s encounter 
with an object of taste. The absence of a concept that might be applied to that 
particular moment of experience with an object raises the possibility of a crite-
ria-less condition of coexistence between individuals. The result for Zerilli is a 
calling upon the subject of experience to be responsive to the experience by 
eliciting criteria that acknowledge the moment of ungroundedness. And this 
“being called upon to elicit criteria” is an important dimension of politics and
—especially—of freedom.  4
This interpretation misreads Zerilli in two important ways, both of which undermine 
the similarity she wishes to draw out between Rancière’s project and her own.  The 
first misreading involves Zerilli’s sense of what elicits “criteria.”  
Panagia’s version of the Zerilli passage pictures an isolated subject facing off 
against an un-subsumable experience, forced by that experience to select criteria by 
which to comprehend it, and thus to acknowledge the ungroundedness implicit in the 
choice of criteria. This is not Rancière, says Panagia: “politics isn’t about being called 
upon to elicit criteria for counting; it is about the making count, regardless of 
$ . Ibid., x.3
$ . Ibid., x.4
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whether or not that activity is persuasive to others”   But by centering the isolated 5
“subject of experience” in his reading, Panagia ignores Zerilli’s “specific interlocutors” 
that, for her, do the eliciting, and he thus misses the way in which recounting criteria 
might be a means of “making count.” 
For Zerilli, the presence of those interlocutor is of seminal importance. It is the 
triangular relation among the person, the particular, and the interlocutor that in fact 
elicits the criteria—there is a disagreement of some kind over what this particular is, 
and it is the specific nature of that disagreement that requires either person involved 
to show the other that the particular is the kind of thing that it is. Thus the import of 
the difference between what Zerilli says—criteria are elicited “in relation to specific 
interlocutors”—and what Panagia hears: eliciting criteria is responsive to [an] experi-
ence.  
Panagia’s second (and related) misreading involves the purpose of eliciting cri-
teria.  Where Panagia emphasizes Kantian “freedom” and “acknowledg[ing] the mo-
ment of ungroundedness,” this bears little relation to any passage in Zerilli. And the 
thrust of Zerilli’s argument surely cannot be aimed at “the possibility of a criteria-less 
condition of coexistence between individuals.”   Quite the opposite, in fact.  6
Zerilli’s picture of two people diverging on the nature of some particular is full 
of political significance that Panagia ought to appreciate. First of all, that a person so 
much as takes another to be an “interlocutor” is a political gesture—it provisionally 
asserts mutual belonging in a group that, by implication, ought to see this “particu-
lar” in the same certain way.  And it further evinces an investment in this belonging-
together: one does not bother trying to bring another into agreement unless that 
agreement (a) is possible and (b) matters. The giving or requesting of criteria is tan-
tamount to wagering a kind of belonging-together that politics, at bottom, is. Far 
from any possibility of criteria-less co-belonging, criteria are recounted as a means of 
testing the possibility of belonging together.  
There is also something to say against Panagia’s association of Zerilli (or Ca-
vell) with social contractarianism. Zerilli’s criteria are nothing like “already agreed-
upon conditions.”  Whether or not interlocutors can agree is the very issue. In Zeril-
$ . Ibid., xi.5
$ . I’m indebted to Ingeborg Löfgren for making the impossibility of a “criteria-less condition of co-ex6 -
istence” clear to me.
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li’s picture, the fact that the interlocutors do not see the “particular at hand” in the 
same way is confounding to them. Criteria are elicited as a response to this confoun-
ding state—that another, with whom one would expect to agree, subsumes it in a dif-
ferent way, takes it to be something else.  In that respect, eliciting criteria rather aim 
at what Richard Eldridge describes in terms of achieving a “reorientation”  toward 7
this “particular at hand.” In thinking of the criterial conversation in terms of Eldrid-
ge’s reorientation or Cavell’s “showing that the world is otherwise than you see,” it 
becomes clear that elicited criteria do not appeal to any “common set of conditions” 
to which the participants have previously agreed. Rather, agreement is being sought 
where it had been heretofore assumed; the criterial conversation itself is an act of 
using one’s own stance on the world as the (groundless, aspirational) appeal to 
another. 
Panagia affirms the link between Rancière’s politico-aesthetic thought and 
Wittgenstein’s discussions of aspect-dawning;  (Panagia 2018, 15); I suggest that the 8
eliciting of criteria amounts to showing rather than saying, and that its political ope-
ration is the facilitation of aspect-dawning in another. Eliciting criteria, therefore, is 
the very making count that Panagia’s Rancière seeks.   9
Cavell’s Acknowledgment and Making Criteria Count 
As I said above, I think that Panagia misinterprets the relation of criteria and its elici-
ting to the activity of judgment as Zerilli and Cavell understand it. On Panagia’s view, 
judgment necessarily presupposes the (Kantian) subject or (Aristotelian) hypokeime-
non, which always stands before or beneath any given action, and over against the 
$ . Richard Eldridge, ed., Stanley Cavell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6.7
$ . Panagia, Rancière’s Sentiments, x.8
$ . If Panagia criticizes Cavell and Zerilli for their reliance on (a certain picture of) judgment in politics, 9
he also approvingly cites Aletta Norval, despite the fact that, so far as I can see, she accurately frames 
Cavell as helping to dissolve a dilemma that Panagia’s Rancière seems to tackle head-on (Norvall 
2012). Cavellian judgment occupies the space between those horns, rather than choosing sides, as I 
think Panagia reads Zerlilli and Cavell. Zerilli seems to see judgment exactly as Norval does, as occupy-
ing an “In-between space (neither objective nor subjective as philosophy has traditionally defined 
them)” (Linda Zerilli, Toward a Democratic Theory of Judgment [University of Chicago Press, 2016], 
xvii). In Panagia’s reading, though, Rancière picks the right side (active intervention) of this dilemma 
and Cavell picks the wrong one (privileging inward judgment). I’m arguing, with Norval and Zerilli, 
that the opposition of Cavell to Rancière is based on missing the active and public nature of Cavellian 
judgment. 
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objective world. Judgment itself is therefore something like an internal or private 
operation, which uses criteria as a means of determining what kind of thing or situa-
tion anything is. This view depicts the subject as (1) fundamentally isolated from 
others in (2) attempting to make sense of the world prior to acting in it. Panagia’s 
Rancière objects on precisely these grounds: that politics must be participatory, and 
also, and therefore, primarily active in the world. Panagia is arguing against an actu-
ally-existing view of judgment and politics, to be sure, but it is not Cavell’s or Zerilli’s. 
Instead, Cavell is one of a group of Wittgenstein readers that understands 
Wittgenstein as militating against the use or sort of criteria that require what Owen 
and Havercroft call “substantive principle[s] that can be stated independently and in 
advance of the particular disputes in which [they are] manifest.”  Panagia cites these 10
authors in support of his own view, so it’s worth noting that, in fact, Zerilli herself ta-
kes exactly the same position on criteria: “[The standard] view of mutual intelligibi-
lity…. separates out criteria from actual judgments, makes them the ground of such 
judgments, and in this way assumes that we have criteria for all eventualities. It as-
sumes that a person’s divergent application of a word can simply and definitively be 
corrected by reminding the person of its agreed criteria.”  Eliciting criteria is not an 11
act of citation to originary contracts or agreements because, on the Cavellian reading 
of Wittgenstein, “we cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be necessary.”  12
The version of “judgment” against which Panagia argues makes the interpretation of 
some founding principle or rule central to political discussions. Cavell, Zerilli, and 
similar readers of Wittgenstein aver, however, that this view mischaracterizes the way 
agreement works in our lives.  
Robert Fogelin, for instance, sees the affinity among rule-following, ostensive 
definition, and so on in terms of a “paradox of interpretation,” and Fogelin’s reading 
of Wittgenstein emphasizes the Investigations §201b: “there is a way of grasping a 
rule which is not an interpretation.” Fogelin reads Wittgenstein as repeatedly raising, 
to show the unworkability of, explanations grounded in the mental judgment Panagia 
$ . Panagia, Rancière’s Sentiments, 15.10
$ . Zerilli, A Democratic Theory of Judgment, 22.11
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: Oxford 12
University Press, 1979), 31.
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disparages. Instead, Fogelin sees Wittgenstein gesturing toward a way of “grasping” 
the world that is not mentally or interpretively centered: 
Wittgenstein is not saying that an individual's interpretation of a rule is correct 
to the extent that it squares with the community's interpretation of it. In rule-
following, we join a consensus in action—a consensus grounded in the kind of 
training that we, as humans, can successfully undergo and the kind of training 
that we actually do undergo in the community in which we are reared.   13
It is important to note—because Panagia decries “consensus theories of democratic 
representation”—that Fogelin’s “consensus in action” is distinguished from a consen-
sus in opinion or interpretation. It emphasizes the joining with others via activity in 
the world, rather than agreement in opinion. The way in which the eliciting of criteria 
amounts to a call to action, an invitation to join a particular community of action, is 
something that Panagia misses. Cavellian criteria, therefore, are nothing like Owen 
and Havercroft’s “universals.” Criteria serve a different purpose, and this fact is the 
key to understanding Cavell’s politics.  
I find myself wanting to say that Cavellian criteria are not fully themselves ex-
cept in their application, in their embodiment in various judgments, here understood 
as attitudinal comportments, or ontological stances, on the world. While it is possible 
to understand criteria as transcendent principles, criteria pictured thusly are inert 
and powerless for Cavell—“dead,” he calls them. Thinking of criteria as fundamen-
tally external features is precisely what leads to scenes of reprehensible obtuseness in 
Cavell’s work, such as the specter of a person kneeling over the crumpled victim of an 
auto accident, saying, “Yes, but on what grounds can I call what you’re experiencing 
pain?” This picture of seeking out criteria because they would constitute the basis on 
which one could accurately describe the inner states of another, or cause one to react 
appropriately to another’s inner states, fully demonstrates the limitations of trans-
cendent criteria for Cavell. 
$ . Robert J. Fogelin, Taking Wittgenstein at His Word: A Textual Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 13
University Press, 2009), 28.
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It is with reference to something like the above example that Cavell first draws 
out his notion of acknowledgment. The obtuseness in the scene is precisely related to 
the inappropriateness of the quest for certainty in the face of emergent need. Cavell 
describes this in “Knowing and Acknowledging”: “Your suffering makes a claim on 
me. It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer—I must do or reveal 
something (whatever can be done.) In a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do 
not know what ‘(your or his) being in pain’ means. Is.”  Whatever criteria’s role in 14
the determination of whether another is suffering, they are fully embodied in one’s 
response to, or the stance one adopts toward, that suffering. Importantly, the image 
of the kneeling philosopher in pursuit of certainty about the accident victim’s suffe-
ring is also a picture of response, a failure of acknowledgement that Cavell variously 
calls deflection, avoidance, or refusal. The kneeling philosopher’s avoidance is an 
example of skeptical withdrawal for Cavell, a decision not to allow our ordinary crite-
ria to count, or to move us. 
Cavell most clearly brings out this structural co-possibility of either ackno-
wledgement or its avoidance in considering cases of another’s pain and in the parable 
of the craftsman and the doll toward the end of The Claim of Reason. Both cases ser-
ve to show that “judgment” is unworkable when imagined as this two-part process: 
the kind of certainty required at stage one in order to generate a correct response at 
stage two is both “impossible and unnecessary,” as David Stern has termed it.  No 15
amount of available knowledge is capable of yielding the proper response, and yet 
proper responses to various situations occur at every moment of every day. Cavell’s 
acknowledgment is an attempt to undo this kind of “phenomenon-splitting,” as Glen-
dinning calls it, and knit the two parts together again, reconstituting judgment as a 
single-stage process of responsive aspect-seeing.  
Cavell thus joins with a host of others, again including Panagia, who emphasi-
ze that the “intellectualist” or “disengaged” view of judgment leads us astray. If we 
make skillful responsiveness to the world or to others dependent upon the possession 
of correct knowledge, then the possibility of this responsiveness seems to vanish, and, 
just as Panagia fears, the possibility of political intervention vanishes along with it. 
$ . Stephen Mulhall. The Cavell Reader (London: Wiley, 1996), 98.14
$ . David G. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 115.15
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Acknowledgment is Cavell’s way of reorienting us from the (impossible) quest for cer-
tainty about facts to the moral demand of responding correctly to, and thus seeing 
correctly, the relevant facts of the matter. This reorientation of the issue might be ta-
ken as an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s distinction between attitude and opinion: “My 
attitude towards him is an attitude toward a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has 
a soul.”  But if this is so, what then of criteria’s import?  16
Conversation, Criteria, and Politics 
Cavellian criteria, as I have sketched the story so far, simply do play the grounding 
role that Panagia imagines them playing in judgment and political action; as Cavell’s 
kneeling philosopher serves to illustrate, skeptical withdrawal remains a standing 
possibility upon which criteria’s mere existence cannot foreclose. Instead, as Zerilli 
has it, criteria constitute something like the means with—and by—which interlocutors 
assert and invite one another into the world as they find it. Criteria’s relevance, here, 
has nothing to do with the private encounter with an object, but with making public, 
and therefore political, sense of things. 
Where Panagia imagines disagreements in terms of the moment of ungroun-
dedness and its consequent freedom, the kinds of divergences figured in Cavell tend 
to take the form of disorientation with respect to the world or to others. “Counting” 
our criteria—or recounting, etc.—is an attempt at re-locating ourselves in worlds both 
public and private, of re-finding ourselves among others. Invoking our criteria may 
seem in every case to be metaphysical speculation, but for Wittgenstein and for Ca-
vell, it is a practical exercise.  Because our criteria ordinarily operate in the back-
ground, enmeshing us in a public world, we might draw upon them in order to recall 
ourselves to ourselves or our community when we experience this uncanny moment 
of discord. Counting and recounting our criteria is precisely an attempt at resolving 
this discord by bringing another to acknowledge a situation as we do, or else to learn 
to acknowledge it as they do.  
$ . Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. and trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 16
Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §22
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Cavell himself dramatizes this sort of interaction in the Claim of Reason, whe-
re he explicitly couches the voicing of criteria in terms of expressing “what points are 
at issue in various judgments.” To recount criteria to another or to oneself is to name 
the relevant aspects of a given thing or situation; to recount criteria in this way is to 
test the extent of a shared sense of relevance. The affordances and stakes of conversa-
tions about judgments depicted here presents a stark contrast with Panagia’s unders-
tanding of a judgment-based politics. 
Arriving at agreement successfully, for Cavell, is figured in two broadly-defi-
ned kinds of situations: (1) scenes of what he will call “initiation,” in which a child or 
a stranger is entering into or acquiring the sorts of agreements that undergird the 
possibility of politics, and (2) encounters between full-fledged members of a given 
group in which interlocutors find that they are out of alignment with one another. In 
the former case, it will turn out that this agreement is not, and cannot be, founded 
upon reasons. In the latter case, and following directly from the above, if disagree-
ments are to be resolved, citations to founding reasons cannot and do not effect such 
a resolution, as the notion of “founding” reasons is misguided from the start.  
How does one come to agree with others in judgments about, say, how to use 
words, over and above agreement in definitions, as Wittgenstein frames the issue? In 
response to this, Wittgenstein answers, in §208 of the Investigations, that “I’ll teach 
him to use the words by means of examples and exercises – And when I do this, I do 
not communicate less to him than I know myself.” Robert Fogelin underscores the 
latter portion, especially: “She [the teacher] is not holding anything back. She is not 
in possession of a secret key that she is trying to pass on to her student that, when 
successfully transmitting, will complete the training.”  This is a further indication 17
that universals, here figured as definitions, are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
projecting a skillful behavior into the future, and so, just as Panagia sees it, a version 
of politics that seeks to found itself on some sort of axiomatic set of propositions will 
always come up short.  
This passage of Wittgenstein’s is often invoked in the way that Fogelin em-
ploys it—as a model of how children or neophytes in fact learn how things are done, 
in fact come into agreement with others in the absence of definitional sufficiency. Ca-
$ . Fogelin, Taking Wittgenstein at His Word, 38.17
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vell is instructively unique in drawing out the implications of lacking that definitional 
security, which is to say, the possibility of failures of initiation: 
Our ability to communicate with him... depends upon our mutual attunement 
in judgments. It is astonishing how far this takes us in understanding one 
another, but it has its limits, and these are not merely, one might say, the li-
mits of knowledge but the limits of experience. And when these limits are rea-
ched, when our attunements are dissonant, I cannot get below them to firmer 
ground. The power I felt in my breath as my words flew to their effect now va-
nishes into thin air. For not only does he not receive me, because his natural 
reactions are not mine, but my own understanding is found to go no farther 
than my own natural reactions bear it. I am thrown back upon myself; I as it 
were turn my palms outward, as if to exhibit the kind of creature I am, and de-
clare my ground occupied, only mine, ceding yours.  18
I read Cavell’s inclination to turn his palms outward as a reference to the same porti-
on of the Investigations that Fogelin draws upon, in which Wittgenstein dramatizes 
the end of reasons: “Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, 
and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’”  19
This impasse is not an abyss. Remaining, in each version of this scene, are the 
protagonists, facing one another. One has his palms turned out; one says, perhaps 
with a shrug, this is simply what I do. This moment retains its political and ethical 
core. Even in the outward palms and in the shrug, there remains a moral claim: you 
ought to be like me, to see things as I do. In the void of reasons, this is what is shown: 
the attitudinal comportment of each toward the other as another self, as one among 
whom I belong too, as Heidegger has it.  
This scene, as recounted in Cavell and Fogelin and innumerable others—and 
even in the subtitle of this article—is always pictured as the end of a story, as the final 
gesture in an interpersonal encounter, as what remains when reasons give out. But 
the gesture itself, that is, confronting another with what you say and do as the asser-
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 115.18
$ . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §217.19
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tion of a claim upon them that they should say and do the same, is really also the ini-
tial move in this encounter, as well. Reaching bedrock is merely the uncovering of 
this existing condition. This stance, this posture, is the very gesture of politics. Even 
in their failure or frustration, these are attempts at making criteria count.  
This stance itself—a particular attitude toward another, as toward a soul—is 
centrally at stake in the second category of Cavell’s depictions of confrontation or dis-
cord: scenes of consent, we might call them. These are omnipresent in the Cavellian 
corpus, ranging from his reading of Othello in the Claim of Reason to his considerati-
ons of “screwball comedies” in Pursuits of Happiness and Cities of Words. This sort 
of confrontation—taking place between a pair of people who in some sense belong to-
gether—is always, Cavell notes, “the means of determining whether we can live to-
gether, accept one another into the aspirations of our lives.”  These conversations 20
turn on precisely what kind of stance one finds oneself capable of adopting with res-
pect to a certain other. Another’s way of holding the world asks for ratification; can 
this other change one’s way of looking at things, as Wittgenstein asks? Can we come 
to see the world in the way the other’s criteria suggests that it is? 
Cavellian judgment, embodied in the ontological stances one finds oneself ta-
king toward the objects and people of one’s world, is therefore more of a discovery 
about oneself in relation to others than a decision in that regard. For that reason, our 
ability to agree with one another in judgments is perpetually at issue, perpetually 
subject to success or failure. This is starkly different from the social contractarians’ 
view. Where Panagia criticizes a judgment-centered view of democracy, he singles out 
the necessity of our “already-agreed upon commitments” to certain form of political 
interaction. Cavell’s point, in this vein, is precisely that our agreements, even if we 
had actually made all the necessary ones, could not secure our continuing agreement, 
or show us the way forward. Indeed, our continued agreement in judgments are what 
we show or fail to show in these conversational or confrontational encounters. 
When Cavell turns explicitly to considerations of democracy in his work on 
Emerson, he refigures his movement of acknowledgment in terms of political con-
sent. In “Being Odd, Getting Even,” Cavell says, briefly considering the case of Ham-
$ . Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: 20
Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2005), 25.
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let, “The emphasis in the question ‘To be or not to be’ seems not on whether to die, 
but on whether to be born, on whether to affirm or deny the fact of natality, as a way 
of enacting, or not, one’s existence.” Importantly, a few lines later, he characterizes 
the decision in terms of assuming a “posture” toward the aforementioned fact of na-
tality. And he goes on to say explicitly that “these matters are represented in political 
thought under the heading of consent.”  The comportment toward a set of facts, af21 -
ter the facts alone have exhausted their ability to move us, is also what he means by 
acknowledgment. 
Consent further echoes acknowledgment to the extent that its movement is 
“simultaneously turned toward oneself and toward one’s contribution to the commu-
nal,” as Cavell remarks elsewhere.  As Cavell notes in Conditions Handsome and 22
Unhandsome, “the issue of consent becomes the issue of whether the voice I lend in 
recognizing a society as mine, as speaking for me, as my voice, my own.” Consent the-
refore also involves assuming a posture in which one’s voice speaks for one’s commu-
nity, while also reciprocally acknowledging that the community’s voice voices one’s 
own self.  And like acknowledgment, this consent can be withheld or avoided, and by 23
the same skeptical means, say with the image of “already agreed-upon commitments” 
as securing or exhausting this consent. 
Cavell’s scene of conversation is therefore dramatically dissimilar from Pana-
gia’s vision of exchanging reasons with an aim of persuasion. In the first place, becau-
se consent is perpetually at issue, the requested alteration occurs at the deeper level 
of agreeing in judgments. Wittgenstein’s scene of consent, one might say, occurs in 
the Investigations §144: “I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance 
of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: 
that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures,” in action, that is, rather than 
opinion.  In the second place, the issue of consent is not restricted to considerations 
of outcomes, but is tested throughout, in the fact of conversation itself, the fact that it 
is continuing or ceasing at every moment. Conversation, as a confrontation between 
$ . Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of 21
Chicago Press, 1988), 128.
$ . Cavell, “Philosophy as Education,” in Stanley Cavell and the Education of Grownups, ed. Paul 22
Standish and Naoko Saito (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 213.
$ . There is something complementary to be said here about Agamben’s reading of the Aristotelian 23
distinction between zoē and bios. Mathew Abbott has done this already, and extremely well.
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interlocutors over a matter of common concern, bodies forth and enacts a certain po-
lity via, necessarily, the eliciting of criteria. 
     
Black Lives Matter, Blue Lives Matter, All Lives Matter 
The Movement for Black Lives emerged in the wake of several killings of African 
Americans, largely at the hands of state agents. Darren Wilson’s killing of Michael 
Brown in 2014 and George Zimmerman’s slaying of Trayvon Martin in 2012 elevated 
the Movement to its current prominence, even as further incidents continue to occur. 
In the shape of its specific claims about the world we inhabit, and in the responses 
the Movement garners, I propose that the Movement for Black Lives offers a contem-
porary example of engaging in Cavellian conversation and politics writ large: the eli-
citing and recounting of criteria such that “the way we now hold the world is contras-
ted with, reformed into, a future way we could help it become.”   24
In a recent article, Russell Rickford outlines both the substantive demands and 
political practices of the Movement: 
Demanding accountability for racist violence and an immediate end to the 
murder of black people at the hands of the state, Black Lives Matter activists 
have used a host of disruptive techniques to advance their cause. Their mains-
tay has been occupation—of highways, intersections, sporting events, retail 
stores, malls, campaign events, police stations, and municipal buildings…. 
What is evident is that most Black Lives Matter adherents recognize the inhe-
rent shortcomings of appeals to politicians, the courts, and other “acceptable” 
channels of redress, and have wholeheartedly embraced the arena of the 
street.  25
The political methods described above comport with Panagia’s distaste for exchange-
of-reasons politics, and so the way in which these methods figure Cavell’s notion of a 
$ . Cavell, Cities of Words, 1.24
$ . Russell Rickford, “Black Lives Matter: Toward a Modern Practice of Mass Struggle,” New Labor 25
Forum 25.1 (2016): 36.
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conversation that shows will elucidate the continuity between Cavell and Panagia’s 
Rancière that Panagia overlooks. 
At explicit issue in the demands and practices of the Movement are the criteria 
for the mattering of a given life. The call for protest actions in defense of black life 
emerges from a view that, manifestly, black lives do not matter. The criteria elicited 
here, the criteria of injustice, often focus on the dual facts that in initial encounters, 
police err on the side of lethal violence in the face of perceived threats to their own 
lives, and that in the legal proceedings that follow, indictments and convictions for 
these officers have not much followed. Blackness is disposable. This is the picture of 
things that the Movement places before the public, the acceptance of which, in Witt-
gensteinian parlance, would consist in our now being inclined to regard such cases 
differently. 
But large segments of the political right not only reject this picture of things, 
but also take these claims, and these criteria, as specific attacks on their own version 
of the world. The mantras “Blue Lives Matter,” referring to police lives, and “All Lives 
Matter” serve to typify these responses. The criteria for the notion that the Movement 
for Black Lives actively denigrates and endangers police officers comes not only from 
the high-profile revenge murder of two NYPD officers, but also the exonerations of 
officers involved in deadly encounters with African Americans. These legal results 
publicly support the notion that officers were justified in fearing for their lives and 
discharging their weapons in self-defense. The “All Lives Matter” motto, meanwhile, 
takes the Movement to be singling out Black Lives for “special rights” or special tre-
atment, which would fly in the face of American equality-for-all ideals. 
Both of these responses to the Movement amount to confronting activists – 
and the third-party public—with contrasting pictures of the situation, pictures that 
similarly lodge a demand for acceptance. Emphasizing officers’ roles in black death 
encourages violence against officers, and to that extent endangers their lives; and 
demanding “special” care by officers is tantamount to asking for “free stuff” based on 
racial identity, and to that extent is racist itself. I wish to highlight the ways in which 
the Blue Lives and All Lives arguments engage in Cavellian avoidance or refusal in 
the face of the Movement’s claims.  
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Most prominently, these modes of argumentation refuse to respond to the cen-
tral element of the Movement’s picture: the racial disparity in lethal state violence, 
which would phenomenologically attest to the null value of black lives. The accusati-
on does not rest on whether individual officers hold prejudicial opinions, but on the 
simple fact of disproportionate black death. But this central fact is persistently avoi-
ded. Blue Lives Matter argues that criticizing officers can lead to prejudicial views of 
the police, which can itself lead to violence. All Lives Matter simply argues that the 
Movement’s motto itself is a call for inequality that we ought to reject. 
These responses to Black Lives Matter are in this way refusals of the first de-
mand—to consider black lives. Both responses look away from the particular cases 
that the Movement cites and instead look either to cases that support their view or to 
transcendent principles. When activists adopt the Occupy protest tactics that Rick-
ford cites, some states reacted by considering legislation to decriminalize drivers who 
hit protesters. All of these responses make the Movement’s point for them: your lives 
are not as important as police lives, as our principles, as our commute time. 
The example of the Movement for Black Lives only serves to show that our 
(American) democratic practices are not well-described by the kind of reason-cente-
red social-contractarianism that Panagia rejects. Cavellian conversation, though, does 
account for this kind of political divergence. As Rickford notes, the disruptive protest 
practices “serve as a means of dramatizing routine attacks on black life,” that is, serve 
to make the relevant criteria evident through action; serve to show it, alongside and 
beyond any saying. Nor is this a new feature. Shana Redmond, for instance, details 
the long history of musical practices in public spaces as central to African American 
(and labor) organizing, another method of intervening in public space and inviting 
others to share in one’s picture of things, in one’s judgments. 
Cavell’s work on agreement, consent, and acknowledgment in the realm of the 
political not only goes beyond the limits of contractarian political thought that Pana-
gia identifies, but also participates in Panagia’s own project of making criteria count. 
Rickford notes that it remains “unclear” whether the Movement for Black Lives either 
“rejects” or “simply mistrusts” electoral politics. But from a Cavellian perspective, we 
can see the Movement is involved in a deeper politics—not attempting to garner votes 
for this or that candidate, but trying to assert and to test whether the relative value of 
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black lives will be a public issue at all. In the course of the confrontational conversati-
on with Blue Lives and All Lives supporters, the criteria of what counts as demonstra-
ting a life’s value, and what counts as standing with and standing against a certain 
picture of the world, emerge. The stakes are not restricted to the next election cycle. 
As in every confrontation, and with every issue, the conversation reveals the extent to 
which we do or do not in fact live together, and elucidates the conditions under which 
we may continue—or begin—to do so. 
CONVERSATIONS 5
Seeing Selves and Imagining Others: Aesthetic 
Interpretation and the Claim to Community in 
Cavell 
JON NAJARIAN 
Politics is aesthetic in principle. 
JACQUES RANCIÈRE	
From his early childhood, Stanley Cavell learned to tread carefully the intervening 
space between twin pillars: of aesthetic sensibility on the one hand, and political be-
longing on the other. Early in his memoir Little Did I Know, Cavell establishes a set 
of differences between his mother and father that far exceed both gender and age (his 
father was ten years older than his mother), as he notes the starkly contrasting dis-
pensations of their respective families: 
The artistic temperament of my mother’s family, the Segals, left them on the 
whole, with the exception of my mother and her baby brother, Mendel, doubt-
fully suited to an orderly, successful existence in the new world; the orthodox, 
religious sensibility of my father’s family, the Goldsteins, produced a second 
generation—some twenty-two first cousins of mine—whose solidarity and se-
verity of expectation produced successful dentists, lawyers, and doctors, pillars 
of the Jewish community, and almost without exception attaining local, some 
of them national, some even a certain international, prominence.  1
From his mother’s family, Cavell would inherit the musical sensibility that, had he not 
ventured into the world of academic philosophy, might have led him towards a career 
as a musician or in music. In his father’s family Cavell observes a religious belonging 
that, in the decades in which Cavell is raised, becomes morally inseparable from politi-
$ . Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 3. 1
CONVERSATIONS 5 !36
cal belonging, as the rise of European anti-Semitism and the threat of Hitler’s ascent to 
power would drastically alter the political significance of Jewish religious identification.  
Indeed, at the end of his first entry in the memoir (which is written as a series 
of diary entries), Cavell recognizes that he had previously cited the work Vladimir 
Jankelevitch not because of Jankelevitch’s interest in music, but because with Hitler’s 
rise “Jankelevitch forswore forever reading and mentioning German philosophy and 
listening to German music.”  Jankelevitch’s “practice of … renunciation,” which for 2
Cavell is common practice in the teaching of philosophy, becomes a productive philo-
sophical counterpoint: the aim of the philosopher, as Cavell articulates it in the next 
entry, is “to write, however limitedly, the autobiography of a species; if not of huma-
nity as a whole, then representative of anyone who finds himself or herself in it.”  The 3
claim to community is a dominant trend in Cavell’s philosophy from Must We Mean 
What We Say? and The Claim of Reason to Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow and 
is perhaps his most important inheritance from the work of Wittgenstein and Austin, 
which Cavell summarizes succinctly in the memoir: “this is how I have understood 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and J. L. Austin’s procedures, in their 
appeals to the language of everyday, or ordinary language, namely, that I speak philo-
sophically for others when they recognize what I say as what they would say, recogni-
ze that their language is mine, or put otherwise, that language is ours, that we are 
speakers” (6). If, as Cavell posits, the project of the philosopher—or at least the philo-
sopher of ordinary language—is to “speak philosophically for others,” then Janekel-
vitch’s renunciation of German philosophy and German music becomes inherently 
inimical to the practice of philosophy. The renunciation would put Cavell at odds with 
both the philosopher he loved most, the Austrian Wittgenstein, who fought for the 
Central Powers in WWI and who, in struggling with own Jewishness, made anti-Se-
mitic remarks that were uncomfortably similar to the rhetoric of the Nazi party 
(comments he abandoned, thankfully, as the Nazi party rose to power) ; and also at 4
$ . Ibid., 5. 2
$ . Ibid., 6.3
$ . See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Penguin, 1990), 313-17. Monk 4
situates Wittgenstein’s anti-Semitism within a broad context of European anti-Semitic sentiment, and 
notes that Wittgenstein never fully believed his own anti-Semitism. Indeed, Wittgenstein was horrified 
by the developments leading up the WWII, and his family faced grave dangers because of their Jewish 
background. See also Marjorie Perloff, “‘To Become a Different Person’: Wittgenstein, Christianity, 
and the Modernist Ethos,” in Wittgenstein and Modernism, ed. Michael Lemahieu and Karen Zumha-
gen-Yekplé (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), 41-56. 
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odds with the German musical tradition of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven (all of whom 
are referenced throughout Little Did I Know) that was so important to his early musi-
cal education.  5
If I’m overstating the contrast between the aesthetic and the political in the 
early years of Cavell’s personal life, it’s to try to understand how these contrasting 
dispensations shaped his philosophical work. As I’ll demonstrate in the rest of the es-
say, there is a strong impetus in Cavell towards bridging the aesthetic and the politi-
cal, though in a vastly different vein than Benjamin’s aestheticization of politics. I ar-
gue, contra Benjamin, that Cavell is interested in the politicization of aesthetics, in 
understanding how the modes of thought that characterize aesthetic judgment are 
fundamental to our participation in civic life. For Cavell, to engage aesthetic objects 
is, as Kant suggested, to make yourself known to others, to unveil something about 
yourself and your world-view, and (as Cavell says elsewhere about “passionate utte-
rances”)  to invite others to share in your sense of how the world strikes you. In his 6
writings on both aesthetic experience and political engagement, Cavell relies on a no-
tion of subjective expression that is subtly but seriously committed to interpersonal 
and communal interaction. 
This is to say neither that art underpins our political institutions nor that it 
provides definitions and arguments for individual rights. Nor is it to suggest that art 
and political life are merely analogous; it is not that some aspect of our aesthetic ex-
perience have surprising but inconsequential overlap with our understanding of the 
lives of others. Rather, this essay draws on recent work on the relationship between 
politics and aesthetics and traces the considerable extent to which making aesthetic 
judgments entails the sorts of activities—imagining and interpreting another’s subjec-
tivity, understanding your own relation to another, giving voice to an argument that 
you want others to accept even as you recognize that they may not—that are essential 
$ . Cavell recognizes the potential political danger of claiming to speak for others, especially when you 5
claim to speak for a disadvantaged or politically oppressed group. He recognizes, moreover, that those 
speaking from positions of oppression might balk at the suggestion that their words be seemingly 
stripped of the historically specific conditions that prompted them and accepted instead as a universa-
list creed of common human belonging—Cavell confesses “that certain women I know who write philo-
sophically would not at all be glad to adopt this posture,” (Little Did I Know, 6) and the same may be 
true for other historically disenfranchised groups who feel the power of oppression and the weight of 
history bearing down on their shoulders.
$ . Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University 6
Press, 2005).
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to the formation of political communities. Moreover, I argue that for Cavell (and by 
extension for Wittgenstein) our experience of others is itself an aesthetic one, most 
evident in Cavell’s explication of Wittgenstein’s famously cryptic remarks about se-
eing something as something.  The world of appearances, whether the face in a pain7 -
ting or the face of an other, motivates our understanding of our place in relation to 
the world around us. Coming to speak philosophically for others—and being able to 
recognize when they speak for us—relies on practices of visual perception, interpreta-
tion, and aesthetic judgement, all of which inform our ability to see others and their 
words as criteria for community. 
Critical thought on the relationship between aesthetics and politics has long 
been haunted by Benjamin’s warnings about the Fascist threat inherent to the aesthe-
ticization of politics. In recent years, however, philosophers and theorists have begun 
to rethink the role aesthetics can play in the development of political thought. Most 
prominently, Jacques Rancière has suggested “There is thus an ‘aesthetics’ at the core 
of politics that has nothing to do with Benjamin’s discussion of the ‘aestheticization 
of politics’ specific to the ‘age of the masses’. This aesthetics should not be understo-
od as the perverse commandeering of politics by a will to art.”  Rather, Rancière con8 -
tinues, aesthetics is “a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisi-
ble, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of 
politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be 
said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the 
properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”  Indeed, Cavell’s work often bears 9
directly on questions of how aesthetic attunement can inform our political sensibility. 
As Nikolas Kompridis points out in the introduction to his edited collection The 
Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought (2014), 
$ . Cf. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford Univer7 -
sity Press, 1979), 354-90.
$ . Jacques Rancière, The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Continuum, 2004), 13.8
$ . Rancière, Distribution of the Sensible, 13. Building on the work of Rancière, David Panagia seeks to 9
explore the ways in which our everyday interactions with the world of appearances are at once aesthe-
tic and political. See his Ten Theses for an Aesthetics of Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2016). Panagia pushes back against the idea that aesthetic judgment is purely sensory, and the-
refore shouldn’t have a place in political discourse that should strive (on certain accounts) to be purely 
rational. Characterizing the view he works against, Panagia writes, “if it is true that instances of aesthe-
tic appreciation are akin to intellectual stultification, and if spectatorship is characterized as a space of 
distraction from what is properly political, then the everyday moments we all have of looking, hearing, 
touching, tasting, and smelling, and those minute instances whereby we derive an unverifiable sense of 
pleasure or disturbance from such moments of aesthetic appreciation, are simply bad” (xii).
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there are problems of politics that can appear as political problems only in an 
aesthetic dimension. Adapting a thought of Stanley Cavell’s for our own pur-
poses, we might say that the aesthetic turn consists in political thought’s re-
cognition of and response to the aesthetic problems of modern politics. We 
can give them the following names: the problem of voice and voicelessness, the 
problem of the new, the problem of integrating (rather than dichotomizing) 
the ordinary and the extraordinary, the problem of judgment, the problem of 
responsiveness and receptivity, the problem of appearance, and of what is gi-
ven to sense to make sense of, and, more generally, the problem of the mea-
ning and scope of the aesthetic dimension of politics.   10
For Kompridis, attention to these questions (of voice and voicelessness, ordinary and 
extraordinary, judgments and appearances) in political thought might come to sup-
plement questions about justice, liberty, and constitution, staking out a political ter-
rain that is implicitly aesthetic. As Andrew Norris has argued, the emphasis in politi-
cal philosophy on questions of justice and liberty over judgment and appearance pro-
bably explains the relative dearth of attention Cavell has received as a political thin-
ker. Noting that Cavell has received far more attention as someone interested in skep-
ticism, Norris suggests that it is nonetheless surprising that the political implications 
of his thought have been undervalued; Cavell is interested, after all, in understanding 
how “Who we are and what beliefs and actions we are committed to is something 
only you and I and others joining us can say. Our common identity is articulated in 
conversations in which we as individuals give and weigh our reasons, our sense of 
what should count for us, and why.”   11
This work provides a foundation from which we can begin to understand the 
extent of Cavell’s interest in the political dimension of aesthetic judgment. I’m parti-
cularly interested in the expanded notions of the aesthetic that many of these thin-
kers employ. Kompridis casts the aesthetic in contexts beyond the mere appreciation 
of art and writes, “By ‘aesthetic’ or ‘aesthetics’ we mean much more than a specialized 
inquiry into the nature of art, artworks, or beauty, grounded in a sensuous, usually 
$ . Nikolas Kompridis, ed., The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 10
xix-xx.
$ . Andrew Norris, “Stanley Cavell and the Claim to Community,” in The Claim to Community: Essays 11
on Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy, ed. Norris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 2.
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non-cognitive, mode of perception. What is meant is something much wider in scope, 
something that is still being explored and mapped, something directly implicated in 
what counts as cognition, reason, experience, meaning and agency.”  “The aesthetic” 12
complicates modes of engagement, especially epistemologically oriented ones, that 
structure our experience of the world. That is, for Kompridis, aesthetics is not simply 
a sensuous contrast to the cognitive, it also asks us to reconsider what cognition looks 
like. Specifically, and as I elaborate later in the essay, aesthetic judgment is for Cavell 
a moment of revelatory expression, an effort to make yourself known and to invite 
others to see the world how you see the world.  
Making yourself known or revealing yourself in the face of the other is inhe-
rently a political act, though political, it should be clear, only in a specialized and bro-
ad sense. That is, like many of the thinkers I’ve cited above, I don't claim here to de-
monstrate the ways in which aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment modify or 
inform political institutions, nor do I hope to suggest that aesthetic judgements dis-
guise (or betray) political ideologies. Rather, I’m interested in how the process of ar-
ticulating one’s sensibility is fundamental both to making aesthetic judgments and 
the formation of political life. For Cavell, community is that which fosters intersub-
jective expression: “To speak for oneself politically is to speak for the other with 
whom you consent to association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by them.”  Re13 -
cognizing the other as an agent that might speak for me, and understanding my own 
relation to her and her words, is the foundation of both aesthetic and political life. 
Just as crucial, however, is the possibility of disagreement, since, as Cavell puts it, 
“To speak for yourself means the rebuff [...] of those for whom you claimed to be spe-
aking; and it means risking having to rebuff [...] those who claimed to be speaking for 
you.”  The definition of community and political life that Cavell provides is not ho14 -
mogenous, and not one that seeks to erase or overlook the differences between us. On 
the contrary, Cavell defines political life by beginning from the premise that we are 
different, that we occupy distinct subjectivities, and that my words won’t necessarily 
be yours; and yet sometimes we find ourselves in the words of others. Consider, for 
example, Stephen Mulhall’s suggestion that “aesthetic debate is thus a way of cons-
$ . Kompridis, ed., The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought, xvi.12
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 27. 13
$ . Ibid., 27.14
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tructing or discovering community through the articulation and development of indi-
viduality; it shows a way in which community can be founded upon the fuller expres-
sion, rather than the complete repression, of individuality.”  Political community, 15
like aesthetic experience, depends upon the ability to articulate a subjectivity even 
while we embrace the subjectivity and the individuality of others.  
As is clear from much of Cavell’s work, to belong to a community depends on the 
ability to communicate and to be understood, and Cavell’s early essay “Aesthetic Pro-
blems of Modern Philosophy” is first and foremost an essay about communicating an 
understanding, and about understanding the act of communication. While he spends 
the first half of the essay discussing the paraphrasability of metaphor, poetry as a “for-
mulable” art, and the atonality of modern music, Cavell characteristically refuses to 
come down on one side of the issues he raises. His point, of course, is not that the issue 
is too complex to decide one way or another, but rather to demonstrate how we might 
think about difficult poetry, or difficult music. “Brooks is wrong to say that poems can-
not in principle be fully paraphrased,” Cavell writes, “but right to be worried about the 
relation between paraphrase and poem.”  To be worried about the relation between 16
paraphrase and poem is not, for Cavell, justification for the belief that poems cannot be 
paraphrased. As Cavell suggests, this “has the gait of a false issue”  because Brooks has 17
misunderstood the role of the critic, whose job is not (or shouldn’t be) to denounce pa-
raphrase as a poetic impossibility but rather to model the sorts of problems that pa-
raphrase poses.  Sometimes when dealing with difficult poetry, such as Hart Crane or 18
Wallace Stevens, we may realize that we are “able to say nothing [about what the lines 
mean] except that a feeling has been voiced by a kindred spirit and that if someone 
does not get it he is not in one’s world, or not of one’s flesh.”  Art, then, allows us to 19
recognize the standards by which we judge not just art, but also our connection to those 
$ . Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Clarendon 15
Press/Oxford University Press, 1994), 29. Mulhall continues, acknowledging that “If this sort of com-
munity can result only from abandoning the guarantee of agreement, then it is hardly surprising that 
we sometimes choose abandonment” (29).
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays, updated edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge 16
University Press, 2002), 82. 
$ . Ibid., 75. 17
$ . As Anthony Cascardi has written, criticism for Cavell “is a way of engaging those things that philo18 -
sophy—whether as epistemology or as metaphysics—had learned to avoid.” Cascardi, “Cavell and Kant: 
The Work of Criticism and the Work of Art,” in Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of 
Skepticism, ed. Richard Eldridge and Bernard Rhie (New York: Continuum, 2011), 48.
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 81. 19
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around us, while criticism is the route that bridges us. The successful critic is able to 
communicate what she sees in the work of art, and to get others to see it there too.  20
“Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy” demonstrates Cavell’s commit-
ment to approaching aesthetic judgment as an act of communal understanding and 
expression. The essay is devoted not to understanding whether modern music is or 
might be atonal, and not to arguing straightforwardly that it is tonal; rather, Cavell is 
interested in interrogating the habits of mind and speech that allow us to voice argu-
ments intelligibly, in understanding how we communicate our aesthetic commit-
ments and, moreover, how expressions of aesthetic understanding either contribute 
to or undermine our appeals to community. Cavell writes about how “we may find 
ourselves within the experience of such compositions, following them” and suggests 
that “then the question whether this is music and the problem its tonal sense, will be
—not answered or solved, but rather they will disappear, seem irrelevant.”  If we find 21
ourselves within and following a composition, we might be tempted to say that the 
composition—like the work of good philosophy, in Cavell’s sense—speaks for us, that 
we can identify with it, that we can see ourselves in the composition. This sense of 
identification, of finding ourselves in a work, justifies our aesthetic engagement and, 
moreover, the Kantian sense that others can, or should, or must, see what we see in a 
work of art. “It is essential,” Cavell writes “to making an aesthetic judgment that at 
some point we be prepared to say in its support: don’t you see, don’t you hear, don’t 
you dig?”  Two things are striking about the passage: the first, that it is essential in 22
$ . Cf. Cavell’s discussion of a passage in Hume, who cites a story from Don Quixote wherein two men 20
taste supposedly excellent wine. One man proclaims the wine very good, but notes a hint of leather, 
while the other, agreeing that is is good, suggests a taste of iron; they find, in the bottom of the cask, a 
key with a leather thong attached to it. “All that makes the critic’s expression of taste worth more than 
another man’s” Cavell writes, here of the wine critic, “is his ability to produce for himself the thong and 
key of his response; and his vindication comes not from his pointing out that it is, or was, in the barrel, 
but in getting us to taste it there.” Ibid., 87.
$ . Ibid., 84. Cavell is following the early and late Wittgenstein, whom he cites on the subsequent page. 21
Cavell summarizes, “the problems of life and the problems of philosophy have related grammars, be-
cause solutions to them both have the same form: their problems are solved only when they disappear, 
and answers arrived at only when there are no longer questions—when, as it were, our accounts have 
cancelled them” (85).
$ . Ibid., 93. Recently, Rita Felski has argued for the value of what she calls “attachment theory,” a 22
notion with links to Cavell’s ideas about attunement, in making aesthetic judgments. She thinks, righ-
tly in my view, that we’ve deeply misunderstood the value of our emotional connection to art objects, 
and that approaching questions of aesthetic engagement vis-à-vis the attachments we form might shed 
some light on what we do as critics and, perhaps more importantly, why. Her book on these topics has 
yet to be published; she’s offered talks at the 2017 MLA Convention in Philadelphia and other venues 
on the subject. 
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Cavell’s view that to make an aesthetic judgment is to be impelled to communicate, to 
have the desire to be understood, and to make a claim to community; the second, that 
in making aesthetic judgments, we become ready to abandon argument. While he 
admits that “the best critic will know the best points”,  his suggestion that the claim 23
to community takes the form “don’t you see, don’t you dig” admits that, somewhere, 
arguments and reasons come to an end.   24
Aesthetic judgment is important for Cavell, then, because of the way in which 
it begets intersubjective expression and prompts us to imagine—or at least to hope to 
be able to imagine—the world of the other.  Can’t you see isn’t just a plea to get so25 -
meone else to accept my view, but also a recognition that I don’t necessarily see 
theirs; it’s an admission of possible difference, and an admission that I may not be 
able to overcome this difference, and most importantly for Cavell, it’s an invitation to 
try to overcome this difference. Aesthetic engagement is an exercise in attempting to 
understand, as the ordinary language philosopher feels compelled to understand, 
“what we say,” not, as Cavell stresses, in an empirical sense, as if a collection of data 
could prove definitively that we say or don’t say this or that, but in the sense that Ca-
vell summarizes in his memoir, in the sense that productive philosophical discourse 
must have some bearing on what it means to belong to human community that has a 
sense of a shared history and culture. This is not, again, to erase the important diffe-
rences between us, but to prompt introspection, to look and see, in Wittgenstein’s 
language,  whether we can identify the ways in which someone else’s words can spe26 -
ak for me: “the philosopher appealing to everyday language,” Cavell writes, “turns to 
the reader not to convince him without proof but to get him to prove something, test 
something, against himself.”  He continues: “All the philosopher, this kind of philo27 -
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 93.23
$ . Cavell is drawing on Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell), §217; 24
Cavell writes, “At some point, the critic will have to say: This is what I see. Reasons—at definite points, 
for definite reasons, in different circumstances—come to an end” (MWM 93). This is not to say, howe-
ver, that aesthetic arguments are therefore shunned to the realm of the irrational, or destined to be 
forever inconclusive. “The arguments that support them [aesthetic judgments],” Cavell writes, “are not 
conclusive the way arguments in logic are, nor rational the way arguments in science are. [...] It does 
not follow, however, that such judgments are not conclusive and rational” (MWM 88).
$ . For more on how Cavell’s notion of the aesthetic resists or revises a conception of aesthetics that 25
would emphasize social power and class distinction (such as in Bourdieu), see Benjamin Mangrum, 
“Bourdieu, Cavell, and the Politics of Aesthetic Value,” in Literature & Theology 29.3 (2015): 260-83.
$ . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §66.26
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 95. 27
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sopher, can do is to express, as fully as he can, his world, and attract our undivided 
attention to our own.”  28
For Cavell, to bridge distinctive subjectivities requires active engagement, the 
willingness to test out the philosopher’s words against our own experience. It is well 
known that throughout his “Aesthetic Problems” essay, Cavell is interested in van-
quishing the problems that philosophers of (particularly modern) art engage, not by 
providing answers to the questions they raise but attempting to show how a change in 
perspective—and, really, a personal change, a therapeutic change—can make certain 
problems seem to disappear. His efforts to dissolve certain of philosophy’s problems 
is distinctively Wittgensteinian.  The problems of both life and philosophy, Cavell 29
writes, “are solved only when they disappear, and answers are arrived at only when 
there are no longer questions.”  This often means, in both Wittgenstein and Cavell, 30
that we undertake to change something about ourselves, something about how we see 
the world.  
Wittgenstein’s frequent appeals to visual perception  are a way of encouraging 31
philosophers to approach philosophy therapeutically: we can solve the problems of 
philosophy, and come to understand something about the world, not if we train our 
conceptual capabilities to practice theoretical acrobatics but by recognizing the pat-
terns of our perceptions and seeking to change how we view the world. This means 
not only understanding and changing our perspective, but understanding how our 
perspective fits in the world, understanding our place in the world around us. “As 
usual,” Cavell writes in his commentary on Wittgenstein’s invocation of the Weltans-
chauung, “the claim to severe philosophical advance entails a reconception of the 
subject, a specific sense of revolution.”  It’s not, in other words, solely about chan32 -
$ . Ibid., 96. 28
$ . He cites Wittgenstein and writes: “In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says: ‘The solution of the problem 29
of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem’ (6.521); and in the Investigations he says: ‘ … the clarity 
that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical pro-
blems should completely disappear’ (§133)” (ibid., 85). 
$ . Ibid., 85. 30
$ . For example, in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §66: “look and see whether there is 31
anything common to all [games]”; “don’t think, but look!” And, more importantly for Cavell, §122: 
“The concept of a surveyable representation [übersichtlichen Darstellung] is of fundamental signifi-
cance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltans-
chauung’?). (Before the fourth edition, “surveyable representation” was translated as “perspicuous re-
presentation.” Cavell uses “perspicuous,” because it was the translation at the time; today, many com-
mentators still prefer “perspicuous,” despite the difficulties that prompted the change to “surveyable.”) 
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 86. 32
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ging your perspective, but about understanding your Weltanschauung and working, 
in a therapeutic sense, through the problems that have impeded you.  
The term Weltanschauung invokes an aesthetically motivated politics, sugges-
ting that our perception informs the beliefs the we hold. Cavell links his writing on 
aesthetic judgment and political belonging most explicitly in his use of the term. Ca-
vell writes, summarizing the segment on embryos, slaves, and humanity in The Claim 
of Reason: 
I have wished to say that it is not a fact that human embryos are human beings 
and that it is nothing more than a fact that certain human beings are slaves. 
This may be to suggest that someone who expresses himself or herself 
otherwise inhabits a particular Weltanschauung; that the world, and himself 
in it, has struck him in a particular way.   33
Cavell has just finished arguing that the slaveowner does indeed see his slaves as pe-
ople (and not as beasts, for example),  and has observed that the slave owner “in the 34
end will appeal to history, to a form, or rather a way, of life: this is what he does. He 
believes exactly what justice denies, that history and indefinite difference can justify 
his social difference of position.”  Importantly for Cavell, in embracing a perspective 35
that is morally wrong, the slaveowner fails to see the connection between himself and 
his slaves: “he is rather missing something about himself, or rather something about 
his connection with these people, his internal relation with them, so to speak.”  It’s 36
not what he does see, that is, but what he fails to see that differentiates him from the 
person who is able to recognize the horrors of slavery; the slaveowner refuses to see 
his world with nuance, and fails to see the nuance in his world. Part of the problem 
for Cavell is that the Weltanschauung of the slaveowner prohibits him from seeing 
arguments against slavery. The problem is more aesthetic than it is rational, logical, 
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 378.33
$ . Cavell writes, “When he [the slaveowner] rapes a slave or takes her as a concubine, he does not feel 34
that he has, by that fact itself, embraced sodomy. […] He does not go to great lengths either to convert 
his horses to Christianity or to prevent their getting wind of it. Everything in his relation to his slaves 
shows that he treats them as more or less human—his humiliations of them, his disappointments, his 
jealousies, his fears, his punishments, his attachments” (CR 376). 
$ . Ibid., 376. 35
$ . Ibid.36
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or political: that is, the problem is not that I can’t provide an adequate argument 
against slavery, it’s that I can’t get my interlocutor to see my argument as adequate. 
As Cavell puts it in The Claim of Reason, “I can refuse to accept a ‘ground for dout’ 
without impugning it as false, and without supplying a new basis, and yet not auto-
matically be dismissed as irrational or morally incompetent. What I cannot do, and 
yet maintain my position as morally competent, is to deny the relevance of your 
doubts.”  37
Let me be clear: I’m not suggesting that making aesthetic judgments and ow-
ning slaves amount, in the end, to the same thing, and I certainly don’t mean to imply 
that holding slaves amounts to little more than engaging with the world aesthetically. 
Rather, I’m attempting to draw out the parallels between Cavell’s claims about 
aesthetic judgment and his claims about the Weltanschauung of the slaveowner, na-
mely that each are motivated by the world of appearances. It’s important, I think, to 
recognize that aesthetic sensibility underwrites Cavell’s ideas about political belon-
ging, inclusion, exclusion, and even abuse: not that holding slaves amounts to 
nothing more than making aesthetic judgments, but that sometimes our experience 
of the world of appearances, and the act of making aesthetic judgments, can amount 
to holding slaves, or can provide justification for adopting a worldview that would ex-
clude, objectify, denigrate, and oppress others.  
This is not to imply that every political judgment is some sort of coded aesthe-
tic judgment, but rather to suggest that, insofar as the faculties at play in making 
aesthetic judgments are also responsible for certain political dispositions, the two 
overlap most explicitly in the act of interpretation. It’s worth remembering that Ca-
vell’s discussion of seeing people as people (or failing to see the internal connections 
between people) begins with his suggestion that Wittgenstein’s writings on seeing-as 
are really about interpretation. “‘Seeing something as something’ is what Wittgens-
tein calls ‘interpretation’,” Cavell writes, and adds that “imagination is called for, fa-
ced with the other, when I have to take the facts in, realize the significance of what is 
going on, make the behavior real for myself, make a connection.”  The emphasis on 38
interpretation becomes the introduction to Cavell’s sense, which he inherits from 
$ . Ibid., 267.37
$ . Ibid., 354. 38
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Wittgenstein, that our responses to and engagements with other people have more to 
do with aesthetics than they do with claims about knowledge, logic, or reason. “To 
know another mind,” Cavell writes, “is to interpret a physiognomy, and the message 
of this region of the Investigations is that this is not a matter of ‘mere knowing’.”  39
Cavell then invokes Wittgenstein’s surprising claim that “the human body is the best 
picture of the human soul.”  “Picture” ask us to adopt an aesthetic attitude toward 40
others and underscores the pronounced shift away from the idea that knowledge is 
what mediates people; it’s not that I either know or don’t know another person, but 
that I respond (or don’t), acknowledge (or refuse to acknowledge), interpret (or fail to 
interpret) their being, their soul, that which makes them irrefutably human, that whi-
ch provides us with an internal relation. Throughout pages 355-70 of The Claim of 
Reason, Cavell juxtaposes knowledge against other, more fitting modes of response 
to the human other, as he talks about knowledge as a form of experience (357), as ex-
pression (358), as attunement and intuition (359), as an attitude (360-61), and as an 
act of reading and interpretation (369-71). If human bodies are pictures of human 
souls, then the way to convince someone of the humanity of the other is not through 
reason and logic, but through aesthetic response: “in knowing others I am generally 
interpreting them.”  In confronting the slaveowner—who, of course, in this example 41
stands in for the Weltanschauung that would deny or question that justice superse-
des the demands of history and tradition—we are left, in the end, with one argumen-
tative claim: can’t you see?  42
Seeing something as something, interpreting a physiognomy, experiencing 
meaning, reading an expression—these are the sorts of things we do, Cavell writes, 
when we interact with others. And it is for these reasons that Cavell writes, pa-
$ . Ibid., 356.39
$ . In Wittgenstein, the line appears in Philosophical Investigations, §25; in Cavell, The Claim of Rea40 -
son, 356. Cavell continues: “Not, I feel like adding, primarily because it represents the soul but because 
it expresses it. The body is the field of expression of the soul. The body is of the soul; it is the soul’s; a 
human soul has a human body.”
$ . Ibid., 371.41
$ . In her essay “‘We Feel Our Freedom’: Imagination and judgment in the thought of Hannah 42
Arendt,” Linda Zerilli makes a comparable and important claim about the political value, even the ne-
cessity, of imagination: “Every extension of a political concept always involves an imaginative opening 
up of the world that allows us to see and articulate relations between things that have none (in any ne-
cessary, logical sense), to create relations that are external to their terms. Political relations are always 
external to their terms: they involve not so much the ability to subsume particulars under concepts, 
but an imaginative element, the ability to see or to forge new connections.” In The Aesthetic Turn in 
Political Thought, ed. Nikolas Kompridis (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 57.
CONVERSATIONS 5 !48
renthetically, “thus may the philosophy of mind become aesthetics.”  We experien43 -
ce our social lives and political lives through practices of aesthetic engagement, th-
rough activities like seeing and interpreting and expressing. And political life is in-
deed an experience, something we live more than something we know. Reconcei-
ving our relations with others as aspects of our aesthetic sensibility shifts the focus 
from questions about what I can or cannot know about my world and others in it to 
questions about what, and how, I experience my world, what I see and feel and can 
communicate.    
Aesthetic judgments in Cavell can be characterized by what Mulhall calls “the 
controlled deployment of subjectivity.”  Far from being the contemplative observati44 -
on of a disinterested subject,  aesthetic engagement asks us to examine our respon45 -
ses to art objects and test our “capacity to understand ourselves in relation to these 
objects.”  Aesthetic engagement is not passive and reflexive, but active and intros46 -
pective, prompting us to understand and responsibly articulate the world in which we 
live. Mulhall continues by suggesting that the critic “must rely upon a capacity of self-
knowledge and a capacity to give expression to that self-knowledge in ways which will 
persuade people to try to share the subjective world of her aesthetic responses which 
is thereby displayed.”  This is a radical claim: the idea that we can share our subjec47 -
tive worlds underscores the extent to which expressions of aesthetic judgments are 
not solipsistic but communal, that in giving voice to our subjective experiences we 
can make known that which is ostensibly private. Aesthetic judgment invites partici-
$ . Ibid., 357. 43
$ . Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 28.44
$ . Forgive me for characterizing a common misreading of Kant’s view of aesthetic judgments. Those 45
who believe that Kant views aesthetic judgment as a dispassionate reflection of detached observer 
might point to sentences like “judgments of taste, of themselves, do not even give rise to any interest” 
and “A judgment of taste [...] is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the 
existence of the object” (Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987] 
48 n. 10, 51; emphasis original). The correct reading, however, would point out that the disinterest is 
directed not toward the judgment itself, but toward the object; if we take an interest in the object, our 
judgment in taste is no longer free. For Kant, our aesthetic judgments are derived not from the object, 
but from the presentation of the object. Kant writes that “what matters is what I do with this presenta-
tion within myself, and not the [respect] in which I depend on the object’s existence,” and also posits 
that “the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name fee-
ling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and 
judging” (46, 44; brackets original). Cavell’s sense that aesthetic judgment has significant impact on 
how we understand ourselves and our relation to our world is indebted to Kant’s suggestion that 
aesthetic judgment refers to, shows us, helps us to feel, not the object but the presentation of the object 
within our own minds.
$ . Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 28.46
$ . Ibid., 28. 47
CONVERSATIONS 5 !49
pation and risks rejection, and recognizing the expression of subjectivity as a claim to 
community helps to explain Cavell’s frequent claim that the appeal to what “we” say 
does not ask to be, cannot be, confirmed or denied through empirical evidence.  48
“The philosopher appealing to everyday language,” Cavell writes, “turns to the reader 
not to convince him without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, 
against himself. He is saying: Look and find out whether you can see what I see, wish 
to say what I wish to say.”  The community that aesthetic judgment begets goes 49
beyond personal agreement or disagreement and asks us to actively participate in 
each other’s subjective experience of the world. I invite you not just to confirm or 
deny my perceptions, but to hear what I hear, taste what I taste, see what I see, and, if 
you can, to determine whether my words would also be your words.  
 One of the chief criticisms of Cavell as a political thinker is that, for all he says 
about the importance of shared human experience, he offers little specific instruction 
about how to define “community”: who does it include and who, if anyone, should it 
exclude?  Cavell might say that these aren’t the sorts of questions that philosophers 50
need to be asking, proposing instead that the philosopher speak for herself and allow 
her interlocutors to determine whether the philosopher speaks for them too. Yet this 
is precisely the sort of response that has encouraged many to relegate Cavell to the 
figurative sidelines of political thought, since it seems to deflect the “ought” that is so 
important to the work of political philosophy. Ought we, for example, denounce ra-
cism, misogyny, homophobia in those around us? If our aim to speak for ourselves in 
an attempt to write the autobiography of a species, hoping that others will find them-
selves in our words, then we have failed to distinguish ourselves from the racist, who 
can claim the same measure of authority from this prescription—that is, while we’re 
busy speaking for ourselves, so the racist will be busy speaking for himself, hoping 
meanwhile that others will find themselves in him. Put another way, to what extent 
do we speak for ourselves? To so great an extent that we refuse to engage, confront, 
denounce those who, in an effort to speak for themselves have committed some act 
$ . Cf. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 64, 95, 220. Compare Kant’s suggestion that the “uni48 -
versal validity” of the judgment of taste “is not to be established by gathering votes and asking other 
people what kind of sensation they are having; but it must rest, as it were, on an autonomy of the sub-
ject who is making a judgment about the feeling of pleasure.” Kant, Critique of Judgment, 144. 
$ . Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 95-96.49
$ . These are some of the critiques that Joab Rosenburg makes in his review of Norris’s The Claim to 50
Community in European Journal of Philosophy 16.1 (2008): 153-56.
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that “we” (those who don’t find ourselves in their words) recognize as morally dubi-
ous, or worse?  
 While there are (deliberately, on Cavell’s part) no formulaic answers to these 
questions, our way out of the problem begins by recognizing that Cavell’s claim to 
community is built implicitly upon the notion that we can speak only for ourselves, 
and that we cannot, must not, speak for others.  While the racist may purport to be 51
speaking for himself in the hopes that others will find themselves in his words—and 
even when others, inevitably, find themselves there—we should recognize the racist 
as, in fact, speaking for others, speaking for precisely those he would denounce. The 
racist, the misogynist, the homophobe are committed to a politics of renunciation: 
the racist speaks for some only insofar as he refuses, rejects, and renounces others. In 
response to Espin Hammer’s suggestion that he is a political romanticist, Cavell wri-
tes that “philosophy participates in two conversations essential to the formation of a 
reforming polity, namely the argument of the ordinary, which I say must never be 
won (since in retrieving words from their exiles—of fixity, encrustation, capture, illus-
tory or empty purity—no one has a privileged authority), as well as the conversation 
of justice, which I say must never be lost (specifically by being closed in citing the ru-
les of a current institution [...]).”  We can recognize in this quote the slaveowner’s 52
moral error: that he closes the conversation of justice by citing the rules of a current 
institution. Yet pointing out the slaveowner’s tautology—it’s okay to own slaves be-
cause the institution of slavery says it’s okay to own slaves—is unlikely to be persuasi-
ve. Even though we may remain unable to convince the slaveowner of his misguided 
morality, we might begin to recognize that his Weltanschauung is one in which he 
sees himself in a particular, and peculiar, relation to certain others; in interpreting 
others, the slaveowner has decided that he can, will, and even must speak for them, 
that his words will be the words of others. Following the practices of aesthetic inter-
pretation that, I have been arguing, are fundamental to understanding our subjective 
experience of the world and mediate our interactions with others, we might point out 
$ . As Cavell puts it in The Claim of Reason, “The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search 51
for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to 
community is always a search for the basis on which it can or has been established. […] The wish and 
search for community are the wish and search for reason” (20). 
$ . Cavell, “The Inessence and the Absence of the Political,” in The Claim to Community: Essays on 52
Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy, ed. Andrew Norris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006), 290.
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that the slaveowner speaks for his slaves to the extent that “I am your master” implies 
its inverse, “you are my master.”  
 Aesthetics can help us here because aesthetic judgments in Cavell are implici-
tly democratic: they turn modes of knowing, which depend upon hierarchical divisi-
ons between subject and object, into modes of interpersonal engagement and expres-
sion.  The aesthetic judgment is an invitation, an attempt to offer up one’s own sub53 -
jectivity in the hopes that other subjectivities will see themselves there.  As Cascardi 54
has suggested, “Criticism works in part [ … ] as a way to disclose and to articulate, to 
test and to sustain, the contingency of the human that subtends the unity of experien-
ce.”  To suggest that aesthetic judgments are democratic is not to flatten or level 55
them, not to suggest that all aesthetically motivated statements are equally valid. Qui-
te the contrary, the democratic aspect of aesthetic judgment lies in the promise of di-
sagreement, in the contested space that is revealed with the expression of subjecti-
vity. But as Kant pointed out, the subjectivity we claim in our evaluations of works of 
art is not a solipsistic subjectivity but an interpersonal one: it is, as Cavell says of the 
passionate utterance, “an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire.”  In56 -
deed, the value of aesthetic judgment lies in our ability to communicate; when we say 
“he really knows the text,” appropriating the language of epistemology, we mean that 
he is aware of its many nuances, can direct you to its subtleties, has worked through 
the text as a mode of expression and has come to an awareness of his own expressive 
response to the text; he can help you toward a deeper understanding of the text and a 
more complete engagement with it. What we mean when we say that someone 
“knows” a work of art is that he has interpreted it well, that he has experienced its 
meaning, that he has read it closely, that he has engaged with it fully. 
 I’ve been arguing here, after Cavell, that the refusal to see others aesthetically, 
to engage with the other through the rationale of aesthetic judgment and appreciati-
$ . Cf. Cavell’s suggestion that this is one of the ways in which the emphasis of his criticism differs 53
from some (but not all) academic criticism: “I think of this emphasis as letting a work of art have a voi-
ce in what philosophy says about it,” Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 10.
$ . Consider Cavell’s related claim, early in The Claim of Reason, that “Since the granting of consent 54
[that you speak for me] entails acknowledgement, the withdrawal of consent entail the same ackno-
wledgement: I have to say both ‘It is not mine any longer’ (I am no longer responsible for it, it no lon-
ger speaks for me) and ‘It is no longer ours’ (not what we bargained for, we no longer recognize the 
principle of consent in it, the original ‘we’ is no longer bound together by consent but only by force, so 
it no longer exists)” (27).
$ . Cascardi, “Cavell and Kant,” 57. 55
$ . Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 19. 56
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on, is a refusal to recognize their humanity. Or, perhaps more accurately, that it is 
aesthetic sensibility that can bridge relations between people: not that I should see 
you as an aesthetic object, but that our relations with and towards other people 
should mirror those that we take towards aesthetic objects, that we seek to read them, 
understand them, engage with them fully and on their terms.  Cavell suggests of 57
aesthetic judgments “that the familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic argument, 
rather than showing up an irrationality, shows the kind of rationality it has, and ne-
eds.”  The same is true of political judgments: the slaveowner accepts his own tauto58 -
logical justification for slavery, bearing witness to the fact that rational argument 
cannot persuade him to abandon slavery. And yet this is not therefore evidence of the 
slaveowner’s irrationality or insanity. Recognizing that the slaveowner sees the world 
this way, and understands his place in it thus, we need an attentive understanding of 
how his world differs from ours, and a patient ability to put on display the nuance of 
our world; perhaps most importantly, we cannot lose sight of the fact that we may, 
after all this, fail to get him to see, and that our failure here is not therefore justifica-
tion to stop trying. Early in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, Cavell explicitly la-
bels Kant’s aesthetic judgment as a form of passionate utterance, before expanding: 
“One person, risking exposure to rebuff, singles out another, through the expression 
of an emotion and claim of value, to respond in kind, that is, with appropriate emoti-
on and action (if mainly of speech), here and now.”  It’s in his emphasis on aesthetic 59
judgment as exposure, as expressions of emotion and claims of value, that aesthetic 
judgment might come to inform or inflect political discourse; and it’s in his appeal to 
community, in the invitation or provocation or plain longing for a proper emotional 
response, that Cavell makes manifest the ways in which claims to aesthetic affection 
are necessarily communal and that aesthetics comes to mean little if it cannot be sha-
red between people, or at the very least if it doesn’t prompt an expression that seeks 
to bridge subjectivities. 
 At the same time, Cavell is not interested in understanding art or artworks as 
modes of political resistance. If what I’ve been describing here is a sort of reversal of 
$ . As a converse to what I’ve been arguing here, we might think of Cavell’s suggestion in “Music Dis57 -
composed” that artworks matter to us in much the same way that people matter to us. See Must We 
Mean What We Say?, 197-98.
$ . Ibid., 86. 58
$ . Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 26.59
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Benjamin’s notion of the aestheticization of politics—if I’m describing a politicization 
of aesthetics—then, insofar as this describes part of Cavell’s aims, this has little to do 
with the political implications of engaging with art, or the political value of art criti-
cism. Rather, Cavell is interested in understanding the ways in which political enga-
gement draws upon modes of aesthetic understanding: not in arguing that aesthetics 
should be political, but in understanding the ways in which our interactions with 
others rely upon the same faculties of reason and experiences of emotion as our inte-
ractions with works of art. His appeals to community are political in the broadest 
sense, in that he sees in art the opportunity to come to deeper understanding about 
our place in the world and our relation to others in it. Engaging in a work of art and 
being able to identify—and defend—what you see there is a way of recognizing your 
own subjectivity and the subjectivity of another viewer. And yet critically, this recog-
nition of subjectivity becomes, for Cavell, an invitation to express something about 
yourself and your world, and an invitation to get others to see what you see. For this 
is what the slaveowner misses about the slave: not that the slave is human, and not 
that the slave is capable of understanding, but that the slave is capable of improvising 
in the disorders of desire. 
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Friend as Enemy: Notes on Cavell and  
Socialism (Via Makavejev) 
RASTISLAV DINIĆ 
Richard Rorty famously claimed that the difference between analytic and continental 
philosophers, boils down to a political one—analytical philosophers are predominan-
tly liberals who share a belief in the rule of law and the institutions of modern consti-
tutional democracy, while the continental ones tend to be more pessimistic about 
this political arrangement, and much more prone to experiment with the alternati-
ves . But where does this leave the members of that rare breed—philosophers who 1
see themselves as working in both traditions? In order to answer that question for 
himself, Rorty has written several books proclaiming his faith in liberalism and Ame-
rica as its most prominent example. But what about Stanley Cavell—a philosopher 
inspired equally by Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austen, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Frie-
drich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger? It is difficult to answer this question straight-
forwardly, since, although many of his writings are in some sense deeply political, 
Cavell rarely wrote explicitly on politics, especially in respect of modern ideological 
struggles. One way someone interested in this question could go about trying to 
answer it is by turning to Cavell’s encounters with more explicit representatives of 
certain ideological positions. That is exactly what I intend to do in this paper—by 
turning to Cavell’s engagement with Yugoslav director Dušan Makavejev. 
The cinema of Makavejev has recently been the subject of a resurgent interest 
among film theorists.  In a recent scholarly outpour on the filmmaker, Cavell article 2
$ . Richard Rorty, “Philosophy in America Today”, in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: Uni1 -
versity of Minnesota Press, 1982),229.
$ . Pavle Levi, A Disintegration in Flames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav 2
Cinema (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007);  Lorraine Mortimer, Terror and Joy: The 
Films of Dušan Makavejev (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2008); Boris Buden, “Behind 
the Velvet Curtain. Remembering Dušan Makavejev’s W.R.: Mysteries of the Organism,” Afterall: A 
Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry 18 (2008): 118-126; Studies in Eastern European Cinema 5.1 
(2014).
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on the director, “On Mavkavejev on Bergman” is a frequent, almost canonical refe-
rence, and still most film theorists rarely engage in a close reading or substantial re-
interpretation of his views on Makavejev’s filmmaking. A notable exception to such 
treatment of Cavell one finds in Sezgin Boynik’s, “On Makavejev, On Ideology - The 
Concrete and the Abstract in the Readings of Dušan Makavejev’s Films”. In his text, 
Boynik argues against what he calls humanist interpretations of Makavejev’s films, 
which are in his opinion crucially indebted to Cavell. 
“He was a true Red Fascist!” These are the last words of Milena, describing 
Vladimir in WR. Red Fascism as the merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia in the American image of totalitarianism is a political terminology par 
excellence. It has played a crucial role in post-WWII America, constructing 
the policy of anti-communism which was paved through the troubled equiva-
lency of Hitler with Stalin. Apart from generating the discourse on the acute-
ness of the task to fight communism, Red Fascism also served the fantasies 
of what might happen. For example, we have to look at Hitler in the 1930s in 
order to avoid a possible coming of Stalin’s Fascism. This fantasy is somehow 
at the core of totalitarian ideology, as a bizarre psychopathological paranoiac 
state that confuses the abstract and the real. This is how Stanley Cavell in his 
article on Makavejev describes the archive materials of the ultimate evil of 
Stalinism, or the Katyn Forest massacre shown in Sweet Movie [1974], as a 
”dreamlike sequence” and poses the great moralist question that a freedom 
lover would: “Isn’t that forest a name for the region inhabited by regimes 
that no longer know that there is a difference between dream and reality, ac-
ting out the one, wiping out the other?” Stalin mistook the concrete for the 
abstract, and according to his critics it is this confusion that makes him so 
uncanny.  3
This passage explicates most succinctly Boynik’s reading of Cavell’s position on 
ideology—and this it does by labeling Cavell as one more representative of the tota-
$ . Sezgin Boynik, “On Makavejev, On Ideology - The Concrete and the Abstract in the Readings of 3
Dušan Makavejev’s Films,” in Surfing the Black: Yugoslav Black Wave and its Transgressive Mo-
ments, ed. Gal Kirn et al. (Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Academie, 2012), 144.
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litarian paradigm. According to him, Cavell does not only subscribes to the anti-
communist consensus which equates Fascism and Stalinism as the two totalitaria-
nisms, but argues that what makes a murderous—or totalitarian—regime is confu-
sing “the abstract and the real,” or conversely “the abstract and the concrete”. Ap-
parently, in opposition to these regimes which get blinded by ideology, thus ending 
in killing concrete and real individuals, Cavell advocates American liberalism whi-
ch puts individuals and their freedom first and foremost—Boynik is not explicit on 
that point, but as much can be deduced from the sarcastic remark about Cavell as 
“freedom lover”. 
I believe this view of Cavell as a sort of Isaiah Berlin type of Cold War apolo-
gist of negative liberty and American-style liberalism to be deeply mistaken. Not be-
cause Cavell does not see himself as an American or as a liberal—as I will show, he 
clearly does—but because his view of America and liberalism on one side, and of the 
socialist alternative, on the other is much more complex than that of the Cold War 
ideologues such as George Kennan (with whom Boynik also compares him), and even 
of the serious liberal philosophers such as Berlin. 
Let us start from the Katyn Forest, and the role it plays in Makavejev’s film, 
and the reading of it Cavell offers in his text. The documentary footage depicting the 
excavations of the victims form the Katyn Forest is shown without any comment and 
at the very end of it a quote is shown, from a letter of Sir Owen O’Malley, the British 
ambassador in Poland, to Anthony Eden: “Let us think of these things always and 
speak of them never.” Cavell writes: 
The conscience of Sweet Movie is most hideously captured in a sequence of 
literal excavation-the Nazi documentary footage of German troops exhuming 
bodies from mass graves in the Katyn Forest. A lifelong participant in a society 
of declared socialist aspirations, Makavejev is asking: Was my revolution ca-
pable even of this? Has it cannibalized everything that has touched it? Is it true 
that the Red Army committed a mass murder of the Polish officer corps? The 
film shows a card which contains Anthony Eden's response to this news: "Let 
us think of these things always. Let us speak of them never." For Makavejev, 
that conspiracy of silence, call it mass hypocrisy, is a prescription for self-ad-
CONVERSATIONS 5 !57
ministered mass death. Mere film alone cannot prove who caused and buried 
the corpses in the Katyn Forest, but this film directly refuses the conspiracy of 
silence about it.  4
Cavell obviously gives a prominent place in his interpretation to the already mentio-
ned quote (although he mistakenly ascribes it to Eden, instead to O’Malley—no doubt 
a sign of the time when film interpretations were still based on strength of personal 
memory, instead on the technologies such as VHS and DVD which make every scene 
in the movie always readily available to the interpreter). This quote is a sign of the 
conspiracy of silence that Makavejev stands up against. But—tellingly—the source of 
this quote is not Soviet—it is British. Thus, this conspiracy of silence does not stop at 
the borders of the Eastern Bloc, but inevitably implicates liberal democracy—the very 
regime that, according to Boynik, the “freedom lover” Cavell is uncritically embra-
cing. (Small wonder that Boynik does not even mention this quote, nor its importan-
ce either for Cavell, or for Makavejev). 
Having that in mind—a different reading of Cavell’s claim that Katyn is “a 
name for the region inhabited by regimes that no longer know that there is a diffe-
rence between dream and reality, acting out the one, wiping out the other”  forces 5
itself upon us. These regimes seem to be not only Fascism and Stalinism, but all 
regimes prepared to wipe out reality in the name of a fantasy, including it seems, 
the one which, although not directly involved in the massacre—is prepared to re-
press any discussion of it in the name of Realpolitik. And was not the Katyn massa-
cre, more than an ideological crime, actually a crime of Realpolitik—a politics whi-
ch believes itself to be the most real of all, completely non-deluded by utopian or 
moralist concerns  (exactly this, then, being its fantasy)? And if so, could not its  6
$ . Cavell, “On Makavejev on Bergman,” Critical Inquiry 6 (1979), 313.4
$ . Ibid., 322.5
$ . “It has been suggested that the motive for this terrible step was to reassure the Germans as to the 6
reality of Soviet anti-Polish policy. This explanation is completely unconvincing in view of the care 
with which the Soviet regime kept the massacre secret from the very German government it was sup-
posed to impress. […] A more likely explanation is that […] this step should be seen as looking forward 
to a future in which there might again be a Poland on the Soviet Union's western border. Since he in-
tended to keep the eastern portion of the country in any case, Stalin could be certain that any revived 
Poland would be unfriendly. Under those circumstances, depriving it of a large proportion of its mili-
tary and technical elite would make it weaker.” Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107.
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name, just as easily, be Hiroshima, or Vietnam?  7
The whole passage from O’Malley’s  letter, from which the mentioned quote is 
taken, is especially telling: 
Let us think of these things always and speak of them never. To speak of them 
never is the advice which I have been giving to the Polish Government, but it 
has been unnecessary. They have received the Soviet report in silence. Afflicti-
on and residence in this country seem to be teaching them how much better it 
is in political life to leave unsaid those things about which one feels most pas-
sionately.  8
The view of politics, in which it is better (in politics) not to speak about things about 
which one feels most passionately has of course, been a recurring target of Cavell’s 
criticism in many of his political writings, but most prominently in his essay on Ra-
wls, “The Conversation of Justice: Rawls and the Drama of Consent.”  There, Cavell 9
criticizes Rawlsian liberalism exactly on the account of closing off politics and politi-
cal conversation for what one feels most passionately about . 10
Of course, Rawls is no proponent of Realpolitik, far from it. But, what is mis-
sing from his account is precisely the account of how the departures from ideal justi-
ce (that is, real politics) influence our consent. As Cavell writes: 
The idea of directing consent to the principles on which society is based rather 
than, as it were, to society as such, seems to be or to lead to an effort to imagi-
ne confining ot proportioning the consent I give my society—to imagine that 
the social contract not only states in effect that I may withdraw my consent 
$ . On America’s engagement in Vietnam Cavell writes that America “is killing itself and killing another 7
country in order not acknowledge its helplessness in the face of suffering, in order not to acknowledge 
its separateness”, Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear,” in Must We Mean What 
We Say?: A Book of Essays, updated edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 345.
$ . Owen O’Malley, “Dispatches of the British Ambassador to Poland,” Electronic Museum, accessed 8
July 31, 2014, http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/Poland-WW2/katyn_memorial_wall/o%27mal-
ley_despatches/o%27malley_despatches_3.html.
$ . Cavell, “The Conversation of Justice: Rawls and the Drama of Consent,” in Conditions Handsome 9
and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1990), 101-26.
$ . See Stephen Mulhall, “Promising, Consent, and Citizenship: Rawls and Cavell on Morality and Pol10 -
itics,” Political Theory 25 (1997), 171-192.
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from society when the public institutions of justice lapse in favor of which I 
have foregone certain natural rights (of judgment and redress) but that the 
contract might, in principle, specify how far I may reduce my consent (in scope 
or degree) as justice is reduced (legislatively or judicially). But my intuition is 
that my consent is not thus modifiable or proportionable (psychological exile 
is not exile): I cannot keep consent focused on the success or graces of society; 
it reaches into every corner of society’s failure or ugliness. Between a society 
approaching strict compliance with the principles of justice and one approa-
ching causes of civil disobedience, there is ground on which existent constitu-
tional democracies circumscribe everyday lives. We know that the original po-
sition has prepared us for, what the lifted veil of ignorance has disclosed: the 
scene of our lives. The public circumstances in which I live, in which I partici-
pate, and from which I profit, are ones I consent to. They are ones with an un-
certain  measure of liberty and of goods that are not minimal, of delays in re-
form that are not inevitable. Consent to society is neither unrestricted nor res-
tricted; its content is part of the conversation of justice.  11
How do these ruminations on Rawls, a prominent liberal philosopher, tie in with Ca-
vell’s discussion of Makavejev? The guiding thought of this passage is already present 
in the essay on Makavejev. As Cavell sees it—one of Makavejev’s main themes is 
exactly how to react to what he calls (in the Rawls essay) “society’s ugliness” if we 
have already consented to that society, the whole of society, and not just its princi-
ples and ideals, be they Rawlsian, or Marxist. According to Cavell, Makavejev’s dis-
covery lies in our capability to be disgusted by the world, or by what has been done, 
or is being done in our name, in the name of society we have consented to: 
The discovery of adulthood through disgust was something acted out in the 
student movement in the time of our war in Vietnam. To perform ugly and in-
decent acts was an expression of the rejection of a world that asked for consent 
to its disgusting deeds. This was not my way of expression, partly because I 
had already given my consent to this world and partly because I do not unders-
$ . Cavell, “The Conversation of Justice,” 108.11
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tand myself as performing ugly and indecent acts. But I understand that way, I 
felt the exactness of its spiritual accuracy. To say so was my way, and it has its 
own price. This is or was so obvious that serious films made during that period 
did not so much need to assert disgust with the world as to ask for its assess-
ment, to acknowledge this fact of the world without letting it sap the motivati-
on to work at this art, even if the art itself was the best context for the assess-
ment. […] Alceste’s interpretation of the uninhabitability of the world, that is, 
of his distaste, is to see the world as a scene of universal hypocrisy. Sweet Mo-
vie interprets this hypocrisy, as it were, by picturing the earth as full of corp-
ses-buried evidence of mass murder, rotting ideals, corpses with souls still in 
them. The film attempts to extract hope—to claim to divine life after birth—
from the very fact that we are capable of genuine disgust at the world; that our 
revoltedness is the chance for a cleansing revulsion; that we may purge oursel-
ves by living rather than by killing, willing to visit hell if that is the direction to 
something beyond purgatory; that the fight for freedom continues to originate 
in the demands of our instincts, the chaotic cry of our nature, our cry to have a 
nature. It is a work powerful enough to encourage us to see again that the ty-
rant’s power continues to require our complicitous tyranny over ourselves. […] 
In my earlier essay I more or less accuse both Alceste and Othello of inviting 
Montaigne’s terrible rebuke to mankind in “On some verses of Virgil”: “What a 
monstrous animal to be a horror to himself, to be burdened by his pleasures, 
to regard him-self as a misfortune!” But I go on to say—something I take Sweet 
Movie to be saying—that the world during my lifetime rather shows that it is 
yet more horrible to lose this capacity for horror.  12
This parallel is interesting and important for our discussion in more ways than one—
first, it shows that the problematic of consent arises both in liberal societies (which 
are explicitly built on the myth of consent, or a version of consent theory) and in so-
cieties of communist aspirations such as Makavejev’s Yugoslavia. What inhabitants 
of both of these types of societies have to face is a sort of hypocrisy, or discrepancy 
between the ideal justice towards which their societies, each in its own way, strive for 
$ . Cavell, “On Makavejev on Bergman,” 319.12
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(or by which they legitimize themselves) and the less than ideal (and sometimes posi-
tively murderous) practice. Here, the two types of society causing a similar type of 
response—disgust—are explicitly compared, with the example of Vietnam war, and 
the reactions of students who “used disgusting acts” to show their disgust towards 
the society which was asking for their consent. Cavell claims that, although he un-
derstood their reaction, he could not take part in it (since he already consented to his 
society)—but that he wrote about it and that way showed his own disgust toward 
what was happening. In this way he is akin to Makavejev—who shows us the Muehl 
commune (the commune of those who do not want to give their consent), but does 
not join it himself. As we will see, that is because, like Cavell, Makavejev has already 
consented to his society and his films represent his own mode of response to that so-
ciety’s “ugliness”. What both share, however, is a refusal to limit their consent to the 
high ideals of their society, and a preparedness to take responsibility for its uglier as-
pects. 
Here it is already quite obvious why the comparison that Boynik insists on—
between socialism (or communism) and fascism will not do as an interpretation of 
Cavell’s views. For it is fundamentally impossible for an inhabitant of a fascist regime 
to consent to its principles, but not to its murderousness. It is impossible for a hypo-
crisy Makavejev and Cavell focus on, even to exist in a fascist society, in which there 
is no striving for ideal justice at all. (Numerous examples of citizens of fascist states 
who later claimed they did not know what was being done in their name, do not go 
against this—for our disbelief in their claims stems exactly from the fact is that even 
if they did not know about the particular cases of crimes—they could not have not 
known that the very principles they consented to were murderous themselves ). Re-
alpolitik is not the flipside of the fascist societies, but their self-proclaimed guiding 
principle.  
But—what are we to make of Makavejev’s “true Red Fascist”? Boynik makes a 
strange move by ascribing the equation of Stalinism with Fascism, not to Makavejev 
himself, but to Cavell, whose interpretation of this provocative line he does not even 
mention (although, as we will see—not because Cavell does not offer such an inter-
pretation—he does.) 
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First, let us see how Makavejev treats this line, and what work it does in his 
film. After Milena has been killed by Vladimir Illich, her severed head, lying on the 
pathologist’s desks, starts speaking into the camera, that is to us—the audience—
thus: 
Cosmic rays […] streamed through our carnal bodies. We pulsated to the vi-
brations of the universe. But he couldn’t bear it. He had to go one step further. 
Vladimir is a man of noble impetuousness […] a man of high ambition […] of 
immense energy. He’s romantic […] ascetic […] a genuine Red Fascist! Comra-
des […] even now I’m not ashamed of my Communist past!  13
Cavell comments on this scene in the following way: 
In the absence of gods, what WR tells us is that this woman lost her head to 
love because of a mortal who had already been turned to stone; that she was 
made a monster, a talking head without a body, or confirmed in monstrous-
ness, by a man who interpreted his purity as demanding that he exempt him-
self from ordinary human desires, save himself for something higher. The wo-
man’s words for this—that is, the talking head’s words, I mean of course Ma-
kavejev’s words-are “He's romantic, ascetic, a genuine Red Fascist,” a patriot. 
Makavejev’s further identification with this murderousness, his refusal to 
exempt himself from recognizing it in himself (in accordance, no doubt, with 
his own romanticism and asceticism and his patriotism toward a still invisible 
fatherland) is his further interpretation of the man's self-exemption as the ca-
pacity for art. […] This is shown in the man’s beautiful song of prayer as he 
walks lost along the river, comprising the closing sequence of this film. Maka-
vejev thus discovers further adjacencies in the concept of art as we have it, art 
as decapitation or renunciation or alienation; and he bears out the knowledge 
that this art is at the same time the victim or martyr of the very circumstances 
that produce it.  14
$ . In W.R.:Mysteries of the Organism (1971).13
$ . Cavell, “On Makvejev on Bergman,” 329-30.14
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There are several interesting points in Cavell’s reading of the scene. For starters,  ac-
cording to him—Makavejev does not exempt himself from the “recognizing the mur-
derousness in himself”. This seems to be clearly on the mark, for, as we have seen, 
Milena’s head (who is speaking for the author of the film, but also for Wilchelm Rei-
ch)—defiantly refuses to renounce her “communist past.” Furthermore, all the attri-
butes (romantic, ascetic ) Milena ascribes to Vladimir Ilich, Cavell ascribes to Maka-
vejev ; all except one—fascist Instead of that, Cavell tellingly adds one attribute whi-
ch is not (literally) present in Milena’s soliloquy—patriotism “towards a still invisible 
fatherland”. 
Those familiar with Cavell’s opus might recognize this “still invisible father-
land” as an echo of Emerson’s phrase which Cavell used as a title of his 1988 book - 
This New Yet Unapproachable America.  The sentence originates from Emerson’s 15
essay Experience, and Cavell discusses at length why the America Emerson speaks of 
might be “yet unapproachable”, and comes to the conclusion that it is unapproacha-
ble because it has yet to be found, but that its finding requires what Emerson calls 
aversion, or what is more commonly known as conversion, a turning away from our 
current state, which Emerson’s writing itself is supposed to exemplify. Writes Cavell: 
Then Emerson’s writing is (an or promise of, the constitution for) this new yet 
unapproachable America: his aversion is a rebirth of himself into it (there will 
be other rebirths), its presence to us is unapproachable, both because there is 
nowhere else to go to find it, we have to turn toward it, reverse ourselves; and 
because we do not know if our presence to it is peopling it. […] The identifica-
tion this writer proposes between his individual constitution and the constitu-
tion of his nation is a subject on its own. The endlessly repeated idea that 
Emerson was only interested in finding the individual should give way of 
founding a nation, writing its constitution, constituting its citizens. But then 
would the writer say “I found” (a new America) as if in answer to the opening 
question, “Where do we find?” (ourselves). If we consider that what we now 
know, know now, of this writer, that say we and that say I, then wherever he is 
$ . Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albu15 -
querque, NM: Living Batch Press, 1989).
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we are—otherwise how can we hear him? Do we? Does his character make an 
impression on us? Has he achieved a new degree of culture?  16
As Roger Griffin notes in his famous essay on fascism, there is something disturbing 
for the liberal ear, about the idea of the birth and rebirth of a nation, and Griffin as-
cribes that idea to the “core” of fascist ideology.  While it is clear that there are many 17
deep differences between Emerson’s individualism and any form of ethnic or cultural 
organicism, Cavell seems to be very aware of the charge that Emersonian perfectio-
nism is “smoothing the way for fascism,”  and has repeatedly returned to debunking 18
it. In one of his most important pieces on Emerson, “Aversive Thinking,”  Cavell gi19 -
ves an elaborate argument against what he sees as Rawls’ mistaken rejection of Ni-
etzsche’s, and pace Nietzsche , Emerson’s, perfectionism as inherently anti-democra-
tic. While he admits that it is tempting to read both Emerson and Nietzsche as exal-
ting great men, and dismissing the importance of the slavish majority (which is seen 
as “bugs”, “spawn”, “mob”, “herd”), he insists that there is a better and more consis-
tent way of reading them as speaking not of particular great men, but rather of the 
possibility of each person for attaining her “unattained but attainable self”, for being 
consecrated to culture. This possibility lies in being disgusted with oneself and one’s 
current state and finding a way for turning away from it, from where we find oursel-
ves at the given moment. Not only is such a possibility in principle open to everyone 
and hence not necessarily anti-democratic, but, Cavell claims, according to Emerson 
it is necessary for democracy’s survival: 
There are undeniably aristocratic or aesthetic perfectionisms. But in Emerson 
it should, I would like to say, be taken as part of the training for democracy. 
[…] I understand the training and character and friendship Emerson requires 
for democracy as preparation to withstand not its rigors, but its failures, cha-
racter to keep the democratic hope alive in the face of disappointment with it. 
[…] That we will be disappointed in democracy, in its failure by the lights of its 
$ . Ibid., 92.16
$ . Roger Griffin, “Fascism: General Introduction,” in Fascist Studies: New Perspectives (London: 17
Routledge, 2010), 118.
$ . Cavell, “The Conversation of Justice,” 102.18
$ . Cavell, “Aversive Thinking,” in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome.19
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own principles of justice, is implied in Rawls’ concept of the original position 
in which those principles are accepted, a perspective from which we know that 
justice, in actual societies, will be departed from, and that the distance of any 
actual society from justice is a matter for each of us to assess for ourselves. I 
will speak of this as our being compromised by the democratic demand for 
consent, so that the human individual meant to be created and preserved in 
democracy is apt to be undone by it.  20
And here, we reach the point we have already mentioned—of facing disappointment 
with the ideals of justice we have consented to. Going back to Boynik’s claims, we may 
now safely say that Cavell does not evoke the “Red Fascist” in order to equate the two 
totalitarianisms. On the contrary—Cavell replaces the word fascist with what he sees 
to be a better fit, “patriotism for a still invisible fatherland”—a perfectionism that he 
subscribes to himself, and which, though mistaken for fascism by an indiscriminate eye 
(which, as it turns out, might even be an eye of a great philosopher such as Rawls), is 
actually not only compatible with democracy, but fundamentally important for it. 
Boynik also misinterprets the link that Cavell establishes between Marx and 
Jung, claiming that in Makavejev’s film “the world of Marx is healed by the parapsy-
chology of Jung”.  But, as we will see, this is a very superficial reading of what Cavell 
actually says.  
Let us start from the way Cavell uses the two quotations: 
The center of the action of the commune sequence is a communal meal, a feast 
whose ritualization strikes me as possessing, for all its confusion of tongues, a 
working solemnity. I think of Marx's characterization of religion as the heart of 
a heartless world, and I ask myself what the things of acceptance and redemp-
tion might look like to those who would actually bring such concepts to earth—
as if inventing them and giving them a heart. I had not liked Makavejev’s com-
plaint that Bergman’s “conception of God, especially, the God who does not 
love people and who makes them unexplainably miserable, seems to me in-
comprehensible and gratuitous for a serious artist.” If this is bad for a serious 
artist, I felt, it is bad for any human being; but is it a matter over which human 
$ . Ibid., 52.20
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beings have a choice? But I also felt that Makavejev is meeting Bergman at 
once on Bergman’s ground and on Marx’s: “The critique of religion is the pre-
requisite of every critique.” What Makavejev sees in religion and how he ef-
fects his critique of it will come up again. (Since in the working of this film and 
in the mode of thinking it exemplifies, apt conjunction is everything, allowing 
the mutual excavation of concepts, I shall quote from the early pages of C. G. 
Jung's autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, without comment [as if 
one might use a quotation within the body of a text, that is, after the text has 
begun, as what you may call an internal epigraph] some fragments from his 
interpretation of “the earliest dream I can remember, a dream which was to 
preoccupy me all my life”: “At all events, the phallus of this dream seems to be 
a subterranean God ‘not to be named,’ and such it remained throughout my 
youth, reappearing whenever anyone spoke too emphatically about Lord Je-
sus. […] The fear of the ‘black man,’ which is felt by every child, was not the 
essential thing in that experience; it was, rather, the recognition that stabbed 
through my childish brain: ‘That is a Jesuit.’ So the important thing in the dre-
am was its remarkable symbolic setting and the astounding interpretation: 
‘That is the man-eater.’ […] In the dream I went down into the hole in the 
earth and found something very different on a golden throne, something non-
human and underworldly, which gazed fixedly upward and fed on human 
flesh. It was only fifty years later that a passage in a study of religious ritual 
burned into my eyes, concerning the motif of cannibalism that underlies the 
symbolism of the Mass […]. Through this childhood dream I was initiated into 
the secrets of the earth. What happened then was a kind of burial in the earth, 
and many years were to pass before I came out again. Today I know that it 
happened in order to bring the greatest possible amount of light into the dark-
ness. It was an initiation into the realm of darkness. My intellectual life had its 
unconscious beginnings at that time.”)  21
Right at the beginning it should be noted that there are two Marx’s thoughts Cavell 
references, while Boynik only mentions one. The other, that Boynik misses is the fa-
$ . Cavell, “On Makavejev on Bergman”, 315-16.21
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mous quote about criticism of religion being the prerequisite of every criticism. This 
thought appears again in Cavell’s essay on Rawls. There, he notes  
Ibsen’s participation in a perception shared by Marx and Emerson and Nietzs-
che, that “the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism.” When 
Marx used those words he prefaced them by claiming that in Germany the cri-
ticism of religion is essentially complete, while Nietzsche a generation later 
will show it to be still beginning, as Emerson had in effect, shown him.  22
In this light, the significance of Jung’s quote becomes much clearer—Jung is not in-
voked to “heal Marx’s world”, but, just the opposite, to show that the task Marx 
thought was complete was still before us—the criticism of religion. In this sense, 
Jung’s dream proves Nietzsche and Emerson to be right, the “struggle with one’s own 
inner priest, one’s priestly nature”  is still far from over. And it is hardly a miracle 23
that it is not—for unredeemed suffering still exists, both in liberal and in Marxist so-
cieties. The Muehl commune brings up this thought for Cavell, because it presents a 
secular way of coming to terms with this fact, just as Sweet Movie itself is such an 
attempt to be reborn, not into another world but into this one, to show that there is 
“life after birth.”  As Cavell writes: “Perfectionism, as represented in Emerson and 24
in Nietzsche, we are invited to a position that is structurally one of martyrdom: not, 
however, in view of the divine but in inspiration to an idea of the human.”  25
In another telling passage, Boynik denounces Charles Warren, whom he pre-
viously chacterized as continuing Cavell’s “humanist” reading of Makavejev, for the 
claim: “Yugoslavia is not the USSR and it resists Stalinism. Milena tells to Vladimir 
that Yugoslavs care about ‘personal happiness’ and do not blur that with State con-
cerns,”  but does not recognize the clear Marxian reference of the line form Makave26 -
jev’s movie—“The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the 
$ . Cavell, “The Conversation of Justice,” 111.22
$ . Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Critique of Hegel’s 23
Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 138.
$ . Cavell, “On Makavejev on Bergman,” 319.24
$ . Cavell, “Aversive Thinking,” 56.25
$ . Charles Warren, “Earth and Beyond: Dušan Makavejev’s WR: Mysteries of Organism”, in Beyond 26
Document: Essays on Nonfiction Film, ed. Charles Warren (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1996), 206. Cited in Boynik, “On Makavejev on Ideology,” 143.
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demand for their real happiness.”  The pursuit of happiness has of course been a 27
longstanding topic for Cavell, as well as the importance of persisting in it in the face 
of human suffering . What Cavell and Makavejev note, and Boynik misses—is that 28
the challenge of illusory happiness is still with us, and in that sense, so is religion—
even if we live in nominally secular (whether liberal or socialist) societies. 
Stephen Mulhall deftly summarizes Cavell’s position on moral argument by 
noting that for Cavell such an argument may be rational even though not necessarily 
leading to consensus.  We may agree on standards of pertinence of different conside-
rations, but still disagree about the weight we attach to them, while at the same time 
recognizing each others’ position as rational and worthy of respect: 
In Cavell’s eyes, contemporary moral argument is a domain which admits of 
many morally adequate positions being taken on any given topic; and as a re-
sult, the particular position a given individual takes up reveals as much about 
her as the action or judgment under consideration. In this sense, moral argu-
ment is both objective […] and subjective […]: it allows people to define and 
defend the position for which they are prepared to take responsibility, and it 
allows those others to determine whether that position is one they can 
respect.  29
Mulhall concludes that this account of rationality in morals is primarily fit for private 
morality, “its paradigm is an encounter between two people who wish to understand 
one another better and perhaps work toward an agreement, but whose relationship is 
clearly an intimate one,” and adds that such a model is clearly “ill-suited to the do-
main of public political morality.”  30
But what if Cavell’s engagement with Makavejev is an example of just such a 
relationship? Read this way—it can be seen as a perfectionist encounter between two 
$ . Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 131.27
$ . See Cavell’s discussion of remarriage comedies and his arguments against them being just “fairy 28
tales for the Depression.” Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), 3.
$ . Stephen Mulhall, "Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: Macintyre, Rawls and Cavell," in After 29
Macintyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan 
Mendus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 214.
$ . Ibid., 214.30
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individuals whose friendship “includes the inflection of friend as […] enemy”, contes-
ting each other’s (each other’s societies’) present attainments . At one point, Cavell 31
asks himself why it is not the real issue for both a socialist and a liberal, to “unders-
tand what happened to the fact and the idea of liberty under Americanization and to 
understand what happened to the idea and fact of community under Sovietization” . 32
Each society, he seems to imply, is failing “by the lights of its own principles of justi-
ce”. Each idea is being compromised by political practice, thus compromising both 
the socialist and the liberal who have consented to their respective societies, that is—
both Makavejev and Cavell. Still, they both continue to give consent to their societies, 
“on pain of self-corruption worse than compromise,” relying only on their intuitions 
that “our collective distance form perfect justice is, though in moments painful to the 
limits of intolerable, still habitable, even necessary as a stage for continued 
change.”  Whose intuition is more accurate? Although obviously not neutral (or 33
maybe exactly because he is not neutral), Cavell does not even try to adjudicate 
between the two positions. In the future, they may come closer together, striking a 
shared balance between liberty and community, or they may just continue to strive 
for change each in its own way. What Cavell makes abundantly clear, however, is that 
Makavejev’s position is one that he can respect. 
$ . “To see Emerson’s philosophical authorships taking up the ancient position of the friend, we have 31
to include the inflection (more brazen In Nietzsche but no less explicit in Emerson) of my friend as my 
enemy (contesting my present attainments.” Cavell, “Aversive Thinking,” 59.
$ . Cavell, “On Makavejev on Bergman,” 315.32
$ . Cavell, “Conversation of Justice,” 112.33
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The Malick Viewed: Is there any Cinematic Heir 
to Cavell’s Philosophical Thinking Today? 
BABAK GERANFAR 
The question of the relation between Film and philosophy has been at the center of 
many intellectual debates since the foundation of cinema. It has been paraphrased 
and articulated in many disciplines such as Philosophy of Film, Film-Philosophy, Phi-
losophy of Motion Pictures, Philosophy of Moving Images, even Film Theory. Ne-
vertheless, as much as the technical aspects of the movies developed rapidly, the phi-
losophical questions around it became more and more specific and the answers be-
came more fallible by the end of the day. If you could agree before with some of the 
ontological conclusions of Bazin, Deleuze, Badiou or Cavell about celluloid-based 
Film, you certainly can not share that agreement to generalize that to the kind of digi-
tal imagery that we call ‘Film’ today, nor can you justify the Hologram or 3D IMAX 
footage as constituents of a motion picture. The irony is that the old question, ‘what is 
Film?’, is as often and as rapidly revised as the question, “what is philosophy?”.  
The fact that some Filmmakers today had proper training as philosophers as 
much as Filmmakers leads us to hope for an actual humane bridge between these two 
sides. Can we find a Filmmaker—or several—who have inherited a specific mode of 
philosophical thinking? Is there anybody out there who makes Films philosophically? 
You can be certain that one name who pops up on everyone’s list is Terrence Malick. 
After all, he was a direct pupil of Stanley Cavell’s, in philosophy, at Harvard and 
translated and published Heidegger’s Essence of Reason to English. Unlike his men-
tor, who firmly believes that the mode of thinking you can find in certain Hollywood 
movies common in the 30s and 40s is a direct inheritance from the American Trans-
cendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau and late blooming of European Romanticism 
in America, Malick exploits high concept material and modern elliptical modes of ex-
pression which are rarely rendered on Film. 
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Like Malick, Cavell’s readings have also been an exception to the trend of the 
figures who dwell on the realm of Film and Philosophy. We can easily call him a Phi-
losopher of Film too; after all, Cavell dedicated a whole book to discussing the onto-
logy of Film (The World Viewed) and in two different books, he grounded his own 
intuitional reading of genre (which is categorized today as “Remarriage Comedies” 
and “Melodramas of Unknown Women”) even in Film literature. He further expan-
ded his meditations on Television and Opera. Even in “Cities of Words,” he read 
many of the classical Hollywood movies of 30s and 40s as companion texts to essen-
tial texts of philosophy of ethics. His use of autobiographical methods gave him cre-
dibility in using the Ordinary Language Philosophy of J.L. Austin and the later Witt-
genstein to describe our experiences of watching movies. In a passage from “More of 
The World Viewed,” he gives a fragmentary reading of some fragments of Malick’s 
Days of Heaven (1978): 
I think the Film does indeed contain a metaphysical vision of the world; but I 
think that one has never quite seen the scene of human existence—call it the 
arena between earth (or days) and heaven—quite realized this way on Film be-
fore. 
 The particular mode of beauty these images somehow invokes a formal 
radiance which strikes me as a realization of some sentences from Heidegger's 
“What is Called Thinking?” (Harper Torchback, 1972).  1
When we say “Being,” it means “Being of beings.” When we say “beings,” it 
means “beings in respect of Being.” […] The duality is always a prior datum, 
for Parmenides as much as for Plato, Kant as much as Nietzsche […]. An inter-
pretation decisive for Western thought is that given by Plato […]. Plato means 
to say: beings and Beings are in different places. Particular beings and Beings 
are differently located.  2
$ . Cavell, The World Viewed, enlarged edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), xiv-xv. 1
$ . Ibid., 227. 2
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According to Plato, the idea constitutes the Being of a being. The idea is the 
face whereby a given something shows its form, looks at us, and thus appears, 
for instance, as this table. In this form, the thing looks at us. […] Now Plato de-
signates the relation of a given being to its idea as participation.  3
The first service man can render is to give thought to the Being of beings […]. 
The word [being] says: presence of what is present.  4
The presence we described gathers itself in the continuance which causes a 
mountain, a sea, a house to endure and, by that duration, to lie before us among 
other things that are present […]. The Greeks experience such duration as a lu-
minous appearance in the sense of illumined radiant self-manifestation.  5
If Malick has indeed found a way to transpose such thoughts for our meditati-
on, he can have done it only, it seems to me, by having discovered, or discove-
red how to acknowledge, a fundamental fact of Film’s photographic basis: that 
objects participate in the photographic presence of themselves: they participa-
te in the re-creation of themselves on Film; they are essential in the making of 
their appearances. Objects projected on a screen are inherently reflexive, they 
occur as self-referential, reflecting upon their physical origins.  
 Their presence refers to their absence, their location in another place. 
Then if in relation to objects capable of such self-manifestation human beings 
are reduced in significance, or crushed by the fact of beauty left vacant, 
perhaps this is because in trying to take domination over the world, or in 
aestheticizing it (temptations inherent in the making of Film, or of any art), 
they are refusing their participation with it.  6
If the question of finding a humane bridge between two disciplines seemed absurd, 
its existence is now undeniable after Malick’s masterpieces. That mode of creation, 
$ . Ibid., 222. 3
$ . Ibid., 235. 4
$ . Ibid., 237. 5
$ . Cavell, The World Viewed, enlarged edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), xvi. 6
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which Cavell emphasises, becomes central in Malick`s other works (most notably in 
Tree of Life [2011] and The Voyage of Time: Life’s Journey [2016]). One easily finds 
how reduced characters are in significance (they are normally wandering and barely 
talking) in relation to the objects capable of self-manifestation (To the Wonder 
[2012], Song to Song [2017], Knight of Cups [2015]) and crushed by beauty left va-
cant (The New World [2005] and The Thin Red Line [1998]). 
If anyone has found a way to transpose Cavell’s thoughts on film for “our meditative 
pleasure,” it is Malick who did it first. He is the one who has discovered how to ack-
nowledge that his thoughts can participate in re-creating themselves on Film. Beside 
his originally cinematic intuitions, his unique philosophical reading of—point of de-
parture from—Heidegger in “The Uncanniness of the Ordinary” is a key to unders-
tand Malick as both a unique filmmaker and a Cavellian—not a Heideggerian—heir:  
  
For him the extraordinariness of the ordinary has to do with forces in play, 
beyond the grasp and the reach of ordinary awareness, that constitute our ha-
bitual world; it is a constitution he describes as part of his account of the tech-
nological, of which what we accept as the ordinary is as it were one consequen-
ce; it is thus to be seen as a symptom of what Nietzsche prophesied, or diagno-
sed, in declaring that for us “the wasteland grows.” Whereas for me the uncan-
niness of the ordinary is epitomized by the possibility or threat of what philo-
sophy has called skepticism, understood (as in my studies of Austin and of the 
later Wittgenstein I have come to understand it) as the capacity, even desire, of 
ordinary language to repudiate itself, specifically to repudiate its power to 
word the world, to apply to the things we have in common, or to pass them by. 
(By “the desire of ordinary language to repudiate itself” I mean—doesn’t it go 
without saying? — a desire on the part of speakers of a native or mastered ton-
gue who desire to assert themselves, and despair of it.)  7
$ . Cavell, “The Uncanniness of the Ordinary: Tanner Lectures on Human Values,” in The Tanner Lec7 -
ture on Human Values, VIII, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Cambridge/Salt Lake City, UT: Cambridge 
University Press/University of Utah Press, 1988), 84. 
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Reading Silence 
[excerpt from Skepticism and Redemption:  
The Political Enactments of Stanley Cavell] 
LARRY JACKSON 
1. Must We Speak Politically?  
Stanley Cavell roams across a wide range of fields in his first book, Must We Mean 
What We Say? most obviously those of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. But 
nowhere in the book’s ten essays does he advance an explicit political theory. Still, 
this book, published in 1969 and written over the course of the preceding decade, 
quietly poses persistent political questions, even in essays on such topics as skepti-
cism and King Lear, Kierkegaard’s Book on Adler and Beckett’s Endgame, atonal 
music and ordinary language philosophy. Just who is the “we” spoken of in the 
book’s title (we philosophers? we Americans? we human beings?)? Is there any re-
lationship between democratic equality and the philosophical appeal to our every-
day language, as described in the book’s eponymous essay?  Does the account that 1
Cavell offers in his piece on Wittgenstein of practices and behaviors shared across 
cultures—the “whirl of organism” of our forms of life—suggest a nascent theory of 
human solidarity?  Our freedom in language and the responsibility we bear for me2 -
aning, topics of the book’s opening essays, raise the question of what we might owe 
to one another and how we might offer—or withhold—it in our choices of words. Is 
this the beginning of a theory of justice? The concept of acknowledgment, descri-
bed in the book’s final essays as a response to the challenge of skepticism, shifts the 
$ . I mean here both an equality of subject matter—a democracy of attention—and an equality of speak1 -
ers, so that philosophy becomes, on Cavell’s account, timely and accessible, which is to say, relevant to 
any and all. 
$ . Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” in Must We Mean What We Say?: A 2
Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 52. 
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problem from what I can know to what I might do.  Is this a theory of moral or po3 -
litical action (or both)?  
Each of the themes that I identify here as political has something to do with 
what counts for us, with what we value, with “our cares and commitments” and res-
ponsibilities to one another.  How I make such determinations—how I enact them—4
determines who I am. If such themes do in fact run through the varied subjects of 
Must We Mean What We Say? it is impossible for me to imagine them being politi-
cally neutral, examined, as they were, in a decade of war, in years of struggle over 
rights demanded and denied—an age in which a nation wrestled with its original sins 
of expansion and inequality, and the world’s fate rested more on the accuracy of our 
intelligence than the wisdom of our leaders. When millions demanded that their voi-
ces be heard and their humanity acknowledged, how could Cavell write about lending 
one’s voice to what one says, or of our shared human forms of life, or of the avoidance 
and the denial of acknowledgment, without meaning it politically? 
Must we speak politically? Do philosophers have political obligations, not just as citi-
zens, but as philosophers—obligations that must be met in the writings or teachings 
that constitute their work? If such obligations can be said to exist, does it make silen-
ce about the political crises of their time unforgivable? Or are there times when silen-
ce is the most appropriate—the only—response?  
Cavell addressed these very questions more than 20 years after the publication 
of Must We Mean What We Say? in a reading of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay 
“Fate,” titled “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending.” It was not Cavell’s first foray into 
Emerson’s writings, nor was it his first reading of “Fate,” but it did represent the first 
time that Cavell felt, as he puts it, “forced to emphasize a political theme in [Emer-
son’s] work.”  What made the politics so urgent?  5
Writing in the early 1990s, the burning issue was not the Vietnam War or the 
American Civil Rights Movement or even the lingering threat of nuclear weapons, 
$ . Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” in Must We Mean What We Say?, 238-66 (see n. 2), 3
257.
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: 4
Oxford University Press, 1979), 312.
$ . Cavell, “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, ed. 5
David Justin Hodge (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 193.
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but the “Heidegger affair”: the scandal over then recent “revelations”—none so star-
tling or so new—concerning Heidegger’s intimate involvement with National Socia-
lism.  For critics of Heidegger the cardinal offense was not that the philosopher had 6
been a member of the Nazi Party (though this was bad enough), but rather that he 
had remained silent—appallingly so—about the mass exterminations carried out in 
the death camps. Bad choices might be forgiven, but a proud, untroubled conscien-
ce discourages such generosity.  
For Cavell the question of Heidegger’s politics was a particularly personal one. 
Emerson, one of Cavell’s foremost intellectual influences, was also one of Heidegger’s 
philosophical forebears. The American transcendentalist had exerted a major influ-
ence on the early Nietzsche, whose ideas became something of an obsession for Hei-
degger just at the time of his involvement with the Nazi Party. This is bad company 
for anyone to keep, but it is an especially unfortunate legacy for the founder of Ame-
rican philosophy. “Does Heidegger’s politics—by association, to say the least—taint 
Emerson’s points of contact with it?” Cavell asks.  But given his own place in that li7 -
neage and his sedulous efforts to make the institutions of American philosophy re-
cognize Emerson as a serious thinker, this question of contamination must refer as 
much to Cavell himself as it does to Emerson. 
Cavell approaches the question of whether Heidegger’s politics pollute Emer-
son’s own ideas by interpreting another problematic silence: Emerson’s apparent fai-
lure in “Fate,” an essay on human freedom, to criticize the institution of slavery in 
America.  Emerson’s opposition to slavery is well known, but his silence in “Fate” 8
about what was, in his time, the single greatest violation of human freedom has 
struck critics such as Harold Bloom and John Updike as an admission of despair that 
$ . The publication of Victor Farias’s book Heidegger et le Nazisme sparked “the Heidegger 6
Affair.” See Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991). For a 
blow-by-blow account, see Thomas G. Pavel, “The Heidegger Affair,” in MLN 103.4 (September 1988): 
887-901. 
$ . Cavell, “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” 194.7
$ . Cavell wrote about “Fate” in 1983, 12 years before “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending.” “I 8
was myself silent about this question of Emerson’s silence when I wrote an essay in 1983 mostly on 
Emerson’s ‘Fate’ (I called it ‘Emerson, Coleridge, Kant’), my first somewhat extended treatment of an 
Emersonian text. It was seeming to me so urgent then to see to the claim to Emerson to be a philo-
sophical writer, in principle imaginable as founding philosophy for a nation still finding itself, that I 
suppose I recurrently hoped that Emerson had, for the moment of the essay ‘Fate’, sufficiently excused 
or justified his silence in saying there, ‘Nothing is more disgusting than the crowing about liberty by 
slaves, as most men are’.” Ibid., 194-95. 
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nothing could be done, “that Emerson gave up on the hope of democracy” altogether.  9
It is not as though Emerson’s silence was absolute: both before and after “Fate” he 
spoke out publicly—polemically—against slavery. But what Cavell is asking, after Blo-
om and Updike, is whether this was enough philosophically.   10
The answer might at first appear to be no. Referring to a public speech that 
Emerson gave in 1844, titled “Emancipation in the British West Indies,” Cavell argues 
that “the absoluteness of the American institution of slavery among the forms human 
self-enslavement takes, hence the absoluteness of philosophy’s call to treat it, to recoil 
from it, is announced.”  Implicit in this reading of Emerson are two assumptions: one, 11
that the goal of philosophy is human freedom, so that philosophical thought and wri-
ting should take the form of an intellectual confrontation with enslavement or impri-
sonment or, as Emerson would put it, fate, in all their forms; and two, that such a con-
frontation must not be polemical. The problem that “Fate” raises, then, is not whether 
Emerson the citizen opposed slavery, voted against it, used his skills as a writer and his 
reputation as an orator to confront it polemically: this is uncontroversial. The problem 
is whether Emerson the philosopher was able to fulfill the very duty that he had assig-
ned to philosophy itself, that is, whether he treated and recoiled from slavery not just 
polemically but as a thinker as well. If the meaning of this—a philosophical confrontati-
on with slavery that is not polemical—is not yet entirely clear, it is worth dwelling, for 
now, on just this question: How could an essay about human freedom written just 
months after the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act—a law that effectively expan-
ded the reach of the slave owner to every state in the Union, extinguishing for the slave 
the very possibility of freedom within the borders of the United States—fail to address 
this most bald and brutal affront to human freedom? Did Emerson succumb to a des-
pair that compromised the emancipatory ambition of his own philosophical writing? 
Did philosophy for Emerson cease to be a confrontation with the world, becoming ins-
tead a retreat from its ruthless realities? If Cavell’s essay on “Fate” is as self-referential 
as I have claimed, then how he answers these questions will, I argue, shed light on the 
political themes that I have sought in Cavell’s own project.  
$ . Ibid., 194.9
$ . For this critique of Emerson, see Harold Bloom, “Mr. America,” in The New York Review 10
of Books, November 22, 1984. Also John Updike, “Emersonianism,” in The New Yorker, June 4, 1984.
$ . Cavell, “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” 210; emphasis mine.11
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Cavell’s response to the question of Emerson’s silence in “Fate,” roughly, is 
this: philosophy cannot but confront slavery. “If slavery is the negation of thought,” 
writes Cavell, “then thinking cannot affirm itself without affirming the end of 
slavery.”  Is this just a glib excuse for inaction, a convenient bromide for the morally 12
self-satisfied? I will have more to say about that, but for now I limit myself to only 
this point. Beyond the question of philosophical influence as it appears in “Emerson’s 
Constitutional Amending,” there is another, historical inheritance worth considering 
when reading Cavell, namely, the legacy of that same absolute institution of slavery, 
which, at the time that Cavell was writing Must We Mean What We Say? took the 
form of Jim Crow segregation. Does it too require an absolute philosophical respon-
se?  If something like this were not true of the call to philosophy in Cavell’s time—13
and our own—if unjust wars and irrational hatreds were not incentives to think, it 
would prove, to quote Cavell, “harder than I could digest.”  14
But that is not the only reason I will contend that these are, for Cavell, the 
most pressing incentives to think. Cavell’s writings, early and late, show him strug-
gling with the political provocations of his age in a fashion that I consider both fun-
damental to his project, and ultimately relevant to political philosophy more gene-
rally.  The stalking, subtle presence of the problems of post-war politics in Must We 15
Mean What We Say?—of war and inequality and indifference and the bomb—thus 
$ . Ibid., 205.12
$ . Cavell the citizen certainly responded to Jim Crow segregation, participating, for example, in Mis13 -
sissippi Freedom Summer in 1964. See Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 429-34.
$ . Cavell, “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” 194.14
$ . Cavell might appear to undercut my argument in his memoir, when he writes: “There came a time 15
during the Vietnam War when I interrupted myself during a lecture, moved to say that I could no 
more ignore that morning’s news, at least to notice it in common, than I would be able to withhold at-
tention to the cry of a child. At the same time I registered my sense that this very acknowledgment sig-
naled the victory of violence over thinking. Then sometimes thinking must turn to destroy its peace, to 
observe havoc, in order to attract its own protection” (Cavell, Excerpts, 478; emphasis mine). But if 
philosophy is an argument with one’s culture, then such interruptions are no more a suspension of 
thought than Nora’s dramatic exit is a cessation of her argument with Torvald: “[T]he final sound of 
the slamming door of the house [...] counts not as the interruption of an argument but as its continua-
tion by other means” (Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage [Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, 23-24]). Elsewhere, citing Heidegger, Cavell suggests that our 
oblivion to such provocations is indeed what calls most for thinking: “[T]he thing most critically pro-
voking in our riskily provocative time [is] that we are still not really provoked, that nothing serious 
matters to us, or nothing seriously, that our thoughts are unscrupulous, private” (Cavell, “Aversive 
Thinking: Emersonian Representations in Heidegger and Nietzsche,” in Emerson’s Transcendental 
Etudes, 141–70 [see n. 7], 144-46).
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provides a window into Cavell’s key philosophical concepts and an indication of what 
his theory of the political might be. 
2. The Interpretation of Politics 
Most commentators on Cavell have either avoided political questions altogether or 
tallied up those few passages in Cavell’s writings where he speaks openly (and, so the 
assumption goes, anomalously) about political topics and issues: the pages on the so-
cial contract or on abortion in The Claim of Reason; the invocations of democracy in 
his defense of Perfectionism against Rawls in the Carus Lectures; or his occasional 
treatment of patently political themes in The Senses of Walden. Andrew Norris opens 
his introduction to a volume on Cavell and political philosophy with an admission 
that “the very idea that Stanley Cavell’s work contributes anything significant to poli-
tical theory might seem odd,” and notes the dearth of writings on the subject.  16
Stephen Mulhall, in a chapter devoted to politics in his book Stanley Cavell: Philo-
sophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary, argues that Cavell’s writings on politics were, 
until later in his career, “much less extensive than his work on aesthetics and mora-
lity.”  Lawrence Rhu takes the opposite position in Stanley Cavell’s American Dre17 -
am, describing “The Avoidance of Love,” the final essay in Must We Mean What We 
Say?, as a work inspired “by the agony of America’s involvement in Vietnam,” while 
arguing that Cavell’s later writings are less political, more literary, and more palata-
ble.  Mulhall and Rhu thus share the premise that a rupture occurs somewhere in 18
Cavell’s writings, a break that is at least rhetorical, if not entirely thematic.  
In this book I offer a political interpretation of Cavell’s work that takes his wri-
tings as a cohesive whole dedicated to the discovery and creation of an American voi-
$ . Andrew Norris, “Introduction: Stanley Cavell and the Claim to Community,” in The Claim to Com16 -
munity: Essays on Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy, ed. Andrew Norris, 1-18 (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2006), 1. Norris writes that only nine of the 214 entries on Cavell in The 
Philosopher’s Index concerned the philosopher’s contributions to political theory. I have not attempt-
ed to replicate Norris’s results, not knowing the precise terms of his search. [Note: This chapter was 
written before Norris’s most recent book, Becoming Who We Are, was published, so it does not grap-
ple with the ideas advanced there.]
$ . Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford Uni17 -
versity Press, 1994), 55. While I think Mulhall underestimates the importance of the political in 
Cavell’s work, his reading has set the tone for those that have followed, including Norris’s. 
$ . Lawrence Rhu Stanley Cavell’s American Dream: Shakespeare, Philosophy, and Hollywood 18
Movies (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 25.
CONVERSATIONS 5 !80
ce for both politics and philosophy. While the centrality of America to Cavell’s project 
certainly draws on the history and culture of the United States, most of all on our “sa-
cred” texts—our movies and our literary laments for lost promises (read: Walden)—
all the world is, once again, for Cavell, America. Which is to say that he understands 
by this word an idea or a site for humanity rather than any specific geographical loca-
tion, historical narrative, or political identity. Cavell’s concept of American subjecti-
vity will, therefore, be at once a theory of political action and of human redemption: 
to speak with this American voice is to “stand for humanity.”  If this idea of America 19
sometimes bears a close resemblance to the history and geography and politics of a 
place called the United States, it is all the more closely related to a state of immi-
grancy or exile that millions have found here, a way of being in no place, which only 
means that the idea of America is, for Cavell, the quest for utopia.  
My argument thus has bearing on how we interpret the entirety of Cavell’s phi-
losophical project and on how we understand his theory of the political. I will pursue 
three interwoven lines of interpretation, which I call, prosaically enough, the thema-
tic, the aesthetic, and the theoretical.  The first of these, the thematic, is the most 20
important and the most controversial […]. There are three tasks associated with this 
first line of interpretation: 
(1) To describe how we ought to read Cavell by examining four exemplary rea-
dings: “The Politics of Interpretation,” “Austin at Criticism,” “Declining Decline,” and 
“Emerson’s Constitutional Amending.” In these avowedly political essays spanning 
his career, Cavell describes his own interpretive strategies, even providing a reading 
of one of his own earlier essays. From this I develop a loose network of concepts that I 
use throughout the book as an interpretive key […].  
(2) To identify and analyze the political themes found in Cavell’s earliest wri-
tings, the essays in Must We Mean What We Say? [...]  
$ . Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even (Descartes, Emerson, Poe),” in Emerson’s Transcendental 19
Etudes, 83–109 (see n. 7), 93.
$ . Each of these labels is flawed, so I offer them here only as useful signs, not as major landmarks. 20
Thematic only accounts for (at best) two of the three tasks I assign to it, failing to describe the work of 
developing interpretive keys; aesthetic is perhaps the best of the three labels, but following on themat-
ic, it might suggest that I am analyzing the aesthetics of Cavell’s writings rather than a particular aes-
thetic idea that Cavell employs; and theoretical says virtually nothing by saying too much entirely, 
though it is, perhaps, for its banality, the most accurate.
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(3) To show how these themes determine the course of Cavell’s philosophical 
inquiries in the texts that follow them. As I have suggested already, Cavell makes an 
appeal to everyday political problems in formulating his seminal philosophical con-
cepts and as a way of achieving a theoretical account of what politics is, a strategy 
analogous to ordinary language philosophy’s appeal to what we say in our day-to-day 
lives as a way of addressing philosophical problems. Having identified these themes I 
will argue that the creation and discovery of a political and philosophical American 
voice or subjectivity leads Cavell in two directions: a reading of Thoreau and (later) 
Emerson, and the study of cinema (which leads, in turn, to a study of opera, a source 
of inspiration for American movies).   21
The second line of interpretation, which I call the aesthetic, examines the dramatic 
genres, plots, and personae (or types) that Cavell associates with politics: the tragic 
[…], the cinematic […], the prophetic […], the operatic or melodramatic, and the co-
medic […]. This might be thought of as the book’s secondary argument: that Cavell 
describes politics as staged or enacted, so that our experience as audience members is 
actually a kind of political education.  As he argues in The World Viewed, when our 22
lives have become theater, the only intelligible explanation of our condition will itself 
be dramatic.   23
My third line of interpretation, the theoretical, is the overarching task of this 
book […]: the development of a Cavellian theory of the political. I claim that the cen-
tral conceptual dynamic in Cavell’s thought is the relationship between two poles of 
human existence: skepticism and redemption. Skepticism is to be understood here as 
a lived condition rather than a (purely or primarily) intellectual problem. The idea of 
“living our skepticism” is Cavell’s most drastic divergence from other accounts of Car-
tesian doubt. He criticizes the academic skeptic for reducing an existential state to an 
epistemological puzzle, as though the quest for certainty were but a clever distraction 
$ . The other reason for turning to opera is the prominence of the voice. It is worth pointing out that 21
Cavell’s studies of cinema make almost no mention of movies prior to the advent of “talkies” (a term 
that appears often, and anachronously, in his writings on film), suggesting that the primary character-
istic of cinema as a medium is not the image. 
$ . See Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 91-94.22
$ . Ibid., 92.23
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from implacable human anxieties, or a last, desperate attempt to hold on to a rece-
ding world. You might as well try to bottle the waning tide. What, then, is skepticism?  
Cavellian skepticism is a condition of alienation from the world and from 
others that takes the form of a crisis of acknowledgment and an avoidance of respon-
sibility. On this reading, the key feature of Descartes’ skeptical recital in the Medita-
tions is the malaise—or madness—that enables his descent into hyperbolic doubt. The 
first Meditation depicts the world as a disquieting nightmare. The reliability and fa-
miliarity of home give way to the false and fickle stirrings of a malicious demon, ren-
dering its every fact and feature a hostile phantom.  
While Cavell views skepticism as a constant human possibility, he also argues 
that it has distinct historical and political causes and manifestations. And it goes by 
many names: Coleridge’s “dejection,” Thoreau’s “quiet desperation,” Emerson’s “se-
cret melancholy,” Marx’s “estrangement.”  Dante’s dark woods are more important 24
to an account of the experience than anything brooded over in Hume’s study. And 
more important than Dante’s woods will be Thoreau’s.   25
Each of these chroniclers of the uncanny describes a world in which things do 
not add up. Like Descartes’, theirs is an account of horror, depicting a senseless, uns-
table reality, complete with zombies and madmen.  But unlike Descartes, they do 26
not restrict this state to the unreliability of the senses or the frivolity of opinion. For 
them, skepticism persists as a shared mood, a zeitgeist in which objects and people 
have been miscounted or valued wrongly, so that they are not what they seem to be. 
Faced with a world that is distant and chaotic, these writers find no place for human 
$ . Cavell frequently links skepticism with mourning as well. See Tammy Clewell, “Cavell and the End24 -
less Mourning of Skepticism,” in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 9.3 (2004): 75-87. 
A more problematic formulation of this interpretation of skepticism is Heidegger’s “bedimmed avera-
geness,” which Cavell also invokes—see, e.g., “The Philosopher in American Life (toward Thoreau and 
Emerson),” in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, 33-58 (see note 7), 39. The problem, of course, is 
that Heidegger uses this phrase in section 27 of Being and Time, which is not only one of the most 
overtly (and uncomfortably) political passages in the book, but is also among the most impoverished 
philosophical accounts of human plurality that I have encountered. The kind of society that Heidegger 
condemns in those pages—bustling, messy, disordered—is precisely what I wish to affirm in this work. 
For more on the politics of this section of Being and Time, see Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical 
Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
$ . Cavell, “Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson 25
and Wittgenstein, 29–76 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 36-37. 
$ . Madness and all species of the undead (e.g., ghosts and zombies) will be important themes in my 26
discussion of Emerson and Thoreau. Dante’s sojourn into hell provides its own share of horrors. 
Specters and zombie commodities haunt Marx’s world. 
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desires and voices, while those who harbor them are but specters amid the shifting 
shadows.  
Redemption, which is never final or absolute, and remains, therefore, a cons-
tant human ambition, requires an enactment of your own existence, recalling the 
claim to exist that, in Descartes, takes the form of the cogito.  The difference betwe27 -
en Cavell and Descartes—the reason why this is an enactment of (rather than a claim 
to) existence—is that redemption must, like skepticism, be lived, which is to say that 
it concerns what we do, rather than what we know. Cavell thus describes redemption 
in terms of what he calls acknowledgment, a phenomenon that is related to knowled-
ge while also going beyond it: to acknowledge my pain is not just to understand it, 
not to verify it, but to respond to it (by alleviating it, for instance).  And to ackno28 -
wledge my pain is to acknowledge me—here, now, this singular being in this specific 
set of circumstances. And with me, goes my humanity. After all, what is made of sto-
ne does not feel pain, which is why some might wish to trade their flesh for it.   29
Enacting my existence, then, means making a place in the world by petitioning 
some other to acknowledge my voice and my desire as a human subject.  I may use 30
words to issue my demand, or I may show it. My demand may refer to some specific 
fact in the world or some particular need that I have, or it may be more nebulous. I 
hope that it proves to be more than mere whimsy, but I cannot know until I have 
made the attempt: in the scene of acknowledgment my trust in what I have to say or 
show—my trust in myself—necessarily precedes my knowledge of it.  Whatever the 31
circumstances, Cavell argues that I enact my existence in a staged confrontation with 
someone else. His concept of redemption thus resembles the demand that occupies 
the place of the cogito in Marx: “I am nothing and should be everything,” only, in this 
iteration the actor is no longer the Proletariat.  It is America. 32
$ . Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even,” 88-90.27
$ . Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love,” 257.28
$ . See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S Hacker 29
and Joachim Schulte (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §283.
$ . The secularization of sin or perdition as skepticism is, of course, taken over from Descartes; the 30
secularization of the concept of redemption is due to the unavailability of God, after Descartes, to be 
my other. Cavell’s secularization of the theological will be an important theme in what follows.
$ . The allusion here is to Emerson’s “Self-Reliance.” It occurs throughout Cavell’s writings and this 31
work. See Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfec-
tionism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12.
$ . Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in The Marx-Engels 32
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker 53–65(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 63.
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Since skepticism is in fact alienation from the world and from others, redemp-
tion through this staged confrontation, the scene of acknowledgment, also takes the 
form of reconciliation, or what Cavell calls a “return to the ordinary.”  This is not ne33 -
cessarily reconciliation with the person I address when issuing my demand: conflicts 
may not end so easily (or at all). It is, rather, reconciliation with a world that, so long 
as I remained mute, would not exist for me: it is not my world until it includes my 
voice. And so, my demand is actually to have my voice heard both in affirming my 
own existence and in “calling back the world.”  The connection between these two is 34
Cavell’s Kantian premise that to be is to judge the world. By enacting my existence I 
enact this judgment. (The voice plays the same role for Cavell that transcendental ap-
perception plays for Kant: the simultaneous presentation of world and self.)  
But what does it mean to bring back the world, to return to the ordinary? It is among 
the most enigmatic, challenging concepts in Cavell’s writings, appropriate enough to 
the melancholic reveries of Romanticism (“Five years have passed; five summers, 
with the length / Of five long winters …”), but hard to nail down as a philosophical 
concept, let alone a political one.  This is how I see it. In speaking, I take responsibi35 -
lity for the world. I express my desire for intimacy with it, for the right to judge it, 
name it, make it my home, as though I were Adam in the Garden. But this is not a re-
turn to (or of) things as they are: my desire entails “recounting” or revaluing things 
and people. The world is not only interpreted here: it is changed. Cavell borrows the 
Emersonian “transfiguration” of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, where the judg-
ment of the world is both the epistemological constitution of it that Kant delineates in 
the first Critique, and the expression of (Romantic?) disappointment with this epis-
temology, expressed as a wish to change the world altogether, the dissatisfaction des-
cribed in Emerson’s “Experience” as knowledge of the contrast between “the world I 
converse with” and “the world I think”—knowledge that I do not synthesize, but suf-
$ . Cavell, “Texts of Recovery (Coleridge, Wordsworth, Heidegger ...),” in Quest of the Ordinary: Lines 33
of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 53.
$ . Cavell, “Opera and the Lease of Voice,” in A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises 34
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 151.
$ . William Wordsworth “Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” in William Wordsworth: 35
The Major Works, ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 131.
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fer.  You might describe this as the claim that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is 36
not transcendental enough. Democracy is Idealism on these shores, the making of a 
new world. It is as though my desire brings the world back to life, animates what I 
once took to be unworthy of—or hostile to—it.  Another word for it, which will come 37
up throughout Cavell’s writings, is rebirth—both my own, and my world’s.  Rebirth 38
follows the craving for intimacy that is desire. 
The claim—implicit in the demand for acknowledgment—that I have a right to 
voice this new desire for a new world, accounts for the confrontational nature of the 
scene of acknowledgment, what Cavell calls, “the argument of the ordinary.” But it is 
this voicing that, however contentious, constitutes the essence of human freedom, 
even when the acknowledgment that you demand is not to be granted. Freedom lies 
in the assumption of responsibility for the world, for yourself, and for your society, 
which is why this staged confrontation is the start of, and a necessary component in, 
what Cavell calls, in his response to Rawls, “the conversation of justice.” How can this 
be political? 
3. Skepticism and Redemption 
In this book, I treat the lived condition of skepticism, as I have described it here, as 
an explicitly (though not exclusively) political experience. The political relevance of 
other minds skepticism—the question of whether another person has ideas, feelings, 
or even a mind as I do—should be obvious. When the harmless suspicions, anxieties, 
and snobberies of everyday life become so exaggerated, is there any reason not to 
deny others justice or life? To say that we can live our skepticism with regard to other 
minds is to say that we do not value others as we should, that society, or the world, is 
now violent and unjust. 
$ . Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Experience,” in The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, edited 36
by Brooks Atkinson, 307-26, (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 326. If Romanticism is the de-
sire to overcome our estrangement from the world, as Cavell argues in In Quest of the Ordinary, then 
Marx and Freud clearly belong to that tradition: both bridge the distance between us and the world 
through a transformation—of the world in Marx—of the self in Freud. For Cavell, this is not a disjunc-
tive proposition.
$ . Cavell, “Texts of Recovery,” 52–53.37
$ . Cavell, “Declining Decline,” 63–64.38
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Less obvious is the political significance of material object skepticism, the idea 
that things may be unknowable or even nonexistent. The politics of material object 
skepticism rests on the notion that our relationship with things in the world is based 
on the value they have for us, and that politics is the determination of these values. 
To say that we can live our skepticism with regard to material objects is to say that we 
do not value things as we should, and we have turned the world into a vicious, inhu-
man place as result. 
There is ample textual support for this political interpretation of skepticism 
[…] here are the broad outlines of my reasoning. First, there are suggestions in seve-
ral of Cavell’s writings, most patently in the introduction to Disowning Knowledge, 
that skepticism should be regarded as a historical event with its own unique genea-
logy, which includes, for instance, the emergence of science and the “death of 
god” (causes that are not exactly politically insignificant), and most relevant here, the 
birth of the idea of politics by consent.  While skepticism is not equivalent to demo39 -
cracy, its reinvention as a modern idea does coincide with the Enlightenment’s redis-
covery of government by the people. And skepticism is, for Cavell, perhaps all the 
more likely to assume tragic (which is to say, public) dimensions in a democratic so-
ciety, a point I discuss at length in my reading of “The Avoidance of Love.” This is 
also one reason why redemption from skepticism is so linked with the idea of Ameri-
ca.  
Second, in describing skepticism, Cavell uses words that, if not strictly politi-
cal, are perhaps most common in such contexts (for example, “alienation”), and he 
quotes accounts from other authors that are meant politically (such as Thoreau’s 
“quiet desperation”).  
Third, and most important, Cavell’s account of skepticism in Must We Mean 
What We Say? is itself developed through his discussions of Vietnam, racial inequa-
lity, and nuclear holocaust. In treating Cavellian skepticism as a political condition, I 
am, therefore, bringing the concept home.  
My treatment of skepticism turns the redemptive claim to existence as a hu-
man subject into a simultaneous demand to have a political voice, which means, ha-
$ . Cavell, Disowning Knowledge: In Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University 39
Press, 1987), 20-21.
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ving the right to revalue or to recount (things and people in) the world. The goal of 
Cavellian politics is not consensus, but rather an unauthorized census, carried out as 
a scene of confrontation where the goal is mutual acknowledgment. That is, politics 
for Cavell is a matter of counting, understood both transitively and intransitively. 
While this concept of census can concern all sorts of matters (What counts as a just 
war? What counts as equal opportunity? What counts as a marriage?), it is, first and 
foremost—and implicit in each of these questions—about who and what counts as 
political. Do you acknowledge me as a political subject, as one who can determine 
what counts (as a just war, as equal opportunity, as a marriage…)? Does my demand 
count for you as political or do you instead dismiss it (as criminal or immoral or pue-
rile or sick)? Do I count for you? The claim to and demand for political status, for the 
right to count, thus accompanies every other political utterance—just as the cogito 
accompanies every physical perception for Descartes, so that I know, despite appea-
rances, my own mind better than I know the sensuous objects around me. I establish 
and disclose my subjectivity—my voice—as the achievement of political action. The 
relevant dramatic medium here would be cinema, specifically Cavell’s account of 
Hollywood stars in The World Viewed, the star being the one who is disclosed in 
exemplary cinematic performances with every character, in each line and glance and 
gesture (Bogart, for instance).  Plots and roles remain significant: without them, 40
stars would not be born; not because the stars were hidden from us, just waiting to be 
revealed, but because they become who they are only in those moments of mass se-
duction taking place there on the screen right before our eyes. The star is distinct 
from both actor and character, yet unthinkable without them: Bogart would not be 
Bogart without that voice, that glare, that impossible blending of intensity and indif-
ference. Nor would Bogart be Bogart without the hard-boiled detectives and disap-
pointed romantics and honorable swindlers that he brings to life. Danish princes 
would never do. It is the light of these stars refracted through the clichés of under-
written roles and overwrought plots that we as audience gaze at, mesmerized, so that 
the exemplary cinematic presentation of any world exceeds the sum of its script, pro-
jecting another world of fantasy coextensive with it and more singular than any boi-
lerplate narrative could ever be.  
$ . Cavell, The World Viewed, 27-29.40
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Every political presentation functions in the same way, disclosing both a de-
mand and the subject issuing it, political subjectivity being, like stardom, distinct 
from the accidental features of biography and identity associated with the actor. It is 
why even politics without parties is bound to traffic in endless labels: a name, good or 
otherwise, is “the immediate jewel” of political utterance. The age-old political practi-
ce of name-calling is only the acknowledgment that our political positions make us 
who we are. Any political actor worth his salt knows that much is to be gained by tho-
se who filch good reputations by naming their enemies well.  
Political census, as Cavell describes it, is by its very nature contentious, an on-
going, interminable argument. Since I am identifying the right to be one who (both 
transitively and intransitively) counts with our claim to exist as human subjects, then 
denying my place in this combative conversation of justice is a denial of my very hu-
manity. Something like this idea is central to our concept of modern democracy, whe-
re rights are not only the possessions of the citizen, but the natural inheritance of 
every human being. While Cavell argues for this convergence by linking political con-
versation with human redemption, he does not consider it sufficiently enough, as in 
his discussion of slavery in The Claim of Reason, where slavery is taken to be a per-
verse acknowledgment of the slave’s humanness, the slave owner being the one who 
imbrutes himself, who denies his own bond with humanity even while denying the 
slave participation in the conversation of justice.  It is not that I oppose Cavell’s re41 -
versal of the problem, which is consistent with the sense once captured in our lan-
guage by the word brutalize, though that sense has now perhaps been lost in the en-
dless stream of atrocities to which we have applied it. I do wish, however, to register 
this general objection. I do not dispute that the sadistic slave owner who tortures or 
rapes the slave acknowledges certain human features, in these cases the ability to suf-
fer the pain and lust that he inflicts upon them. I do not doubt that he even recogni-
zes himself in his victim, at least in these limited ways, and exploits the intimate 
knowledge that this grants him of a hidden maze of psychic pains and weaknesses. No 
one ever said sadists and psychopaths were not perceptive or cunning. But then, 
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 372-75. It would seem that this was not always Cavell’s view. In The 41
World Viewed Cavell refers to a racist assumption that Scarlett O’Hara makes in Gone With the Wind 
as “dehumanizing.” I will have more to say about this scene in chapter five. Cavell, The World Viewed, 
34.
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normal people also talk to horses and describe dogs as their best friends: our hate, 
like our love, can transgress the boundaries between species.  
This point may be an obvious one: it has become a treacly cliché to speak of 
the dehumanizing of our enemies and our poor and our oppressed, as it has, conver-
sely, become a sanctimonious cliché to remind others that the Russians (or whoever 
has replaced them as our foe) love their children as much as we do, as though that 
fact will be enough to make us toss away our guns once and for all. No, Cavell is right 
to say that there is a terrifying fact that we must all own up to in being human, na-
mely that there is no limit to the horrors we are willing to inflict on other people. If 
only every day were Christmas, when, as an endless number of battlefield legends 
have it, the trenches fell silent while enemy armies that had been killing one another 
just a few hours earlier serenaded each other with carols across no man’s land—only 
to replace the sound of song with the noise of bullets the next day. There is no end to 
the ways in which we deny others their voices; no end either to our means of imbru-
ting ourselves. But does our altered sense of the word brutalization—our sense that it 
is now our victims who come out as something less than human in our assessments—
offer a thread worth following?  
Just look at the photos of the mangled bodies of children who have worked in 
mines or the sinewy scars on the backs of slaves and you cannot help but feel that this 
sentiment of pillaged, broken humanity, commonplace though it may be, is somehow 
correct. What Cavell adds to this cliché, though he fails to realize its implications in 
full, is a way to think through the power this sentiment has over us, along with our 
blindness to the ways in which we go on denying the humanity of others by ending or 
ignoring the conversation. Child labor and slavery are now too painful for our consci-
ences to endure, but our deafness to countless others is not (yet).  42
While participation in the conversation of justice thus occurs on two levels si-
multaneously—the human and the political—this convergence ceases to be, in my re-
ading of Cavell, that of “man” and “citizen.” The immigrant or exile, Cavell’s words for 
the political subject, now displaces the citizen. But if skepticism means not being at 
home in the world, why should the immigrant or the exile be the redemptive political 
$ . I write this knowing that the “we” that I identify here is not as large a portion of humanity as I 42
might like.
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subject rather than the very symbol of our estrangement? The answer is that our 
(American) settling into the world, as dramatized in Thoreau’s project at Walden and 
captured in Emerson’s idea of “abandonment,” consists of “being on the road, on the 
way.”  It is as though America’s presence a world away from Europe made it, for 43
Thoreau and Emerson, a place where stifling paradox became fruitful irony. I have 
said already that in Cavell’s reading of them we return to the world through its reva-
luation, which is to say, its creation, its discovery as new. I will add now to this irony 
our achievement of intimacy through exile, and our redemption from alienation by 
becoming immigrants—immigrancy being Cavell’s Emersonian “transfiguration” of 
our skeptical homelessness.  The idea is clear enough as a reading of, say, Emerson’s 44
essay “Circles,” where abandonment is taken as the human condition, the fact that 
“around every circle another can be drawn,” so that the range of human experience is 
“god in nature […] a weed by the wall.”  Which is to say that we possess all the 45
power and severity of the wild and of the divine: no walls can contain us, just as no 
borders can contain the immigrant or the exile. To accept limitation—the only sin, 
according to this defrocked preacher—is to deny our desire for the world, and thus to 
deny our humanness. But what could any of this mean politically? 
I have said that having a home in the world means making a home, and ma-
king a home in a strange or foreign place is exactly what the immigrant or exile must 
do. Specifically, in politics the redemptive status of immigrancy or exile derives from 
the fact that political confrontation occurs, according to Cavell’s inflection of utopia, 
in no place—as in “no place else,” as in, here … or anywhere.  There is no proper set46 -
ting for political exchange, so my staging of a demand is itself the creation of a politi-
cal space, not according to some fixed idea, but as the creation and discovery of poli-
tical action itself: my demand is not just raising a new issue, but inventing a new idea 
of—a new medium for—politics. The emancipation in the last two centuries of private 
life, of the worlds of labor and love, represents not just new causes and new laws, but 
the creation of new sites for the staging of acknowledgment. I do not refer here to the 
expansion of the established political realm, the absorption of private life by the pu-
$ . Cavell, The Senses of Walden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 29-30.43
$ . Cavell, “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” 211.44
$ . Emerson, “Circles,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson: The Essential Writings, 252-62 (see n. 40), 255.45
$ . Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, 20.46
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blic sphere, though this has clearly happened as well. I mean instead that what had 
been understood as the proper space of politics turned out to have no monopoly on 
acknowledgment, while in the dark, constricted recesses where, for centuries, people 
had toiled invisibly, content to be acknowledged only in the next world, human 
beings were reborn, demanding that the next world coincide with this one. In politics, 
at least, existence precedes essence. 
Skepticism in its political form includes the sense that political action is im-
possible, and impossible because we do not know what it is or where to begin; we do 
not know how to offer our consent (or not). It is as though the terms of the social con-
tract have been reversed, so that we live in a pre-political state of nature precisely be-
cause our society is so well ordered that it can get along just fine without our voices. 
But without my consent it is not a contract at all: it is a skeptics’ conspiracy.  As a 47
political subject I thus feel compelled to stage my enactment of existence outside of 
all conventions, what Cavell names the order of law, either because I think this order 
is hopelessly compromised by injustice, or when this is not the case, because the or-
der of law is only truly just—i.e., I only actively consent to it—when it is animated by 
my (human) desires. I become an immigrant or exile, convinced that a home for my 
desire must be made elsewhere, in a new world, a world that will be found and foun-
ded right here. In other words, consent is possible only by way of voicing my dissent, 
what Cavell calls, after Emerson, aversion. It means settling into my home, my soci-
ety, by going into exile, by being on the road. 
Being outside the order of law means that I risk unintelligibility, that I suffer 
accusations of childishness, madness, illness, perversity, criminality, or worse. I have 
no authority, no appeal, no claim to standing beyond a voice or the silent staging of 
my desire and my humanity. I may not even have an obvious grievance or injury that 
I can point to. Yet I feel wronged and wish to establish a new standard, surpassing 
that of my society, for measuring human justice. Risking unintelligibility in this realm 
of desire does not mean that I have given up on making myself understood—the des-
pair that Bloom and Updike accuse Emerson of, or what Cavell will describe, after 
Wittgenstein, as the “fantasy” of a private language. On the contrary, I refuse despair 
by persisting in my attempt to achieve intelligibility outside of the available conditi-
$ . Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 469-70.47
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ons for political conversation, driven by the feeling that action and intelligibility are 
impossible within the order of law; not because the words I use are inadequate, but 
because my words and my life are now misaligned.  My words continue to mean: I 48
do not. According to the order of law I am, as an exile, no one, which is precisely why 
I can speak for all, why, at that moment, “I stand for humanity.”  What I called 49
Marx’s cogito becomes this for Cavell: I am no one, and I speak as everyone. 
The best example of the Cavellian political subject is Nora in Ibsen’s A Doll 
House.  Of course, Nora leaves her husband Torvald, who can hear her only as a 50
child, a hysteric who needs to be calmed, rather than a fully realized human being ex-
pressing a desire for change. The order of law she inhabits is compromised, and so 
she too is compromised, unable to be reborn within its confines, represented in this 
case as the house she inhabits, the house referred to in the play’s title. She stages her 
desire by leaving it, by slamming the door behind her, an unspoken utterance that is 
the enactment of her existence. However loud that slamming door must sound to 
Torvald and to us as her audience, it is a silent show of desire that we must read. But 
must politics always entail slamming doors and other literal abandonments?  
Above I said that it is not only when the order of law is hopelessly compromi-
sed by injustice that such enactments occur, that they are, on the contrary, ways of 
revitalizing the conversation of justice and showing that I consent to my society. My 
final chapter, which explores Cavell’s engagement with Rawls in The Claim of Reason 
and the Carus Lectures, considers how such enactments, as forms of dissent, can con-
tribute to the conversation of justice in societies that have, as Cavell calls it, “good 
enough justice,” so that, while I stage my demand outside the order of law, I am not 
compelled to slam the door on it, to walk out on it altogether. In such a society, ar-
gument and confrontation make possible the conversation of justice by redirecting it 
away from the impersonal rules and political operations that have no need for my 
voice to scenes of mutual acknowledgment where the possibilities of language to re-
count the world are explored and contested. In such circumstances, dissent is not the 
mark of a society’s failures, but a measure of consent to its mode of justice. 
$ . James Conant, “Must We Show What We Cannot Say?,” in The Senses of Stanley Cavell, ed. 48
Richard Fleming et al (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989), 242-83.
$ . Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, 5.49
$ . My references to this play are all drawn from Henrik Ibsen, A Doll House, in Ibsen: Four Major 50
Plays, Volume I, trans. Rolf Fjelde (New York: Signet Classics, 2006).
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The argument I have delineated here largely begins […] with the dynamic of 
skepticism and redemption in relation to the three political issues I find in Must We 
Mean What We Say?: the threat of nuclear holocaust, the continued injustice of raci-
al inequality, and the destructive madness of the war in Vietnam. Each of these issues 
is part of a larger claim that America is no place, in the dual sense of not existing and 
of being a utopia, the site of human redemption. Dramatically, Cavell’s claim is that 
ours is a state of tragedy, our fate as a nation like that of Lear. Philosophically, Cavell 
shows that we cannot know in advance what counts as political, that political action 
and intelligibility are subjects of constant contestation […]. 
I claim that Cavell seeks an alternative to this American tragic narrative in 
cinema and in Thoreau’s Walden, a book written in response to the same political cri-
sis of a nation tearing itself apart by expanding its powers and by failing to ackno-
wledge a sizable segment of its population, which is to say, by failing to count pro-
perly. The important themes to emerge here are those of recounting or revaluing the 
world, and of our society as a parody of the social contract, what I have already refer-
red to as a skeptics’ conspiracy. Thoreau’s prophetic persona, the dramatic mask or 
type that Cavell finds in Walden as an alternative to tragedy, also sets the stage for 
the remainder of my argument, where prophetic politics becomes what Cavell calls 
“passionate utterance,” corresponding to the dramatic narratives of opera and melo-
drama […].   51
I show how passionate utterance figures in Cavell’s engagement with Rawls, so 
that dissent forms the basis for a continued conversation of justice in the form of the 
interminable argument I have described. This drama of consent, as Cavell calls it, is a 
narrative of forgiveness corresponding to comedy in two ways. First, it is the drama 
of a society in which citizens can exercise their dissent freely, can show their aversion 
openly, as do all the quirky, amorous pairs that populate romantic comedies, or as the 
Marx Brothers do in their ecstatic eccentricities. These pairings and partnerships re-
pudiate society’s conspiracies by offering a model of genuine consent, while at the 
same time testing society’s tolerance for aversive dissent (which is why so many ro-
mantic comedies feature brushes with the law, to say nothing of the Marx Brothers’ 
$ . Cavell suggests that his notion of passionate utterance is the most politically relevant idea in his 51
work, though what little explanation he gives differs from my own account. See Cavell, “The Incessance 
and the Absence of the Political,” in The Claim to Community (see n. 17), 263-318.
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own adventures in that arena). Second, it is comedy that best shows us a world that 
refuses to conform to our ideas, a world as hostile to us as anything dreamt of in Des-
cartes’ first Meditation or Marx’s haunted world in which commodities stalk us like 
zombies and “all that is solid melts into the air.” It is in the comedian’s world that 
every step is a pratfall, that every seat has a tack on it, and that our own bodies cons-
pire against us—a rumbling stomach at the lothario’s moment of seduction or our 
limbs becoming the tangled, heavy chains of that clumsy condition we call being hu-
man. Comedy is the knowledge, as hard as it is happy, that being human means being 
humbled. We all share in this knowledge because, living our skepticism, we experien-
ce a world pitched against us, mocking our presumptions of power and relishing our 
vulnerabilities. But the comic alone finds grace in such moments, showing us that the 
world is not to be recovered rapaciously, as in tragedy, but accepted in its risible 
unwieldiness, what Emerson calls its “lubricity.” It is comedy, therefore, which tea-
ches us to forgive the world for its rebuke of us, where forgiveness is not accommoda-
tion or resignation to the humiliations of being alive, but a refusal of despair in the 
face of them. Grief may make idealists of us all, as Emerson writes, but it is despair 
that will deflate our every ideal, which is why Emerson called on the American Scho-
lar not to instruct, but to cheer us, and to cheer us not that we may escape from the 
ugly realities of the world, but that we may go on suffering them, confident that we 
may at last find the genius to match them, and in the end, claim some small victory 
for justice. 	52
		
$ . Emerson, “Experience,” 309.52
CONVERSATIONS 5
End Times According to Stanley Cavell 
[a review essay of Larry Jackson’s Skepticism 
and Redemption: The Political Enactments of 
Stanley Cavell] 
AMIR KHAN 
Unintelligibility. Madness. Death. These are strange and ominous words to lead any 
essay, but the words themselves are not so strange to philosophy, and certainly not to 
anyone with an ear for Stanley Cavell’s voice. Then certainly philosophy uses them in 
a strange way, or, say, in unconventional ways. To assume these words mean what 
they “ordinarily” do (when reading Cavell) is to put on a presumption of drama that is 
not only uncalled for, but romantically irritating. When Cavell says unintelligibility, 
he doesn’t really mean unintelligible; when he says madness, he cannot possibly 
mean madness; and when he says death, he cannot possibly mean death. So what is 
with philosophy’s or Cavell’s insistence on using these words outside of their ordinary 
habitat, particularly when Cavell is so obviously sympathetic to the Wittgensteinian 
plea to bring language back from holiday?   
Does Cavell wish to add extraordinary supplements to words like unintelligibi-
lity, madness, and death, or does he wish for us to read and understand these words 
in precisely their ordinary and natural setting? If the latter, how can this be?  
Put as bluntly and non-romantically as possible: no one would risk unintelligi-
bility (i.e., actually speaking in tongues) for the sake of philosophy. No one would 
risk madness or losing one’s grip on reality for philosophy. No one would risk death, 
or physical extinction, to do philosophy. In their ordinary contexts, these are very bad 
things indeed, so why should philosophy, in explicitly seeking to avoid charges of ro-
manticism, insist on such macabre terms in the first place? But surely a title with the 
word redemption in it cannot help but echo romantic sentiment. But does Jackson 
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(via Cavell) provide too much or too little? In the end, that is, is Cavell’s philosophy 
hopeful or baleful? I can only offer the following: on my reading, upon my unders-
tanding of Jackson’s masterful take on the words and work of Stanley Cavell, one co-
mes away feeling that Cavell holds out on the promise of philosophy, which means 
that in the present, to do philosophy like Cavell, or to see the world as he sees it is to 
commit to a dark vision indeed. Jackson renders Cavell’s work thus: the world is bad, 
in bad shape, and in no way ready for philosophy—which is a strange, unnatural, and 
extraordinary rendering of “redemption” as well. 
Reader, let me be clear: Larry Jackson’s Skepticism and Redemption is a 
tour de force. Despite its remarkable ability to provide suitable signposts for us to 
make our way through the vast (and truly, I mean vast) expanse of Cavell’s thought 
and thinking, Jackson’s book leaves no room, as far as I can tell, for any type of 
emancipatory politics, or politics of solidarity—the hope for which is the driving en-
gine of the piece, particularly for those (like myself) who have managed to interna-
lize disparate realms of Cavell’s thought disparately. Put another way: this book is 
for those who have compartmentalized Cavell’s thinking (on film, on ordinary lan-
guage, on Shakespeare), who have avoided “manipular” attempts to give meaning 
and cohesion to Cavell’s thought as though to do so would be to “enact” some sort 
of philosophical enterprise out of Cavellian spirit. But the promise of a Cavellian 
politics is tantalizing, and Jackson’s book reads in the manner of a philosophical 
caper. He takes us to the end and we are forced to follow along precisely because his 
title promises a politics.  
Which leads to two principal ironies of the book. The first is that it cites Emer-
son: “But I have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts to realize the 
world of thought” (47), which is to say that not much is to be gained by systematizing, 
ontologizing, or methodologizing the world we think, as opposed to the world we 
inhabit. Yet this book is just such a manipular attempt aimed at the world that Ca-
vell thinks. Part of the reason I found myself so engrossed by Jackson’s essay, I think, 
is because it does something I had long resisted doing, something I think Cavell’s 
work specifically uncalls for, i.e., the manipular attempt at constructing a cohesive, 
unified Cavellian ontology (specifically, a political one). The hope of a unified Cavelli-
an politics, and the belief that such a thing could be achieved forced me to draw down 
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some of the defences I had unknowingly put up. Make no mistake: Jackson’s book, 
like most of Cavell’s work, is so skillfully executed that one could easily (mis)construe 
it as dangerous, even diabolical.  
If we are aware of the first irony as we read Jackson’s essay, the second is appa-
rent in hindsight only. The book itself (to which I am doing considerable disservice in 
fleshing out this “spoiler”), in the end, does not leave us with a politics in hand but still 
begging for a politics, despite its well-earned exhortation that we may not have, as of 
yet, earned the right to do politics at all—because even if I, or you, dear reader, have in-
ternalized the political thinking of “everyday” and “ordinary” redemptions necessary to 
truly enact a stance of “skepticism,” it is frightfully apparent that no one else has. Part 
of the revolutionary potential of Cavell’s writings comes in the waiting (patience, and 
patience) for others to come around. The Cavellian lesson brought to bear by Jackson is 
that if this world is not ready to own up to its own words—if this world continues, that 
is, to swallow the words of others in order not to see its own vulnerabilities—then the 
best we can accomplish as a political act is not even the direct calling out of such stan-
ces of cowardice, but the indirect expression of our own inner transformation and re-
cognition of our countrymen’s hollow thoughts and speech.  
If responsibility is the definitive feature of freedom […] then we are not free 
until we have set aside childish words, or rather, ceased to let words speak for 
us, as though they were our parents. Yes, they were here before us and we do 
inherit them: so too must we claim them […]. The epic [Walden] Thoreau wri-
tes is a war over words: words he must capture by living what they mean. Only 
then is he responsible for what he says, only then is he free. Until the nation 
can speak in this way it is not free either. “In religion and politics, literality is 
defeated because we allow our choices to be made for us,” writes Cavell. He 
adds, “in politics we allow ourselves to say, e.g., that a man is a fugitive who is 
merely running from enslavement. That is an attempted choice of meaning, 
not an autonomous choice of words.” […] What does it mean, then, to say […] 
that politics requires the renunciation of our cannibalism? It means no longer 
swallowing the words of others. (214-215) 
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What the nation acts, in its understanding of fugitives and slaves, is not, at least not 
necessarily, the world I think. To claim one’s language is to have the courage to think 
for oneself. It may be obvious enough nowadays that a slave running from enslave-
ment is not a fugitive. But what exactly is a fugitive today? Is an immigrant a fugitive? 
What makes an immigrant illegal?  
But these are heady questions. And while Cavell in Jackson’s hands is deeply 
troubled by America’s sins (slavery and Vietnam), I don’t think Jackson ever promi-
sed heady answers to be articulated elsewhere (say, in our legislatures or at executive 
board meetings). What Jackson did promise, or what we are at the very least tempted 
with, is the possibility that our ordinary and everyday transcendences of injustice 
might result in some version of collective emancipatory politics not as yet-to-be or 
elsewhere, but here, now, in the present: a present politics of individual, everyday, 
ordinary redemptions somehow collectivized and carrying, of course, a bona fide Ca-
vellian stamp of approval.   
Cavell’s entire philosophical project thus begins as the removal of the tragic 
curses of war and racism that plagued America in the 1960s … “We have, as 
tragic figures do, to go back to beginnings,” writes Cavell, “either to un-do or to 
be undone, or to do again the thing which has caused tragedy, as though at 
some point in the past history is stuck, and time marks time there waiting to 
be released.” It is the task of releasing the time, of setting it right by undoing 
America’s curses, that leads Cavell […] to Thoreau’s Walden, a book also writ-
ten in response to an imperialist war (in Mexico) and the evils of racism (as 
slavery); a book also dedicated to claiming a new existence for America. (163) 
Perhaps America’s tragedy, its inability to address the curses which have plagued its 
existence, has been collectivized. Indeed, Jackson’s discussion on what constitutes 
“public” as opposed to “private” tragedy is entirely useful: modern politics became 
“tragic” the moment the idea of political “consent” moved away from the church or 
state into the realm of (secular) politics. The citizen can no longer take for granted 
manipular ontologies ratified by either the church or state as constituting the real. 
What instead marks the real is our own voicing of consent; our consent-to-be-offered, 
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sincerely, genuinely, is now the only authentic political act. In a sense, the modern 
“performance” of political consent means not that we must shun masks but learn to 
embrace the mask proper to us. We must decide which religion suits us, which go-
vernment suits us and in so doing, we are guaranteed to face disappointment becau-
se we will never find the “true” religion (true to me, or to us), nor will we ever find the 
“true” government (true to me, or to us) in the world we inhabit. In the end we do not 
really express consent at all, but dis-consent—i.e., our dissatisfaction with words and 
the world as they stand. Paradoxically, only by so doing are we expressing any sort of 
meaningful consent of any kind (which is, at the very least, a desire to be heard), al-
beit one that cannot be ratified by the state apparatus at all, which, of course, begs 
the question: “Why go on repeating yourself if what you say goes unheeded?” (241) 
If our lives do in fact rest on theater nowadays, as Cavell claims in his reading 
of Hamlet, then redemption will not mean the end of acting, the but the end of 
tired roles and worn out scripts. It will mean, therefore, “to act without per-
forming.” And if theatricality is akin to the fantasy of a private language, in 
which I have perfect control over what I express, then presentness means 
abandoning “the wish for total intelligibility.” It means assuming the risk of 
becoming unintelligible in entering the visible, audible [i.e. public] world I 
share with others; presentness is “the capacity to exist for others, to ackno-
wledge and accept the limitedness of others’ views of oneself.” When I am as 
yet unknown and thus unintelligible to others, all I can do is enact my existen-
ce once more. (153) 
The steps are tricky. First, one must decry or denounce any public ratification of one’s 
words and world. Second, one must be willing to “wage war” with one’s (own) words 
in order to examine what they really mean for society and for oneself. Third, one 
must not then renounce words altogether as inadequate, but find ways and steps to 
ratify one’s disappointment with them publicly, which may be to offer a rebuke, or 
may be, indeed, to offer one’s rebuke in silence as though by refusing to take up and 
use words so cavalierly, one is holding out on the promise of words, or, at the very le-
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ast, the hopes for emancipation and justice that seem to derive from the fact that we, 
as human beings, are creatures fated to use words to express our desires.  
So the true political question becomes not, “How do we achieve perfect 
justice?” or, “Are we on our way to achieving perfect justice?”, but rather, “Is the jus-
tice we have now good enough?” And if it is not, we do not move forward couched 
cozily within some prearranged teleological unfolding that guarantees some future 
emancipation (the standard understanding of “redemption”)—in a sense, prescribing 
the way forward (championing what are, in effect, tired old oppressions, whether of 
“freedom,” “justice,” “equality,” or more degrees of it) but precisely backwards, to 
break down the ways in which we use and understand these phrases in the first place 
as if in our counterfeit understanding of these words lies the true source of unfree-
dom, injustice, and inequality. 
The desire or need for spiritual self-examination requires retiring, for some 
measure of time at least, from the human community of shared language. True politi-
cal consent can only be formed when one is given time and space to contemplate 
one’s own allegiance to the world and words which one finds oneself in by matter of 
sheer contingency. The withdrawal from society, the withdrawal of consent, the desi-
re not to speak, however temporary, are all essential in ensuring one has a public voi-
ce at all.   
[Cavell’s] concept of redemption thus resembles the demand that occupies the 
place of the cogito in Marx: “I am nothing and should be everything,” only, in 
this iteration the actor is no longer the Proletariat. It is America. (15) 
Later, Jackson adds: 
Being outside the order of law means that I risk unintelligibility, that I suffer 
accusations of childishness, madness, illness, criminality, or worse. I have no 
authority, no appeal, no claim to standing beyond a voice or the silent staging 
of my desire and my humanity […]. I feel wronged [or, perhaps, feel others to 
have been wronged] and wish to establish a new standard, surpassing that of 
my society, for measuring human justice. Risking unintelligibility in this realm 
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does not mean that I have given up on making myself understood […]. On the 
contrary, I refuse despair by persisting in my attempt to achieve intelligibility 
outside of the available conditions for political conversation, driven by the fee-
ling that action and intelligibility are impossible within the order of law ... I 
am, as an exile, no one, which is precisely why I can speak for all, why, at that 
moment, “I stand for humanity.” What I called Marx’s cogito becomes this for 
Cavell: I am no one, and I speak as everyone. (25-26) 
Jackson has not the proletariat as nothing, but America. America is in exile, is an 
immigrant, stemming from its original desire to break away from the community of 
European nations to found its own Republic. By virtue of claiming its independence 
in 1776, America took on a massive political risk of unintelligibility; it started from 
nothing in order to one day speak for everyone from a position of perfect justice. 
But clearly Americans don’t think this way. Americans think: I am everything 
and should be. If the goal of philosophy is to get America to consider herself as 
nothing, in order to be everything (say, a philosophical beacon on the hill), or to spe-
ak not for everyone, but, at the very least, for its citizens (if its citizens, that is, de-
mand that America is or become some version of the good city, of Plato’s imagined 
Republic), absolutely no one in America will follow this train of thought, and Cavell’s 
political project, like Thoreau’s, is destined to fail (though perhaps protected and pre-
served by a small coterie of dedicated souls willing to defer, for many more lifetimes 
to be sure, the conditions necessary for Cavell’s words, and Thoreau’s for that matter, 
to be taken up again in future). Thoreau wanted his countrymen to face the founding 
injustices which created slavery and war, denying at least part of the promise of Ame-
rica which serves to paper over its atrocities. One-hundred and twenty-four years la-
ter, Cavell wants his countrymen to do the same, in regards to racism (Civil Rights) 
and war (in Vietnam). But America will continue to deny its sages and forgo opportu-
nities for redress. Now, a full generation and a half after Cavell’s writings in Must We 
Mean What We Say?, America faces many more setbacks, including Ferguson, MO, 
and multiple Vietnams (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria). Indeed, Cavell can no longer 
be construed as providing a warning because the warning has come before, unheard 
then and unheard now. Too late. History is stuck. So what indeed is he doing?  
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In the years that Cavell was writing Must We Mean What We Say? Moses ap-
peared in America perhaps a dozen times; and a dozen times an assassin lur-
ked in the shadows. Rather than hearing its prophets, then, and repenting, 
America refused its mortality altogether, aspired to godlike “awe-inspiring” 
power, and a kingdom, indivisible, where no angel was fallen. (138) 
Jackson’s treatment of Cavell is a philosophical enactment not so much of politics, 
but of love, of self-preservation, and of preserving the other’s voice, in particular, the 
other’s voiced desire as mattering, hence preserving one’s own voice and ensuring 
that it, however lost on the multitudes (and to the present moment), still matters 
also. There is no reason our desires should ever mesh with so-called “political” (i.e., 
legislative) reality. The collective existence of separate individuals is precisely the 
idealized form of the good city, i.e., of life in the democratic polis. Collective emanci-
pation is not the goal; rather, it is the emancipation of individuals on a mass scale 
(one by individual one)—which, in the end, could only be a romantic project, a philo-
sophy suited to spiritual giants, a happy few, and certainly not to the masses. Indeed, 
no mass redemption is possible, which is another way to say that Cavell’s political 
philosophy, rendered exquisitely here by Jackson, leaves no room for emancipatory 
politics. The only thing we can share in solidarity is isolation. It is a politics where 
the hope for redress, redemption, and justice is exclusively spiritual, incapable of ma-
king the leap to the material. It is a philosophy designed not to empower the masses 
but the individual, placing its hopes in the utopian unlikelihood that a good city full 
of citizens whose words have been thoroughly self-examined are not the ones who 
ought to rule over others (as in Plato’s Republic), but ought to populate the city in its 
entirety.  
In order to be an individual and own one’s words, one must face up to one’s 
separateness. Yet it does not follow, or has yet to be established for me convincingly, 
that claiming one’s individuality will, of some political necessity, lead to some type of 
collective emancipation. But then what have we reduced our collective politics to?—
brainless masses following dear Leader? Certainly, whatever politics is, emancipation 
is key, so the real political question is whether one can have a politics of individual 
emancipation (good enough justice, moving backwards) and  collective emancipation 
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(not perfect justice, but something like solidarity, which is the continual communal 
striving towards justice (we can move forward together; we can only move backwards 
alone)), or if the two remain mutually exclusive, the demarcation of each from the 
other routinely buttressed not via the existence of libertarian fascists on the one side 
and totalitarian communists on the other but by the existence of parliamentary de-
mocracies which banally promise to take the best from each, compromising both. In 
Jackson’s assessment, Cavell’s politics makes a case for occupying this space of con-
valescence and “forbearance” guaranteed by parliamentary democracies. It is not a 
challenge of the status quo, but the responsible philosophical survival of its disap-
pointments that is enacted.  
Moreover, to hold out on the promise of philosophy is not to be hopeful about 
the future, which would amount to a romantically trite and exhausted understanding 
of redemption. Rather, one must face philosophy’s continual impotence. We are not 
to mobilize our political disappointment and make further demands for justice in the 
world. Rather, we are demanding of ourselves the fortitude and courage to keep hol-
ding out on the promise of philosophy, of our words to transform not the outer world 
of injustice, but the inner world of thought. By so doing, we have conceded a) that we 
are powerless to change the material conditions of injustice all around us and b) that 
such acknowledgment is the only form of political redemption or victory philosophy 
has the business of cultivating. Not demanding that the world change, but demanding 
that we ourselves change to accommodate a world with such suffering in it with abso-
lutely zero likelihood that the masses will regard such “acts” as redemptive in any way 
(what we are describing, in fact, are not “acts,” but thoughts, which some may regard 
as the only true acts, but certainly not the majority—hence the risk of being unintelli-
gible, of seeming childish).  
So if waging a war on words is first and foremost to wage a war against oneself, 
why oughtn’t we to do it? What is there to lose? Certainly we may lose standing, in-
fluence, authority and these are significant traumas, but are, in the end, superficial. If 
a moral life requires that such a war be waged, what stops even those of us who desire 
a world with justice and redress in it from moving forward (technically, I should say 
“backward”) in thought? What prevents the activists of the world, for example, from 
putting down the picket signs to instead retire to Walden pond?  
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[T]he promise of rebirth or redemption that the phrase may equally convey—
the difference between “wanting this world to stop itself, and wanting all world 
to end” … is a difference as infinitesimal as that between comedy and tragedy: 
just a half step apart; for redemption “presents itself as the dying of the self 
and hence the ending of the world.” This is why we are so reluctant when faced 
with the promise of change to endure its trials; why even our suffering is so 
difficult to give up: “But if I change, I am no longer intact; I die to my world. I 
would rather die.” Making matters worse is the fact that we are rarely able to 
discern whether we have indeed found a new beginning or whether we are only 
in fact at an end, one reason why Hamlet casts such a long shadow over … Ca-
vell. It is the grim, unspoken question that darkens his words. (160-161)  
The question (To be, or not to be?), of course, concerns suicide for the individual; for 
we are talking about not the victory of the sage who manages to get through to the po-
lis, but the one unable to do so, who remains, for a lifetime, unintelligible and exiled 
from others, perhaps even to him/herself. The half-step between comedy and tragedy 
is the same half-step between insanity and wisdom and there is no good reason—if 
one undertakes to visit first principles and wage war against oneself and one’s own 
words—that one will come out victorious. Put another way: if the project of individual 
emancipation can only occur one by individual one, how many deaths without re-
demption are we willing to risk or tolerate to build the good city? How many are we 
prepared to send to the nuthouse?  More pressingly, how many are we prepared to 
send not simply to metaphysical extinction, but to physical extinction as well? The 
promise of parliamentary democracies surely is that we can avoid such needless me-
taphysical suffering by recycling our disappointments back into the apparatus of sta-
te—which means the only victories which count in a democracy are legislative ones—
certainly not spiritual ones. Martin Luther King Jr. did not demand his followers reti-
re to Walden pond; he had them march on Washington and surely we would rather 
see our sons and daughters die marching on Washington than die for philosophy.   
Which is why I insist that this book, however well-intentioned, leaves us 
stranded, in a place akin not to Plato’s Republic, but Dante’s Inferno. The manipular 
attempt to then pull us out of the ninth circle via the political enactments of Cavellian 
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skepticism is unconvincing. Jackson ends his essay on this note of optimism via 
Whitman: 
In scenes of confrontation and acknowledgment [between individuals, of cour-
se, not collectives], we join the conversation of justice, clamorous “multitudes” 
enacting their own existence and also the existence of America each time. “Th-
rough me many long dumb voices, / Voices of the interminable generations of 
prisoners and slaves / Voices of the diseas’d and despairing and of thieves and 
dwarfs” Cavell hears America singing. (283) 
Jackson brings us to the end to be sure, but, perhaps like Hamlet, I do not see a new 
beginning on the horizon. We have reached the end and nothing in Cavell’s philo-
sophy suggests that our humanity will follow; far more likely our viciousness. Unin-
telligibility, madness, death—these are hardly terms with redemptive currency; add 
to these “isolation” and “separateness,” and where are we? The above noted optimism 
is clichéd. I hear more resoundingly Jackson’s words concluding his second chapter, 
which perhaps unknowingly leaves the dark vision of Stanley Cavell breached: 
It may be that the risk in this way of thinking is that you settle for learning 
only forbearance, for transforming yourself alone. But then it must still be 
considered how such transformations can give birth to new worlds (“You are 
different, what you recognize as problems are different, your world is diffe-
rent”: one hopes this is not just a solipsistic delusion) […]. I claimed that lear-
ning how to suffer the world as it is is a necessary condition for changing it […] 
as if desire and true needs are born of suffering the world’s separation. Cavell’s 
reading of indirectness in Emerson and Wittgenstein understands them as te-
aching us to learn suffering (“patience and patience”), where despair is the 
most daunting obstacle in our way, and change requires reconciliation with a 
world of disappointments, the world we converse with. The paragraph from 
“Experience” that counsels patience and speaks of the futility of manipular at-
tempts to realize new worlds, the final paragraph of the essay, concludes:  
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Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat: up again, old heart?—it 
seems to say—there is victory yet for all justice: and the true romance 
which the world exists to realize will be the transformation of genius 
into practical power. 
The idea is the bickering sibling of that other great German Idealist of Emer-
son’s time who writes of “that genius which pushes material force to political 
power.” The difference between them is an Emersonian poetics of weakness: 
the painful knowledge that the revolution is not before us, but always behind 
us, lost and forgotten, its ambitions in tatters; that change cannot be won at all 
costs; that you must go on in spite of your failures, because in an imperfect 
world justice demands of you the discipline, the courage, to fall forever short 
of its ideal. This is what it means for us to reconcile ourselves to the world’s 
separateness and to allow our interests to be transformed by it—a romance as 
fraught and profound as any that Hollywood has ever produced. (48-50) 
Forbearance must be faced alone. Marx is defeated by Emerson before the so-called 
political disappointments of twentieth century. Genius is divorced from material and 
political power. To reconcile ourselves to the world’s separateness is precisely to give 
up on collective emancipation and the goal of the Republic is not to liberate the mas-
ses, but to build a city that is good enough to allow us to bear witness to our own phi-
losophical and political ineptitude. That is perhaps a vision of redemption, even an 
accurate Cavellian vision of redemption. But such enactments of skepticism and se-
parateness are not only a deep compromise with justice, but with politics and collec-
tive solidarity altogether. We remain in Hamlet’s shadow, in patient forbearance. Can 
we rest there? 
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Sore Feet in the City of Light 
LAWRENCE RHU 
for Karen 
Is this some bairro of Parnassus  
That names street after street after poets 
Or just a flight from where we live? 
The airport’s a quick Metro ride away  
From Rua Fernando Pessoa, 
But my fasciitis prompts no song  
On cobblestones where two cops clamp  
Denver boots on two parked cars.  
We met at the school bike rack down yonder  
Where nine streets invoke the Muses  
In New Orleans and Clio’s debate  
With Melpomene and Calliope—  
Epic and tragic history— 
Still rages. General Lee’s lost his place  
On top of the column at Lee Circle  
Where we shared such distances  
As Tucson and Lake Wobegon,  
Mater Dolorosa and Our Lady  
Of Perpetual Responsibility,  
And found our way from job to job,  
To children and family trips out West.  
Memory’s daughters are keeping  
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Their titles down at the river bend. 
The last time we drove through Denver 
Tim hosted us outside at Vincenzo’s. 
His kids both played Frisbee with ours  
And, before we pressed on to Boulder,  
Our pair became their slightly older 
Idea of kindness, according to Tim.  
On the drive back through Denver we dined  
At a sidewalk café in LoDo 
And watched a guy on a penny farthing  
Pedal by in a dress—one of many  
That evening on bikes in drag for Men- 
Can-Wear-Dresses-Too Day. I’d never  
Seen women’s outfits like those guys’  
Since Doolen Junior High’s prom,  
I recall, on Rua Fernando Pessoa  
Where one often wonders,Who am I?  
And why? 
  Ten years before, in our new  
Preowned minivan, our kids were upset.  
They missed the fireworks back home 
As we pressed on through Oklahoma  
Due west to Shamrock, on the Fourth  
Of July, heading to Santa Fe.  
The sun sank in the Panhandle  
While the radio played country songs, 
And darkness dropped down all around.  
Small towns, on both sides of the road,  
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Began kindling up the night sky  
With rockets that sparkled and burst  
With bright streaks and stars. Soon  
Disappointment disappeared  
From the kids’ faces. They gleamed 
Looking out at their windows wide-eyed. 
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Cartesian Auto Body 
LAWRENCE RHU 
“Son of man, can these bones live?” Ez 37:3 
I. 
“The body and the engine are one,” declares  
Dnezivich, the  Senior Specialist  
In Total Loss. “They’re indivisible,  
A single unit.” Naturally, he prevails 
Though nature plays no part in his discourse.  
I haven’t heard so much philosophy  
In years; it promptly silences appeals  
To values dutifully applied in practice: 
Required maintenance performed, as scheduled,  
Every three months or three thousand miles. 
“Please, don’t bother with that bump or scratch,” 
I say to Frank at Suddeth Automotive. 
“We need this van for work and family trips, 
Not for parades, although we love parades.” 
A visitor once peeked beneath the hood  
CONVERSATIONS 5 !111
And raved spontaneously in praise of what,  
To his surprise, he saw and heard inside:  
The clear efficient hum of finely tuned  
Well-oiled parts, each performing its own role, 
Thanks to Frank, Amy, Mike, and John at Suddeth. 
Could partial loss and total be the same?  
II. 
   
Seated by the fire in contemplation, 
Descartes resolved his fierce and vexing doubts. 
How could he not exist if he was doubting  
His own existence? If he did not exist, 
Who was doing the doubting? As for you  
And me or others he might see pass by  
In overcoats and hats outside his window, 
How could he know we were not automata, 
Wearing hats and coats, of course, but still, 
Who could say for sure we were, like him, just folks  
In heavy clothes hustling down chilly streets? 
This dilemma did not lead Descartes to God.  
Although he got there other ways, he left  
Us in the cold—automotons in hats 
And coats. Some things you never know for sure— 
The authorship of Shakespeare’s plays, the birth- 
Place of Obama. What makes me think I know  
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I landed on the shores of light  
In West Penn Hospital? Vertigos of doubt  
Can make heads spin, and quests for absolutes  
Are bound to fail. With standards high as those,  
Descartes himself could not succeed. We know  
Foreseeably for sure that water boils 
At sea level at 212˚, 
But we know we exist from inside out,  
Subjectively. Consider Hecht’s “A Letter,”   
“I have been wondering what you are thinking about  
“And by now suppose, it is certainly not me.”  
Supposition here morphs into certainty  
Only if we trust the speaker. The unnamed  
Addressee alone and only to herself  
Could verify this loner’s abject claim. 
Acknowledgement must own what can’t be proved. 
III. 
But I’m in pain and you can recognize  
My pain. My humanity and yours become  
Discernible through agons such as these,  
However minor. I’m no stoic hero  
Nor am I a self-indulgent whiner.  
I’ll playfully recover from my loss,  
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Absorb the shock, laugh off the arbitrary 
Damage at my insurance agency’s  
Expense of spirit. But, please, give me a moment. 
Salvage yards keep calling me—four times 
Yesterday, three times today. My loss,  
They’ve heard, is total, but their interest  
In my wiped out car belies that drastic claim,  
Making me wonder, What is in this deal 
For everybody else but me? Why strive 
For what’s worth less than its repair will cost? 
A chop shop lady dunned me pleasantly, 
As though the vulture read Miss Manners.  
Dnezivich recited his monadic premise 
Regally, but somehow I forgot his words  
Are only registers of market value.  
Shall I go mad with undue empathy   
Considering such conversations soul-  
To-soul? Please, don’t let me forget again.  
IV. 
In this regard my patience has a limit.  
My driver’s license designates that I’m  
An organ donor. Mortality’s enough  
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To make me glad to share with those in line  
And need of this or that—an eye or hand,  
A lung or liver—spare parts, which become  
Useless to yours truly after my last breath. 
Meanwhile, if it’s utility, not love,  
That brings you near, please, keep away from me 
And from our minivan. Integrity’s 
A task that I’ve been working on for decades  
Now, with mixed results but no surrender. 
Although I set no such high standards  
For our aging storied family Odyssey,  
No rival theorist of value, no Senior  
Specialist in Total Loss may stake  
A claim on any part of me or our  




On 42nd Street, beyond the bright marquee, alight with Hamlet 2,  
We find its star, Steve Coogan. He plays Dana Marschz,  
Who came from Canada to Tucson, my hometown, or so it seems 
At least as much as Hamlet seems a myth of origins 
Enabling our imaginations to conceive of selfhood  
In terms of consciousness as process, self-awareness  
Struggling to proceed, man or woman thinking, 
The American scholar in Wittenberg or Elsinor, Concord or Tucson— 
Wherever that might be or we might find ourselves. 
Skull in hand, Hamlet stops to think, and thinks iconically,  
“Am I the cause of what I cause, the subject of what happens to me?”    
Essays, soliloquies, and cogitos put us in our place in time, 
With mysteries and problems to abide or solve 
Or, bit by bit, address somehow.  
When I think of starting out, I think of Tucson:  
The Old Pueblo, La Fiesta de los Vaqueros, 
The Ash Alley Singers with Linda Ronstadt, 
The Indians’ spring training at Hi Corbett Field  
Nearby the public links. Once, on the first tee, Hoyt Wilhelm 
The famous knuckleballer joined Grandfather Ford and me. 
We played the front nine as a threesome. 
Hamlet then was beyond my ken. 
CONVERSATIONS 5 !116
From the championship tees, of course, the course plays differently, 
And distances in time will change, paradigms will shift. 
When Camden, South Carolina’s own Larry Doby was playing centerfield 
For Cleveland, Grandfather Ford took me to a church event  
To meet Jackie Robinson, who shook my hand with his much larger hand. 
Born in Dundee, oldest of six, reared mainly by his mother— 
A milliner who always wore a bit of ruching at the neck 
And entered by the servants’ door— 
Grandfather skipped high school to help support the family. 
When he worked at Pittsburgh’s Stock Exchange,  
He’d leave at 3 for Forbes Field during baseball season. 
He shagged balls there and posted hits and runs  
On the scoreboard in leftfield. And he had tales to tell  
Of Honus Wagner, the Flying Dutchman, to a wide-eyed boy. 
Later, he became a Baptist minister—American, not Southern,  
He’d interject, as though those two were opposites.  
We might call him a self-made man, but isn’t that heretical? 
Grandfather told congregations modest edifying jokes:  
The car he drove, which bore his name, was good enough for him.  
It took him where he wished to go. Often it took us to Oracle,  
North of Tucson, where he’d pinch-hit for another preacher.  
I may have been star-struck, but I started hearing   
“Wish” and “need” as rivals for whatever I was seeking. 
Was our journey’s end, somehow or not, achieved  
Step after step along the way? Or, even now, am I, retrospectively, 
Getting ahead of myself, out front and out of sync? 
On 42nd Street, beyond the bright marquee, alight with Hamlet 2,  
We find Dana Marschz, who came from Canada to Tucson,  
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“Where,” he says, “dreams go to die.” Yet he proved otherwise,  
Directing West Mesa High’s production all the way  
To the Great White Way—and adding Jesus to the monstrous mix.  
There, spectacularly, it flops, 
So Dana seeks to minimize his students’ disappointment,  
“No matter where you go, it will always be better than Tucson.”  
There’s no West Mesa High in Tucson, Mesa is near Phoenix,  
Hamlet 2 was filmed in Albuquerque. 
          Still I sing with gratitude for prehistorical deeds.  
In the myth that heals my mind, they count. Their sum’s a figure in some cosmic tally. 
The practice range and public links at East Broadway  
And Alvernon define the real estate where I worked hard at play.  
Grandfather nursed my dreams as though they were his own  
And dreaming seems enough with such a guide to start  
From somewhere and to move ahead from there. 
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“This Most Human Predicament”: Cavell on 
Language, Intention, and Desire in Shakespeare 
RICHARD ELDRIDGE 
In the second paragraph of “The Avoidance of Love,” the earliest of his essays on 
Shakespeare, Cavell asks, “What has discouraged attention from investigations of 
character?” in Shakespeare criticism of the mid-twentieth century. “What […] has 
[instead] specifically motivated an absorbing attention to words?”, as in the criticism 
of William Empson and G. Wilson Knight. The answer that Cavell offers is that it is 
“the merest assumption,” foisted off on us “by some philosophy or other, that [liter-
ary] characters are not people, [and] that what can be known about people cannot be 
known about characters” (DK, 40).  Cavell then goes on to challenge this assumption 1
by noting that it is at the very least quite natural “to account for the behavior of char-
acters” by applying “to them [psychological predicates, like ‘is in pain,’ ‘is ironic,’ ‘is 
jealous,’ and ‘is thinking of …’” (DK, 40). 
In one sense, then, Cavell is committed instead to treating characters as or as 
importantly like real people. This might well raise the worry that criticism based on this 
commitment is slack, inattentive, and emptily impressionistic relative to the real work 
of the plays, as if the practitioner of this criticism has somehow forgotten that plays are 
made materially out of words. If we are left only with the thoughts, say, that Hamlet is 
melancholy, Coriolanus is angry, or Othello is jealous, this worry might well be justi-
fied. Kenneth Burke, for example, charges the character criticism or “portraiture” prac-
ticed by A. C. Bradley and Samuel Johnson with just this kind of empty impressionism. 
$ . All references to Cavell’s Shakespeare essays will be to the appearance in Disowning Knowledge: In 1
Seven Plays of Shakespeare, updated edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Stanley 
Bates usefully challenges the assumption that characters are not people and argues that our very idea 
of what a character is is formed as strongly by our experience of figures in literary texts, where plot 
abstracts and highlights related but temporally separated displays of temperament, interest, and son 
on, as by experience of actually existing people. “Character,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
and Literature, ed. Richard Eldridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 393-419.
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The risk in “portraiture” of the Bradleyan sort (and Samuel Johnson has done 
it admirably too, also with reference to Othello) is that the critic ends where he 
should begin. […] Let the critic be as impressionistic as he wants, if he but re-
alize that his impressions are the beginning of his task as a critic, not the end 
of it. Indeed, the richer his impressions the better, if he goes on to show how 
the author produced them. But the great risk in “conclusive” statements about 
a work is that they give us the feeling of conclusions when the real work of 
analysis is still before us.  2
Here, for Burke, the real work of analysis must consist not in having impressions of 
characters as types, but instead in close attention to the specific words that Shake-
speare or any other dramatist has used to make the characters who they are. 
As Cavell rightly remarks on behalf of Coleridge and Bradley, however, and in 
turn also on behalf of the linguistic criticism of Empson and Wilson Knight, the as-
sumption that interest in characters competes with interest in their specific words 
should surely be rejected. 
Can Coleridge or Bradley really be understood as interested in characters 
rather than in the words of the play; or are the writings of Empson or G. Wil-
son Knight well used in saying that they are interested in what is happening in 
the words rather than what is happening in the speakers of the words? […] 
The most curious feature of the shift and conflict between character criticism 
and verbal analysis is that it should have taken place at all. How could any se-
rious critic ever have forgotten that to care about specific characters is to care 
about the utterly specific words they say when and as they say them; or that we 
care about the utterly specific words of a play because certain men and women 
are having to give voice to them. Yet apparently both frequently happen. My 
purpose here is not to urge that in reading Shakespeare’s plays one put words 
back into the characters speaking them, and replace characters from our pos-
session back into their words. The point is rather to learn something about 
what prevents these commendable activities from taking place. (DK, 39, 41) 
$ . Kenneth Burke, “Othello: An Essay to Illustrate a Method,” in Kenneth Burke on Shakespeare, ed. 2
Scott L. Newstok (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2007), 85.
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As Cavell’s engagements with Shakespeare develop throughout the essays that 
compose Disowning Knowledge, it emerges that the sorts of things that prevent 
these commendable activities include a materialist metaphysics (according to which 
the only real thing composing a play is pattern of ink on paper and the only thing 
composing an action is a bodily motion with an inner material cause) plus a kind of 
self-protective fear of engagement on the parts of readers, who might find their 
metaphysical and moral commitments challenged by the thought that some charac-
ters in dramas make available exemplarily valuable or horrific possibilities of action 
as such. As readers, that is, we tend to protect ourselves by covertly assuming mod-
els of reality, knowledge, and self that may be insupportable and that express an 
overriding commitment to the value of control, as achievable by detached internal 
intelligence facing off against inert, mere material nature. (Here the metaphysics 
and the fear may be internally related: fear of exposure to moral criticism of oneself 
by the text may motivate the pursuit of control over it, and commitment to de-
tached control may help to suppress fear of exposure.) The work of challenging both 
materialist metaphysics and self-protective fears via readings of Shakespeare’s 
plays then both requires and centers on the commendable activities of putting the 
words back into the characters speaking them and replacing characters from our 
(too-knowing) possession back into their self-possession in, by, and through their 
words. Or as Cavell puts it in the Coriolanus essay in his most direct methodologi-
cal remark, 
I might characterize my intention in spelling out what I call these fantasies [of 
Coriolanus] as an attempt to get at the origin of words, not the origin of their 
meaning exactly but of their production, of the value they have when and 
where they occur. I have characterized something like this ambition of criti-
cism variously over the years, and related it to what I understand as the char-
acteristic procedure of ordinary language philosophy (DK, 156). 
From the very beginning of his career, Cavell’s understanding of the characteristic 
procedure of ordinary language philosophy involved less a commitment to demotic 
ordinary speech as such, as a norm for all speech situations, than a psychoanalytically 
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inflected commitment to figuring out why anyone might utter exactly these words 
within a very specific speech situation.  This commitment on Cavell’s part has evi3 -
dent affinities with any dramatist’s commitment to, and with Shakespeare’s genius 
for, getting exactly right the words that a genuinely human character within certain 
straits of circumstance, character, passion, and verbal talent would say when.  4
That ordinary language must be both available as a vehicle for communication 
and for meaningful interaction among subjects, yet also open to change and never 
fully under the control of any individual subject, is a dominant theme of The Claim of 
Reason, especially of Chapter VII, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language.” 
Language must be, as Cavell puts it there, both stable enough to permit successful 
communicative and expressive use and tolerant of change. Nothing—no putative uni-
versal or fixed convention—can function as the meaning of a word, such that if one 
just knew that exact entity or fixed fact associated with the word, then one could be 
absolutely assured of the conditions of its correct application and so immunized 
against even the possibility of making a mistake. Or as Cavell picks up the thought in 
Disowning Knowledge: 
words recur in foretellable contexts; there could be no words otherwise; and 
no intentions otherwise, none beyond the, let me say, natural expression of in-
stinct; nothing would be an expression of desire, or ambition, or the making of 
a promise, or the acceptance of a prophecy. Unpredictable recurrence is not a 
sign of language’s ambiguity but is a fact of language as such, that there are 
words (DK, 231-32). 
  
This ontological fact about language—that it is both stable and tolerant, and that lin-
guistic meaning depends on nothing more or less than human subjects continuing 
well enough and intelligibly enough to invest their recognitions, interests, and pas-
sions in what is mostly ordinarily done with words, even while change in usage is 
$ . On the role of Freud’s work in shaping Cavell’s thinking about specific uses of language and how to 3
hear their many often multivalent and conflicting meanings, see Richard Eldridge, “Criticism and the 
Risk of the Self: Stanley Cavell’s Modernism and Elizabeth Bishop’s,” in Stanley Cavell: Philosophy, 
Literature and Criticism, eds. James Loxley and Andrew Taylor (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2011), 92-105.
$ . Stephen Greenblatt powerfully describes the development of what he calls Shakespeare’s “new tech4 -
nique of radical excision” enabling “an intense representation of inwardness” in his essay “The Death of 
Hamnet and the Making of Hamlet,” The New York Review of Books (October 21, 2004), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/10/21/the-death-of-hamnet-and-the-making-of-hamlet.
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possible–then has immediate consequences for the life of human subjects as such. 
One becomes a distinctively human subject–or enters into the role of a discursive, de-
liberating, reflective, subject, as opposed to being simply an empirically identifiable 
biological human being–over time, through training, by imitatively taking up the pos-
sibilities of communication and expression that come to dawn on the infant as mani-
fest in the behaviors of grownups. Grownups being what they are, and relations with 
them on the part of infants being what they are, the development of a sense of what it 
is correct to say when is bound up with conflicting demands made on the infant and 
with the infant’s desperate wish to please parents and others who make these con-
flicting demands. Adventure and a sense of dawning cognitive, communicative, and 
expressive power are crossed for the infant with anxiety and frustration, as an ego de-
velops caught between libidinal impulses and superego commands and prohibitions 
that are internalizations of the demands of others.  5
One natural reaction to the agon of entry into language and into the life of a 
human subject is a wish to know absolutely and to have absolute control of the condi-
. For an excellent survey of subject development that brings together Cavell’s work on language with 5
Freud’s developmental psychology, see Marcia Cavell, Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). A second dramatic picture of subject de-
velopment as it occurs through learning language within a field of contestation and accommodation oc-
curs in R. G. Collingwood’s Hegel- and Spinoza-inspired account of language learning in The Principles 
of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 227-228, 239-240. Finally, compare Charles Petersen’s very apt 
summary of Cavell’s Freudian-inflected understanding of the stages of subject development: First, an 
ambition [Cavell] finds fundamental to the human condition: the desire to make the world more present, 
to experience the world even more directly, to know that another loves you, say, to the same degree that 
you love him. Second, since making the world more present becomes impossible, and we cannot know 
the love of another in the same way we know our love for that other, we arrive at the feeling of fraudu-
lence (where others, since we can’t confirm their love, can’t confirm our love, so we doubt that even we 
do love), and skepticism (where others, since we can’t confirm their existence, can’t confirm our exis-
tence, so we doubt that we exist). Ever since Descartes first asked how he could be certain the world was 
not the work of a demon—the famous line of inquiry that led to modern skepticism—this problem has 
seemed little more than an intellectual exercise. Cavell makes skepticism fundamental, a relation to the 
world that comes not from the intellect but from (frustrated) desire. The third stage, then, is the attempt 
by philosophers (and writers of all kinds) to solve skepticism, to rid themselves of doubt and achieve cer-
tainty by abstracting the world, which Cavell interprets as a redoubling of skepticism—an attempt to 
again make the world more present not by acknowledging that frustrated first attempt but by ignoring it, 
or avenging it, “a kind of violence the human mind performs in response to its discovery of its 
limitation.” This is Cavell’s diagnosis of logical positivism, the philosophy of his peers. Next follows the 
fourth stage, represented by the work of the ordinary language philosophers: an attempt to return to all 
that had been left behind through the abstraction of everyday life. But this return is radically altered by 
the initial run-in with skepticism, such that what had been ordinary becomes uncanny, and the philoso-
phers of ordinary language, as it were, discover for the first time the ordinary, the everyday, all that had 
previously been taken for granted. They thus point the way, though without going far enough. After skep-
ticism, Cavell writes, “the everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appear […] lost to us”; but the 
answer to skepticism is not a “philosophical construction,” not a treatise or a single technique, but the 
wholesale “reconstruction or resettlement of the everyday.”  “Must We Mean What We Say?: On Stanley 
Cavell,” n+1, (11 February 2013), https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/must-we-mean-
what-we-say.
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tions of linguistic-discursive-judgmental performance and of the actions that follow 
from judgment. This wish is the source of philosophy’s repeated and repeatedly frus-
trated attempts to make contact with absolute givens that determine correct judg-
ment. Plato’s talk of abstract forms, Aristotle’s of forms immanent in nature, 
Aquinas’s of divine Providence, Descartes’s of clear and distinct perceptions, Hegel’s 
of the Absolute, and Marx’s of species-being are all ways of giving expression to this 
natural wish that remains unappeasable within the ambit of ordinary experience. 
They promise, but in fact fail to yield, understanding of and resonance with some-
thing as a source of absolute assurance and orientation in one’s life as a subject. Al-
ternatively one might accept one’s complete powerlessness and ability to judge and 
act according to reason by embracing Humean skepticism and naturalism. Here one 
is promised freedom from responsibility for orientations and relationships, but with 
the implausible cost of being able to do nothing, as if all one’s bodily motions and ut-
terances were necessarily no more actively formed or alterable than is the turning 
green of leaves when chlorophyll production diminishes with falling temperatures. 
Both these flawed strategies for coping with the agon of the inheritance of lan-
guage are absolutist, in resting on an all-or-nothing assumption. Either we are, or can 
become, absolute masters, or we are absolute victims. But this all-or-nothing as-
sumption is the very thought that should be rejected. We are, instead, always at stake 
and at risk in judgment and in action (even if sometimes the stakes are low and easily 
met). We cannot stand on self-enclosed, internalized intentions (formed either under 
contact with absolutes or passively under conventions); we always mean more in 
what we say and do than we can fully control, and we are always responsible for com-
ing to reasonable enough terms with that fact. That we must mean what we say is 
both a description of commitments enacted in judgment and action that outrun our 
foresight and a normative demand to take responsibility for our commitments as best 
we can with our finite foresight and finite accomplished powers.  “Intension [a mean6 -
$ . Anthony J. Cascardi aptly notes that “The disclosure of our commitments in what we say, together 6
with an account of what it means to honor or to skirt them, is as important as anything in Cavell’s 
work.  …Cavell portrays his engagements with Shakespeare as unavoidable because it is Shakespeare 
who, above all writers, explores the full range of the commitments that language entails. The power of 
Shakespeare’s work rests on his ability to envision characters who live out the fate of their words re-
lentlessly, without compromise or escape, or who suffer disasterously from their failure to do 
so.” (“’Disowning Knowledge’: Cavell on Shakespeare,” in Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Eldridge (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 190-205, at 190.
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ing-entity grasped and enclosed within the subject] is not a substitute for intention 
[or what is always expressed and at stake in action],” as Cavell puts in in “Must We 
Mean What We Say?”;  we should reject the thought that “if intention counts for any7 -
thing in meaning, it counts for everything” (DK, 240). Or, in a wonderful question 
that occurs in the collection In Quest of the Ordinary, “Is W. C. Fields our only alter-
native to Humpty Dumpty?”  The standing fact of our lives with language as human 8
subjects, as Disowning Knowledge puts it, is that 
you always tell more and tell less than you know. Wittgenstein’s Investigations 
draws this most human predicament into philosophy, forever returning to phi-
losophy’s ambivalence, let me call it, as between wanting to tell more than 
words can say and wanting to evade telling altogether—an ambivalence epito-
mized in the wish to speak “outside language games,” a wish for language to 
do, the mind to be) everything and nothing. Here I think again of Emerson’s 
wonderful saying in which he detects the breath of virtue and vice that our 
character “emits” at every moment, words so to speak always before and be-
yond themselves, essentially and unpredictably recurrent, say rhythmic, fuller 
of meaning than can be exhausted (DK, 201).  
Within this most human predicament, character and one’s uses of language in judg-
ments, together with the actions that express them, are each other’s obverse and re-
verse, each being and meaning what they are only in relation to each other. Burdened 
by multiple, conflicting demands, coming from other subjects, freighted with anxi-
eties, and haunted by fantasies, yet in possession of some possibilities of agency and 
expression, our words–anyone’s words–must at some level reveal our complex lives 
as subjects.  9
$ . Cavell, “Must We Mean What We Say?,” in Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: Charles 7
Scribner’s Sons, 1969), 29.
$ . Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even (Poe, Descartes, Emerson), in Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary 8
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 117. The thought here, of course, is that there is some 
alternative open to us between Humpty Dumpty’s world- and other-denying claim to be absolute mas-
ter of what words mean and W. C. Fields’s sullen, depressive, alcoholic resentfulness at the antics of 
children and café waitresses.
$ . Cascardi registers this point in noting that “Cavell’s analyses of Shakespeare are rooted in a convic9 -
tion that Shakespeare’s characters must mean what they say, and mean it thoroughly, unless of course 
they are in a posture of avoidance, in which case their words may reveal whatever it is they might wish 
to disown. It bears upon us as readers and critics of these plays to suppose this and nothing 
less.” (“’Disowning Knowledge’: Cavell on Shakespeare, 193.)
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This most human predicament is arguably felt to be more pressing in moderni-
ty, from say roughly the early 14th century in Italy (Petrarch) onwards, as emerging 
transportation networks, developing urbanization, and improved technologies of 
production (themselves all resting on skill development in pursuit of genuine human 
interests) begin to make less repetitively local and more diverse and skill-based social 
identities available.  But it is also arguably an ontological predicament that attaches 10
to human life with language as such, with economic scarcities and facts of coercive 
power sometimes acting to inhibit the emergence of a felt sense of this predicament. 
A sense of human life as open to exercises of creative power and conversion of inter-
est is certainly evident as early as in the Platonic texts and in early Christianity, as 
well as in modernity.  
For those caught within this predicament who have both a strong sense of it 
and possess substantial imaginative power and self-discipline, so that they might in-
augurate new possibilities of life, there is a natural tendency to experience what 
Cavell elsewhere calls the uncanniness of the ordinary: a sense that  
the everyday is ordinary because, after all, it is our habit, or habitat; but since 
that very inhabitation is from time to time perceptible to us–we who have con-
structed it–as extraordinary [sometimes in its decadence and resistance to full 
expressions of creative individuality]–, we conceive that some place elsewhere, 
or this place otherwise constructed, must be what is ordinary to us, must be 
what romantics–of course including both E.T. and Nicholas Nickleby’s alter 
ego Smike–call “home.”  11
$ . Jay Bernstein dwells on Cavell’s perception that modernity is an age of subjectivity prominently 10
foregrounded and individualized, but therein also prominently detached from love and community. 
Cavell’s “idea of saving ‘love for the world [until it is responsive again]’ is intended as a way of express-
ing, at least, that love of the world is no longer possible because the world is no longer lovable, […] and 
hence that our attachment to life, however fierce and insistent, is smaller, meaner, narrower. […] 
[Cavell’s claim is] that love, or what we think of as love, and subjectivity as we have inherited it from 
the exemplary instances of Hamlet and Descartes, are all but incommensurable. […] Hamlet begins, 
and so modernity begins, with the loss of the king-father and the queen-mother, that is, not only with 
the loss of the ideal god-like father and goddess-like mother, but thereby with the loss of father and 
mother as the (representative) sources of ideality, sources of meaningful order.” (“How Tragedy Ends,” 
in Stanley Cavell: Philosophy, Literature, and Criticism, 106-122, at 106, 108, citing Cavell, “A Matter 
of Meaning It,” in Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 213-237, at 229.)
$ . Cavell, “The Philosopher in American Life, “ in Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 9.11
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Within the grip of this sense, there is then for those with visionary power a standing 
tendency to deny the significance of the fallen ordinary as it stands in favor of the 
pursuit of a reformed, different, more meaningful ordinary. Both the skeptic’s repu-
diations of ordinary knowledge and the systematizing philosopher’s turn to a world of 
forms or the will of God or a world of absolutized mathematical physics are disci-
plined efforts to deny the significance of the ordinary. 
The systematizing philosopher’s efforts at radically new intelligibility founder, 
however,  and there is, by Cavell’s lights, no intellectual way out of this condition: 12
the truth of skepticism–its correct perception that meaningfulness is not as fully 
present and lived as it is felt it ought to be; its “expression of an awareness that pre-
sentness was threatened, gone” (DK, 95)–is “that while criteria provide conditions of 
(shared) speech, they do not provide an answer to skeptical doubt” (DK, 205-6). 
From within either the skeptical or the systematizing impulse,  “acknowledging that 13
the world exists, that you know for yourself that it is yours, is not so clear a 
process” (DK, 203). Skepticism–more honestly and directly so than its systematizing 
double and rival–is “an intellectualization of some prior intimation” of lost or absent 
meaningfulness (DK, 206). It is “an expression of the human wish to escape the 
bounds or bonds of the human, if not from above then from below, […] the human 
craving for, and horror of, the inhuman, of limitlessness, of monstrousness” (DK 
229). It is “a power that all who possess language possess and may desire: to dissoci-
ate oneself, excommunicate oneself from the community, in whose agreement, mutu-
al attunement, words exist,” for the sake of a better one, or, failing that, for the sake 
of intactness, privacy, and (fantasized) invulnerability. Skeptics at times are we all. 
Shakespearean tragedy is then “an interpretation of what skepticism is an in-
terpretation of”: our human predicament, that we live within “the human fatedness to 
$ . In Eldridge, “Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism,” I trace, fol12 -
lowing Cavell, the continual surging forth of this effort and its foundering in Philosophical Investiga-
tions.
$ . Cascardi notes correctly  that “Cavell’s work is to dismantle the opposition between skepticism and 13
epistemology, rather than to oppose skepticism by proposing an alternative to epistemology.  ….In 
Cavell’s readings, Shakespearean tragedy and romance are interpreted as presenting openings into the 
problems of skepticism and knowledge that lie beyond, or beneath, what philosophy conventionally 
imagines to be at stake in them. […] Shakespeare’s texts ask us to take account of the full measure of 
what skepticism means and thereby challenge us to confront those things for which epistemology has 
come to be a cover. […] What epistemology avoids must be something that ‘knowing’ cannot provide. 
Indeed, knowing serves as the excuse, the cover, or the alibi for what ought to be 
acknowledged.” (“’Disowning Knowledge’: Cavell on Shakespeare,” pp. 191, 192, 194.
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significance, […] victims of intelligibility,” both its fact and its limits. (DK 5, 95).  14
Hence Cavell’s character criticism is not an impressionistic encounter with singular 
eccentricities or, as it were, denizens of possible worlds. It is instead a criticism of 
human character, fated always to partial significance, as it appears within an individ-
ual within a particular set of highly straitened circumstances, ambitions, power, and 
desire. Lear’s skeptical impulse is toward withdrawal and hiddenness, an “attempt to 
avoid recognition, the shame of exposure, the threat of self-revelation” (DK, 58). 
Coriolanus’s takes the form of “disgust with the world, […] a vision of communication 
as contamination, the discovery that human existence is inherently 
undistinguished” (DK, 12). Macbeth’s seeks “deeds done in the doing without conse-
quence, when surcease is success, [in name of] a wish for there to be no human ac-
tion, no separation of consequence from intention, no gratification of desire, no 
showing of one’s hand in what happens […]–a wish to escape the human” (DK, 233). 
Othello’s takes the form of murderous jealousy driven by a wish to preserve his in-
tactness, apartness, and invulnerability to the claims of ordinary love. 
Happily, however, we are not fully fated to follow these figures in their shames, 
disgusts, and murderous rages. In his sunniest book, Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell 
describes how some couples, through a combination of luck, wit, readiness to have 
fun, and acceptance of chastenings, may “trace the progress from narcissism and in-
cestuous privacy to objectivity and the acknowledgment of otherness as the path and 
goal of human happiness.”  Skills in managing this progress, are, however, fragile, 15
and we live “between avoidance and acknowledgment,” and so open to being caught 
to various degrees within both the tragic skepticisms of Lear, Coriolanus, Macbeth, 
and Othello and the happinesses in joint purposiveness of Cary Grant and Katherine 
Hepburn, Cary Grant and Irene Dunne, and Clark Gable and Claudette Colbert. This 
betweenness–our human predicament, our fatedness to (limited) intelligibility and to 
$ . This should not rule out the further thoughts that men and women, say, or the masculine and the 14
feminine, may experience this fatedness differently. As Cascardi puts it, “The idea, not inconsistent 
with some feminisms, is that men are rather less certain than women of their bodily existence and con-
tinuity with others, and in the face of those uncertainties are drawn to what the world has come to call 
‘heroism,’ ‘achievement,’ or ‘originality.’” (“’Disowning Knowledge’: Cavell on Shakespeare,” p. 199. It 
is surely no accident that Shakespeare’s tragic protagonists are (all but) all men.
$ . Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni15 -
versity Press, 1981), p. 102. Derek Gottlieb, in Skepticism and Belonging in Shakespeare’s Comedies 
(London: Routledge, 2016) follows out this thought in taking Cavell’s work in Pursuits of Happiness to 
provide a lens for re-reading Shakespeare’s major comedies, themselves a major inspiration (by way of 
Northrop Frye) for Cavell’s comedy of remarriage book.
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fantasies of overcoming or escaping it–then entails its continual expression in our 
lives and its continual expression and rescrutinizing in the art that engages with our 
lives. “Apart from the wish for selfhood,” as always to be more fitly achieved, Cavell 
writes, “hence the always simultaneous granting of otherness, I do not understand 
the value of art. Apart from this wish and its achievement, art is exhibition.”  Dis16 -
owning Knowledge is Cavell’s account of Shakespeare’s art, and its tracking major 
forms of the accomplishment of selfhood under the tragic but all too human condi-
tions of domination by a wish for absolute orientation, assurance, and control.
$ . Cavell, The World Viewed, enlarged edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 22.16
